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ABSTRACT
This thesis applies discrete choice techniques to an analysis of
housing demand in the United States and West Germany. Housing demand
comprises the choices of household formation, tenure, type of
structure, and size and quality of dwelling. We will focus on
peculiarities of housing demand which have found little attention in
the otherwise ample literature on housing demand. Usage of similar
surveys in the United States and West Germany allow us to make
comparisons between the two countries and to identify mechanisms which
are concealed by examining only one country.
The multidimensional heterogeneity of housing demand
possibilities suggests the usage of discrete choice techniques, in
particular hierarchically nested choice models. The theory and
estimation of nested multinomial logit models is reviewed &nd
extended.
Household formation as a dimension in housing demand renders
household based models inappropriate. A model which simultaneously
determines headship status and conventional housing demand is
developed and estimated for U. S. data. Simulations mimicking the
Experimental Housing Allowance Program underscore the importance of
household formation as a factor in housing demand.
The tenant-1andlord relationship over time is examined.
Empirical evidence points to the eXistence of tenure discounts,
1eading to a bias in conventional price specifications 0 A
microeconomic model highlights the potential misinterpretations in
housing market analysis when tenure discounts are disregarded. As
illustration, we evaluate the German rent and eviction control
legislation.
Finally, we compare housing choices in the United States and West
Germany. We apply a common analytical model on comparable data sets
to examine the differences in tenure choice and size demand. Using
this model, we try to isolate behavioral from institutional
differences.
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1.1 SUbstantive Issues
This thesis investigates the demand for housing as a
heterogeneous commodity. We will focus on the demand side of the
housing market in most of our empirical work and restrict the analysis
to partial models, that is, on potential demand under perfect elastic
supply. This long run analysis is in tune with the use of two large
cross-sectional data sets and their interpretation as steady state
equilibria: the Annual Housing Survey in the United States and the
One Percent Sample in West Germany. The only deviation from our
concentration on demand only will be in the theoretical model of the
nature of those steady state equilibria.
To capture the heterogeneity of the commodity housing we will
introduce a comprehensive notion of what housing demand consists of:
it includes the choices of quality, size, tenure, and headship status.
We will not consider choice of location, however, and we will
concentrate on large metropolitan areas.
Although housing demand is a well studied field, there are still
a host of unresolved sUbstantive issues. Having introduced the notion
of the commodity housing as a broad class of different housing
categories or alternatives, a general issue is the question of
substitutability among these categories. In Joan Robinson 9 s (1933)
words, we are looking for the gaps in the chain of SUbstitutes. Do
dwellings for smaller dwellings inpeople easily substitute larger
response to price increases, or do they switch tenure? Does the
- 12 -
SUbstitutability among housing alternatives change with the life
cycle? Are there differences in behavior between the United States
and West Germany?
Furthermore, how does household formation as a dimension of
housing demand fit into the chain of substitutes? Is household
formation responsive to price changes in the rental and owner markets?
Does this response depend on the stage in the life cycle or on
demographic characteristics?
Apart from interest in the structure of a comprehensive housing
demand per se, we might ask ourselves how this structure is reflected
in poliCy analysis. The tax codes in both countries are asymmetric in
their treatment of owner-occupancy versus rental housing, but it is
not clear whether all of the observed preferences in the tenure choice
can be explained by taxes alone. Would a drastic tax change induce a
drastic change in the preference for tenure? A comparison and West
Germany and the United States seems to be of particular interest due
to their very different proportions of owner-occupancy (1978: u.s.:
65.2 percent, Germany: 36.3 percent). Are there repercussions in the
other dimensions of housing choice? What about the response of
household formation to changes in the tax code? And, more interesting
for the latter dimension, is there a response to direct demand
subsidies like housing allowances? Is the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program flawed in its complete ignorance of household
formation?
- 13 -
A final topic of this thesis and another red thread through the
five chapters is the question of what the proper price is for this
heterogeneous and durable good. In the last Chapter, we will use
hedonic indexes to capture heterogeneity, an at least empirically
resolved issue. However, the durability of housing has implications
on intertemporal pricing which are not well understood. Is there
price dispersion in the housing market? How can it be explained? Can
different explanations be empirically tested against each other? How
does the eXistence of price dispersion affect our knowledge of price
responsiveness? And finally, do we have to reevaluate policy analysis
in the presence of price dispersion? How does normative analysis of
rent and eviction control change in a non-walrasian market With price
dispersion?
- 14 -
1.2 Methodological Issues
The comprehensive notion of housing demand as the choice among a
collection of heterogeneous alternatives raises many methodological
issues. There is the question of the appropriate functional form for
housing demand equations which include the qualitative and
quantitative components of the commodity housing. We will resolve
this question in simply dividing the qualitative dimensions into
sufficient of discrete categories, and proceed with large discrete
choice models.
However, the specification of large discrete choice models is
closely related to the question of sUbstitutability among the choices
which was raised in the previous section. Is there a feasible
compromise between choice models which are easy to compute but impose
strict cross-substitution patterns, and choice models which leave
freedom for the cross-substitution effects but are computationally
intractable? We will show that nested multinomial logit models
(McFadden, 1978) constitute such a compromise in housing demand
analysis. The unresolved issues at stake is the efficiency loss of
the sequential estimation technique and the viability of full
information maximum likelihood. A further theoretical issue is
whether the estimation results can be rationalized by a highly
structural economic choice model, the random utility hypothesis.
Household formation as a part of housing demand raises the
question of how usable our household based surveys are. The entity
- 15 -
"household" is endogenous and we face a potential self selection bias
in our estimations. How can we resolve this sample selection problem?
Is it possible to avoid a structural model of household formation
which is bound to be poorly estimable due to our poor knowledge about
this process and will result in a large noise-to-signal ratio? Can we
find a reduced form approach with just enough structure to resolve the
endoqeneity problem?
A final methodological issue is the handling of price dispersion
generated by intertemporal processes when only a single cross section
of observations is available. How large is the potential bias in
. estimations ignoring price dispersion?
results?
How do we get unbiased
- 16 -
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized in four chapters. The
first of these chapters is devoted to the microeconornic and
econometric underpinnings of our basic tool, the nested multinomial
logit demand functions. The microeconomic part includes the
compatibility of t~ese demand functions with random utility
maximization, the econometric part discusses the use of fUll
information maximum likelihood estimation.
Chapter Three applies the demand model on the joint choice of
household formation, tenure, and size of dwelling to three SMSA's in
the United States to answer the question of how price responsive our
comprehensive housing demand is. Some microsimulation results
illustrate public poliCy implications.
Cnapter Four is a digression on the dynamic nature of the rental
housing market. This chapter, mainly microecono~ic theory, is
intended as a motivation and guidance to analyse price dispersion
generated by a complicated intertemporal interaction of the demand and
supply side.
Finally, Chapter Five applies all the tools we have collected so
far on an analytic comparison of housing demand in West Germany and
the United States: A common hierarchical choice model for both
countries embodies hedonic rent indexes to capture the heteroge~eity
of the housing stock and corrects for price dispersion in both
- 17 -
countries.
Each chapter contains an introductory section to present the
issues at stake, and a conclusion to summarize the results. An
appendix lists the FORTRAN source of the full information maximum
likelihood estimation program for nested multinomial logit models in
random and choice based samples.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BASIC TOOL: NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT DEMAND FUNCTIONS
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2.1 Introduction: Discrete Choice Description of Housing Demand
Housing or, more precise, the service stream from a housing unit,
is a heterogeneous commodity. Some dimensions, as size or age of
structure, are measured on a continuous scale, others, as tenure or
type of structure, are discrete properties. Measuring the volume of
housing services as housing expenditure essentially ignores this
heterogeneity, and for a large number of policy purposes, the
distribution of housing consumpti.on into qualitatively different
categories is of more interest than an aggregate quantitative measure
of housing expenditures alone. The most popUlar example of the
interest in qualitative dimensions is the choice between renting and
owning, and the response of this tenure choice to federal income tax
treatment. (See Laidler (1969), Rosen (1979), Rosen and Rosen (1980),
Henderson and Ioannides (1983).)
We can go one step further: not only the choice of tenure, but
also the choices among other continuous or discrete ch·~racteristics of
a housing unit will be affected by taxes and subsidies. Furthermore,
the decision whether to form an autonomous household at all may be
dependent on relative prices and income. ThuS, housing demand
decisions consist of discrete decisions r e. 9., concerning headship,
tenure, as well as continuous decisions, e. g., size or quality level.
Lee and Trost (1978) and subsequently King (1980) arque that the
tenure choice ~id the choice of size and quality level are made
simultaneously. We will pOint out in Chapter 3 that also the headship
- 20 -
choice is influencing and is in turn influenced by the other two
decisions, so that all three choices are made in a joint decision
process. This joint decision process constitutes a comprehensive
notion of housing demand which will the focus of this thesis.
The econometric theory of joint discrete/continuous models is
well studied, and there exist a variety of applications, e. 9. Lee
and Trost (1978), King (1980), or Dubin and McFadden (1984)e We will
not pursue this line of modeling, however, but use consistently a
discrete choice framework throughout this work. Sweeney (1974) casts
the entire bundle of quality characteristics into discrete categories
so that housing units can be arranged in a commodity hierarchy. We
will use a similar discretization of the quality space in a finite
number of housing alternatives. Discretization of continuous
variables has widely been applied in transportation economics, see
Chiang, Roberts, and Ben- Akiva (1982) for a model of freight mode and
shipment-size, or Small (1981,1982) and Small and Brownstone (1981)
for discrete models of trip timing. Ben Akiva and Watanatada (1981)
provide a theoretical analysis of the aggregation of a continuous
variable into a finite number of discrete choices. There is good
pragmatic reason to do so: it simplifies both the theoretical
analysis and the empirical estimation. In addition, for most policy
purposes, it suffices to explain or predict shifts among rough
categories as "large owner-occupied houses iO , "low quality rental
housing", or "non-headship." Table 2-1 lists the choices we will
consider in our comprehensive notion of housing demand.
- 2~ -
Table 2-1: Definition of Housing Alternatives
~~--~-~--~-~~~~~----~---~~~~---~----------~~­--~----~---~-~~-~~---~-~-~--~-----~---------~
Symbol I Housing Alternative
--------+-----------------------------------------------------------
NH
o SF.S
o SF.M
o SF.L
o 2F.S
o 2F.M
o 2F.L
o MF.S
o HF.M
o MF.L
R SF.S
R SFeM
R SF.L
R 2F.S
R 2F.M
R 2F.L
R MF.S
R MF.M
R MF.L
Non Headship; lives as a subnucleus in another household
Owner-Occupied, Single-FaMily-Structure, Small Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Single-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Single-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Two-Family-Structure, Small Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Two-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Two-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
OWner-Occupied, Multi-Family-Structure, Small Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, MUlti-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Owner-Occupied, Multi-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Single-FaMily-Structure, Small Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Single-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Single-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
Rental~Housing, Two-Family-Structure, Small Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Two-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Two-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
Rental~Housing, Multi-Family-Structure, Small Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Multi-Family-Structure, Medium Dwelling
Rental-Housing, Multi-Family-Structure, Large Dwelling
--------+-----------------------------------------------------------
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Estimating such a complex joint decision process poses a number
of econometric problems: the choice set, that is the set of housing
alternatives from which the consumer has to select one, is fairly
1arge and consists of alternatives of which some are close sUbstitutes
specifications of the functional form
restrictsand others not. The first problem
of the relation
the possible
between the
choice probabilities and the explanatory variables to functions that
have a structure which simplifies the computations involved, e. 9.,
the class of generalized extreme-value functions. On the other hand,
the second problem prohibits the use of simplifying assumptions like
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives which reduces· the
multinomial decision to binary comparisons. As a viable compromise
between computational simplicity and economic complexity, we will
nested multinomial logit models (WMNL) as the basic analytic tool for
our empirical research. The remainder of this chapter reviews the
microeconomic foundations and the econometrics of NMNL-models and
extends the theory of the relation between utility maximization and
estimated NMNL-parameters.
- 23 -
2.2 Random Utility Maximization and Hierarchical Choice
2.2.1 Microeconomic Theory
Let us assume the housing market is partitioned into M discrete
housing alternatives, e.g., as depicted in Table 2-1. We associate
each of these alternatives with an index of desirability, which
comprises all advantages and disadvantages for a given consumer into
one scalar unit corresponding to the indirect utility function in
neoclassical continuous consumer theory. Uncertainty about quality
and erratic or irrational valuations introduce a stochastic component
into this indexe Like the hypothesis of utility maximization under
budget restriction, we assume that each household will choose the
alternative with the highest index of desirability. Due to the
probabilistic nature of the index, we will call this the random
utility maximization hypothesis (McFadden, 1981).
In the following, we will give this notion a more precise
definition. For each household t we decompose the desirability index
Uit of the alternative i into a deterministic and a stochastic
component:
The stochastic component eit is drawn from a M-dimensional joint
distribution characterized by the cumulative distribution function
F(e1, ••• ,e~) with an associated finite-valued; density f(e11a •• ,eM).
The deterministic part Vit is dependent on the characteristics of the
alternative (e. 9., price) as well as on the characteristics of the
household (e. g., income), and is linear anO additive separable 2 :
- 24 -
(2.2) Vi t = LX~t * bk + L yi * a; 1
k k 1where Xi t = the k-th characteristic of alternative i
for household t,
yl = the I-th characteristic of household t,
ail , b k = weights (to be estimated).
Choices are made by pairNise comparison of utilities. Thus, only M-l
differences of utilities describe the choice behavior 3. This implies
that household specific variables that are alternative invariant will
be irrelevant for the choice among alternatives as long as they do not
interact with each alternative. We therefore let the weights of the
household characteristics vary by alternative 4 •
In addition to uncertainty and erratic valuations, the stochastic
disturbance eit will pick up deviations of the household t from the
weights ail and bk in the population. The different components of eit
can not be identified or only under specific assumptions.
Household t will choose alternative i, if Uit > Ujt for all
j + i. Thus, the probability that household t chooses i among all M
possible alternatives is
= ••• dF (e 1 t' • • • , e Mt )
eMt=-GO
where F denotes the joint cumulative distribution function of the
errors eit-
- 25 -
Definition (Random Utility Maximization)
Choice probabilities Pt(i) are said to be generated by random utility
maximization, if there eXists a random utility function (2.1),
characterized by a linear, additive separable deterministic utility
(2.2) and a distribution function F with a finite-valued density of
the stochastic utility, such that (2.3) holds.
Fina11y, the aggregation
(2.4)
T
f(i) = ; L: Pt(i)
t=l
i=l, ••• ,M
will yield the relative frequencies of alternative i in the
population, also called aggregated or market shares of choice i,
provided the households t are a random sample of the population.
- 26 -
2.2.2 Functional Specification of the Choice Probabilities
This theory has a very important implication: for a given
specification of the deterministic utility Vit' the choice of a
functional form for the relation between the choice probabilities
Pt(i) and the explanatory variables X~t and yi is equivalent to the
specification of the joint distribution F of the error terms e;t.
The integral formula (2.3) shows the dilemma for this choice. On
one hand, the correlation among the eit should be as fleXible as
possible to allow different correlations among the choice
probabilities. On the other hand, the computational effort of
evaluating the multidimensional integral should be minimized,
suggesting a distribution function F where this can be done
explicitly. This in particular prohibits the use of a normal
distribution for problems with more than four alternatives.
Two families of distribution functions allow easy evaluation of
the integral. One leads to a linear functional relation between the
choice probabilities and the explanatory variables, and thus does not
take account of the addinq up and the unity interval restrictions of
the choice probabilities. The other family is that of generalized
extreme-value distributions, an extension of the logit approach; this
is the family we will use to specify the choice probabilities.
A completely free correlation structure of the disturbances
implies the estimation of M*(M-l)/2 correlation coefficients which is
- 27 -
impractical for most sets of alternatives. Thus, further restrictions
are necessary. The most drastic restriction is to postulate the
independence of the eit. Then the multidimensional integral can be
factorized into a product of simple integrals. If in addition the eit
are extreme value distributed, the resulting choice probabilities are
of the well-known multinomial logit form. An application of the
latter specification to the housing market can be found in Quigley
(1976).
The assumption of independent eit is known as "Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives'V (McFadden, 1973) due to the following
necessary and sufficient characterizations:
(1) The eit are stochastically independent.
(2) The odds of choosing alternative i over alternative j are
independent of the attributes of all other alternatives
and independent of the eXistence of any other alternative.
(3) The elasticity of the relative frequency f(i) of
alternative i with respect to the attributes of any other
alternative j~i is constant, that is independent of j.
Therefore, independence can only be assumed for alternatives that are
"equally different," but not for alternatives with different degrees
of sUbstitution. The following example translates a classical example
(Domencich and McFadden, 1975) into the housing market. For
simplicity, consider the tenure choice. Let us assume the relative
odds are 1:1 for renting versus owning. Let us introduce a third, new
form of tenure (e.go, cooperative) which is a very close sUbstitute
for owning- Intuitively, we would expect the new distribution to be
something like 50% : 25% : 25%. But condition (2) tells us that the
relative odds of renting versus owning have to stay constant, forcing
the new distribution to be 33': 33% : 33', which is implausible
because of the
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similarity of owning individually and owning
cooperatively.
The failure to accommodate different degrees of cross-alternative
sUbstitution renders the multinomial logit speCification inappropriate
for such heterogeneous choice sets as depicted in Table 2-1. On the
other hand, the possibility of grouping or clustering the alternatives
according to their degree of SUbstitution allows us a relatively
straightforward way of combining the computational simplicity of the
multinomial logit form with a richer sUbstitution pattern: for each
cluster, we introduce a parameter that describes the similarity of its
alternatives. We can do the same with clusters themselves, and
thereby achieve a hierarchical structure of similarities and
substitution patterns. Within each cluster and between the clusters,
we apply multinomial logit choice probabilities. This approach is
called "Nested Multinomial Logit" (NMNL). McFadden (1981) gives a
discussion of the development of these models and their relation to
other discrete choice approaches.
For the application at hand, let us introduce three steps of
clustering. F~,~st, we bundle housing alternatives by size and
quality, then these clusters by tenure and type of building, and
finally all headship alternatives versus the nonheadship
alternative, see Figure 2-2 for a simple example. We can look at NMNL
models in two ways: they represent hierarchically grouped clusters of
alternatives with a larqe within group substitutability, ana we can
interpret them as hierarchical decision processes or decision trees,
ALL
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FIGURE 2-2: CLUSTERS OF SIMILAR ALTERNATIVES
~---~--~-~~--~--~~~--~-~------~--~--~--~---~~~-~ - -~ -~ - ~ ~ ~ - ~
ALL
ALL
NH: non-head
R: rented
0: owned
s: small
M: medium
L: large
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where each nucleus decides whether to head a household or not~ the
heads decide about tenure, and owners and renters choose their
Of course, this does not necessarily implydwelling size and quality~
a temporal Oecomposition of the decision process. Figure 2-3
represents this second interpretation graphically, an~ the equivalence
to the representation of Figure 2-2 can be seen in each of the steps.
We can decompose the choice probabilities for a three-level
hierarchical decision process into a marqinal choice probability at
the highest level of the decision tree and conditional probabilities
at each lower level (we suppress the index t for the individual
household):
(2.5)
where
= probability of the headship choice Hi that is
implied by choosing alternative i,
= probability of the tenure choice T i implied
by choosing alternative i. given headship choice Hi'
PS(SiIH;,Ti) = probability of the size choice Si implied by
alternative i, given headship choice Hi and
tenure choice Tie
At each level, the conditional choice probabi1ities have the
multinomial logit form:
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FIGURE 2-3: DECISION TREES FOR HOUSING ALTERNATIVES
~~----~~~---~~-~~------~----~~~--~-~--~-~--~------~-- ~--- ~ ~ ~~~~ - ~ - ~ - ~ ~ -
NH R S R M R LOS 0 MOL NH R S R M R LOS 0 MOL
:f: ALLLA~HEAD
NH R S R M R LOS 0 K 0 L NH R S 0 S R MOM 0 L R L
NH: non-head
R: rented
0: owned
S: small
M: medium
L: large
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PS(Sd H1,T 1) = exp( V(S1) ) ILexp( V(Sj) ),
(summation over all size choices Sj possible in tenure choice T i )
PT(T 1 IH 1) =exp( u(T 1 ) ) I Lexp ( U(Tj) ),
(summation over all tenure choices T j in headship choice Hi)
PH(Hl) = exp( W(H1) ) I Lexp ( W(Hj) ),
(summation over all headship choices Hj )
In these choice probabilities, V(S1) denotes the utility, a consumer
derives from dwelling size S;, and u(T;) ( w(H;) ) the utility from
tenure choice Ti (headship choice Hi' respectively) implied by
choosing alternative i.
At the higher levels, we assume that there is no utility per se
of either headship or tenure over and above the utility derived from
the alternatives underlying each tenure or headship choice. If we
aggregate the utility provided by all alternatives Sj in tenure
category T; we obtain (McFadden, 1978):
(2.6) U(Ti) = log ~ exp ( Cj * v(Sj) )
j E1i
and similarely for the aggregated utility of the headship choice Hi:
(2. 7) w(H 1 ) = log ~ exp ( d j ~ U(T j ) )
JGHj
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Note that the attributes of the lowest level utility, e. g., income
and prices in the size choice, enter recursively, bottom-to-top, the
utility of the tenure and heaOship choices. On the other hand,
decisions are clustere~ in a sequential fashion, top-to-bottom, as
Figures 2-2 and 2-3 suggest. Altogether we have achieved a
simultaneous choice of hea~sh1p, tenure, an~ ~wel1ing size where
prices as well as income are allowed to influence not only the size
and tenure choice, but also the headship decision and thus household
formation.
The taste weights Cj and dj have to be estimated. The aggregate
utility levels U(Ti) and w(H i ) are called inclusive values of their
respective lower level alternatives because they can be interpreted as
the surplus generated by these alternatives. The taste weights Cj and
d j are called dissimilarity parameters because they can be interpreted
as a measure of the substitutability among the respective lower level
alternatives. For Cj and d j equal to one, the decision tree model
collapses to a simple multinomial logit choice model among all
alternatives~ If they are smaller than one, alternatives in the
respective clusters are close
alternatives.
SUbstitutes relative to other
We can test whether the difference between the simple MNL model
and the nested MNL model is significant. Usually, the MNL model has
to estimated in a first stage to obtain initial values for the NMNL
estimation. Thus, we have all ingredients of a lekilihood ratio test,
see Table 5-13 for examples. Furthermore, we can construct a Wald
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MNLSimpletheattest
appropriate formula. The
of this test trinity is
These test are tests of the
Finally,
asymptotic and small sample properties
examined by Hausman and McFadden (1981).
reported in the estimation results.
Lagranqe multiplier test and evaluate this
estimates, see McFadden (1983) for the
test based on the estimateO dissimilarity coefficients in the NMNL
model with their joint covariance matrix. For simple one-dimensional
tests we can look at the asymptotic t-statist1cs aroun~ one as
we can calculate a
Simple MNL functional specification versus the nested MNL model.
Thus, they amount to tests of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives property.
The random utility maximization interpretation 01 the NMNL
functional form rested on the integral formula (2.3). However, the
cumulative distribution function F is parameterized by the taste
weights ail' bkr the dissimilarity coefficients Ci, d ir and depends on
the data as well. If all similarity parameters are in the
unit-interval, the underlying joint distribution of the disturbances
is well behaved and consistent with the microeconomic theory outlined
at the beginning of this section, independent of the explanatory
variables. With similarity parameters outside the unit-interval, this
consistency will hold only for a certain range of explanatory
variables, and it must be checked, whether this range includes the
given data. ThiS check and a reconciliation of such NMNL models with
the random utility maximization hypothesis is discussed in the
followinge
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2.2.3 The Relation Between Dissimilarity Parameters and the Random
Utility Hypothesis
Let CT denote the similarity coefficient corresponding to the
first-order clusters of elementary alternatives (say, tenure
categories), and d H the similarity coefficient corresponding to the
secon~-order clusters consisting of first-order clusters (saYr
headship categories). The NMNL functional form specified in (2.5) is
then equivalent to the following joint cumulative distribution
function of the errors eit in (2.1) (McFadden 1978):
(2.8) F{e1,···,eM) = exp { -G [ exp(-e1),···,exp(-eM) ] }
with
L L L l/CT CT!d H dH(2.9) G [y l' • • • 'YM] = Ys ) )
H T.H Se-T
where we sum over the highest-order clusters H, the first-order
clusters T contained in each cluster H, and finally over the elemental
alternatives S in each cluster T.
Two theorems provide the link between NMNL-models and the random
utility maximization hypothesis (RUM). They are global statements in
the sense of being independent of the realization of the explanatory
vari.ables.
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Theorem 1 (Global Sufficiency) (McFadden 1979):
Let 0 < dH S 1 and 0 < cT/~H S 1 for all T and H.
Th~n the HMNL model 1s consistent with RUM for any data.
Theorem 2 (Global Necessity) (Williams 1977, Daly anO Zachary 1979):
Let dH > 1 or CT/dH > 1 for at least one T or H.
Then it is always possible to construct data at which the NKNL model
is inconsistent With RUM.
The question arises, whether this pO~Sibility of RUM-inconsistent
data points is relevant for the data at hand. Theorem 2 leaves the
possibility open that for the data given by the application, the NMNL
model is consistent with RUM, and that the data points where the
inconsistency occurs are insensible for the given application. Thus,
the purpose of the remainder of this Section is to construct a
discrete choice model that (1) is compatible with RUM, (2) has the
same cumulative distribution function F for the given data points, and
(3) preserves the choice probabilities of the original NMNL model. We
shall give a necessary ana sufficient condition under which such a
construction is possible.
The failure of the random utility hypothesis occurs because the
estimated dissimilarity coefficients prevent F from (2.8) being a
cumulative distribution function:
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Lemma 1:
Let cT an~ dH > O.
(1) Then F 1s differentiable to any or~er, in particular, all mixed
partial derivatives eXisto
(2) F -> 1 for 81 ->00 , F -> 0 for 81 -> -~
(3) The choice probabilities derived from F obey
Pitt) = 1.
The Lemma follows from the obvious properties of (2.5),(2.8), and
(2.9)e Thus, Theorem 2 implies the eXistence of at least one pOint in
which F has a negative mixed partial derivative r i. e. , a point of
negative marginal or joint "density".
We shall illustrate the effect of QH > 1 in the simplest case of
a three-alternative, two-level NMNL-model in which the first two
alternatives constitute a cluster.
distribution function
This model has the cumulative
F(e) = exp { - [ exp(-e1/d) + exp(-e2/d ) ]d - exp(ea) }.
Because of translation invariance (see Footnote 3), we can reduce F to
the two dimensional space of differences without loosing information.
Let v = e2~e1 and W = e3-e1- Their joint distribution function is
( l+exp(-v/d) )d-1
F*(v,w) = --------------------------( ~+exp(-v/d) )d + exp(-w)
with density
( l+exp(-v/d) )d-2
f*(V,w) = -------------------------- * exp(-w) * exp(-v/d) * discr,( l+exp(-v/d) )d + exp(-w)
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where the discriminant term
2( l+eXp(-v/d) )d
d1scr = -------------------------
0-1
( l+eXp(-v/d) )d + exp(w) 0
signs the density f·.
For d < 1, discr > O. However, for ~ > 1,
f*(V,w) > 0 <=> W > log(d-l)-log(d+l) - ~ log(l+exp(-v/d».
ThiS function approaches the constant log (d-l)-log(d+l) for v -> CO
and a by this constant shifted 45-degree line for v -> -00. Thus, we
can partition the (v,w)-plane in a part with nonnegative and a part
with negative density, see Figure 2-4. Note that the latter part
cannot be contained in any choice probability defining orthant.
If any of our data points is in the (shaded) area f* < 0, we will
not be able to explain the data by preference maximization using the
integral formula (2.3) underlying RUM. Moreover, if f*(e) < 0 for
some e, then the continuity of f* implies the eXistence of a point e
This point need not necessarily be in the set
{f* < oJ. Again, we cannot rationalize the data by RUM. Thus,
Theorem 3 (Local Necessity):
Let A be a set containing all data points.
Let anyone of the following conditions be true:
(1) A mixed partial derivative of F up to order M is negative
at a point in A.
(2) F exceeds unity at a point in A.
Then the construction of a RUM-compatible discrete choice model in A
is not POSSible 5•
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~he proof is trivial: F cannot be a c.d.f. if it exceeds unity or
any of its associated marginal or the joint ~ensities is negative.
If neither of the conditions of Theorem 3 1s raised, we can
indeed reconcile a NMNL-model with large dissimilarity coefficients
with random utility maximization:
Theorem 4 (Local Sufficiency):
Let A be an open interval containing all data points.
Let both of the following conditions be true:
(1) All mixed partial derivative of F up to order Mare
nonnegative in A.
(2) F does not exceed unity at a point in A.
Then for any positive cT' dH eXists a continuation Fe of
F, such that
(a) Fe is a cumulative distribution function,
(b) Fe generates the ~ame choice probabilities as F.
We will give the proof by construction. Figure 2-5 i.llustrates the
construction in the case of three alternatives, already underlying
Figure 2-4. We first use the translation invariance principle to
reduce the dimension of the problem to )1-1: for any point y in RM w
let * be the N=M-l dimensional vector (Y1-Y21 ••• 'Y1-YM)'·y
Correspondingly, we introduce A*, F*, and f* as the M-l dimensional
counterparts of A, F, and f. For a set C, we use int(C), bnd(C),
ext(C), and clo(C) to denote the interior, the boundary, the exterior,
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FIGURE 2-4: THREE ALTERNATIVES: CHOICE PROBABILITIES AND DENSITY
===========~========================================== ==========
e2+Y2 > e 1+Y 1
e2+Y2 > e3+Y3
<=>
e2-e 1 > Y1-Y2
(e2-e 1)-(e3-e 1) > (Y1-Y3)-(Y1-Y2)
III<
+ y
<=>
e3+Y3 > e 1+Y 1
e3+Y3 > e2+Y2
or
e1+Y1 > e2+Y2
e1+Y1 > e3+Y3
e1-e 2 > Y1-Y2
e1-e 3 > Y1-Y3
I
I
I
e3-e 1 > Y 1-Y3
I (e3-e 1)-(e2-e 1) > (Y1-Y2)-(Y1-Y3)
I
I
----------------------------+----------------------------------> e3-e 2I
d-l
f*(V,w) > 0
+ - - - - - - - -~-_- --~-:--- log
d+l
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FIGURE 2-5: CHOICE PROBABILITY PRF~ERVING CHOICE MODELS
===============================~==~~===================
- - +------------------+------+
A
L (y 1)
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and the closure of C, respectively.
For each y., we can partit.ion RN according to the M choice
probability defining open sets
and the M separating half-hyperplanes
The sets Pi(Y~) and Li{Y*) will be important at the boundary of A,
an~ it is convenient to define for y* in bnd(A*):
Pmin
_
; -
y* in A·
and
L(Y*) = L;(Y*) with i such that L;(Y*) n clo(A*) is empty.
The p~in define the smallest choice probability of alternative i
attainable in clO(A-) where this well-defined minimum occurs for each
i at one of M corners of the interval A*. The L(Y*) define the
half-hyperplane pointing outward of A*. This is well-defined except
for the above mentioned M corners. Here, we define:
We now construct a choice model which has identical choice
probabilities in A* by shifting all probability mass outside of A*
onto the boundary of A* in a way which does not distort the oriqinal
choice probabilities.
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We define
f*C(y) = f· (y) for y in AIt:,
f*C(y) =fdF* for y in bnd(A*),
L{Y*)
f *C(y) = 0 for Y in ext(A*).
We have to show:
(i) f*c nonnegative u
(ii) f*c integrates to one,
(iii) Pt (i) = f dF = f dF c •
P t (i) P t (i)
To (i) :
We only need to show the nonnegativity at the boundary.
Case 1: y is at one of the M corners defining p~in.
Then the f*C(y) is a choice probability which is always nonnegative
for positive cT, dH by Lemma 1.
lim .f dF·
P j (Y*-hZ j )
Case 2: y otherwise.
Then f dF" =
L ; (y.)
l/h ( r dF* -
h -> 0 ~
P j (y*)
where j is an arbitrary index other than i and z a vector of zeroes
except a one at the j-th component. ThiS; however, defines the j-th'
marginal density of F* which is nonnegative due to assumption (1).
To (ii):
Decompose f f*C(U)dU = f f*C(U)dU +
RN A*
f f*C(U)dU +
ext (A *)
f f·C(u)du
bna{A qt)
=
.f ciF* + f dF* + a = fdF* = 1,
A* RN\A* RN
because F(e) -> 1 for any ei -> co for positive cr, dH by Lemma 1.
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To (iii):
+ f dF*
Pi (y*)n(RN\A *)
.- f dF*~ +
Pi (Y*)()A *
=
f dF- C
Pi (y *>nbnd (A *)
f dF - c + f dF ~ C =
P 1 (Y *)()A * Pi (y *) n(RN\A *)
This proves Theorem 4.
f dF$C
Theorem 4 extends the usefulness of NMNL-models by reconciling
large dissimilarity coefficients with random utility maximization,
provided q conditions (1) and (2) hold. In practice, these conditions
can be checked by evaluating the density and cumulative distribution
function at the corners of an interval containing the data.
Furthermore, the idea behind Theorem 4 can be exploited to
construct a large class of RUM-compatible discrete choice models. Any
function which is translation invariant in the sense of Footnote 3 and
obeys conditions (1) and (2) of the Theorem in an interval containing
the data can be extended to a cumulative distribution function
generating a probabilistic choice system by equation (203).
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2.3 Estimation Techniques
2.3.1 Econometric Theory and Numerical Analysis
The likelihood function of the hierarchical choice model are the
logarithms of the choice probabilities (205), cumulated over all
consumers. Thus, we can estimate the model by maximizing over the
taste weights ail' b k • an~ the similarity coefficientR C;I die
Because the full information maximum likelihood function is highly
nonlinear in the similarity parameters, this approach is costly. As
an alternative, we can exploit the recursive structure in (2.5) and
estimate sequentially by level of clusterinq. This approach has been
applied to a large number of problems in transportation, energy
demand, and urban economics, see Domencich and McFadden (1975) or Anas
However, the sequential estimator is inefficient, especially
for complex decision trees. Furthermore, it can not embody parameter
restrictions across branChes/clusters of alternatives.
The first point relates to the flow of information: the
sequential estimator uses all the information of the lower branches to
estimate the dissimilarity coefficients at the upper levels, but not
cunverselyv Amemiya (1978) noted that the standard errors of the
estimated coefficients at the upper levels have to be corrected for
the presence of lower level estimated coefficients, McFadden (1981)
provides the proper formulae. Evaluating these corrections is
expensive and greatly reduces the computational advantaqes over the
FIKL estimator, see Small and Brownstone (1982). The second point is
more important: if the alternatives in different branches have taste
- 46 -
weights in common, a proportionality constraint has to be fUlfilled
which is non-trivial for the case of at least two elementary
alternatives in at least two branches:
(h/c) 1
The sequential estimator estimates (b!C) 1 and (b/C) 2 in the first
stage choices, then C1 and c2 in the choice between the branches. A
common b implies
However r imposing this restriction Oestroys the sequential
decomposition and leads us back to fUll information maximum
likeli.hood. The proportionality constraints could be imposed by an
iterative procedure where the Ci from the sequential estimation as
described are used in a seconO sequential estimate to scale the (b/C);
as (b/Ci);' calculate new Ci, and so on. This iteration will further
reduce the computational advantages over FIML estimation in addition
to the necessary correction of the standard errors, in particular so
in higher level trees.
We therefore prefer joint estimation and use the modified
quadratic hill-climbing method developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972)
with analytical first and numerical second derivatives. This
procedure proved computationally fairly efficient compared with BHHH
procedures (Berndt, Hall, Hall, Hausman, 1974). Small and Brownstone
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(1982) report similar experiences with BHHH as compare~ to a method of
scoring. The reason for the relative poor performance of the BHHH
alqorithm seems to be the highly nonlinear dependence of the
likelihood function on the dissimilarity parameters. In particular,
the function and its gradient have a singularity in ci or di at zero.
The singularity is well behaved for the likelihood, but is a pole for
the gradient. Thus, the outer product of the gradients is ill-behaved
and a ba~ approximation of the hessian for small values of the
dissimilarity parameters.
This unpleasant behavior of the l~kelihood function requires a
careful numerical analysis of the algorithms involved. In particular,
the data should be normalized to prevent the multiplication of very
small with very large numbers and numerical extinction. The appendix
lists a FORTRAN program for the full information maximum likelihood
estimation of NKNL models which emboOies all these considerations.
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2.3.2 Elasticities and Goodness-of-Fit Measures
Following the random utility maximization theory and equation
(2.2), the estimated parameters represent the taste weights of the
respective explanatory variables in the deterministic part of the
indirect utility function Vit. For a more intuitive interpretation of
their magnitudes, the taste weights can be transformed into
elasticities of the choice probabilities With respect to the various
explanatory variables:
?logp(i)
(2.10).-------- = ak * Xjk * ( -p(j) + ks * lie
')109 Xj k
+ kT * (1!C-l/d) * Q(S)
+ kH * (d-l)/d * Q(S) * Q(T) )
where ks = 0 if i and j are in the same size category
= 1 otherwise
kT = 0 if i and j are in the same tenure category
= 1 otherwise
kH = 0 if i and j are in the same headship category
= 1 otherwise
c,d = similarity parameters: c=cr and d=dH
Q(S) = conditional choice probability ps(SjIHj,T j )
Q(T)
--
condit1.onal choice probability PT(Tj IHJ)
These elasticities measure the percentage Change of the probability to
choose alternative i, when the k-th attribute of alternative j is
changed by one percent. Note that for the cross elasticities the
difference between i and j enters only through the "switches" kS I kT'
and kH. The structure of the tree is therefore directly reflected in
the pattern of cross elasticities. If the dissimilarity parameters c
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and d are in the unit interval, equation (2.10) implies descending
elasticities with the "distance" in the tree, i. e., elasticities are
larger within than between branches. This plausible structure is
destroyed fo~ dissimilarity parameters larger than one, hinting to
alternative tree specificationso
Derived from a highly non-linear model, elasticities at variable
means are generally different from mean individual elasticities, and
in interpreting the e1asticities, one should keep the absolute level
of the choice-probabilities in mind; the elasticities tend to be very
high at very low probabilities and vice versa, ref~ectin9 saturation
effects.
Three scalar measures of performance or fit will be used in the
applications- of Chapters 3 and S. Arnemiya (1981) provides an
extensive review. The straightforward discrete analogy to the
continuous R2 uses the sum of squared errors:
(2.1.1.)
where
L L (y it-Pi ·db» 2 / P it (b)
1 - -----------------------------LL (y it-P it (0» 2 / Pu(b)
, -to
Pit ~enotes the predicted choice prObabilities of alternative i
for consumer t, evaluated at the optimal parameter values b or at
zero, and Y;t the actual response 6 • However, this measure has little
discriminatory power for well specified models. A more satisfactory
measure can be constructed from the ratio of the likelihood at the
estimated parameters and the likelihood with taste weights at zero and
similarity parameters at one. One minus this ratio behaves like the
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continuous R2 , see Mcfadden (1973):
(2.12)
L{b)
1 - ------
L(O)
Domencich and McFadden (1975) give a comparison between these two
measures of fit and their discriminatory power. As a third measure of
fit, we compare actual with predicted individual choices which is a
fairly stringent, thouqh erratic criteriono Note that discrete choice
mo~els produce two predictions of the aggregate choice probabilities:
(2.13) f(i) =+~Pt(i)
t
(2.14) f(i) = n(i)/T
with n(i) = number { t I Pt(i) = max Pt(j) }
j=l •• M
T = sample size
The erratic nature of the percentage of correct predictions is due the
integer constraint in (2.14). We can disaggregate this measure into
the form of a success table in which observed and predicted
alternatives are crosstabulated and the off-diagonal elements show the
mispredictions.
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2.3.3 Aggregate Probability Shares
The aggregate probability shares f(i), i=l •• M, where M denotes
the number of alternatives, from equation (2.14) can be used for
prediction and poliCY analysis. They should reproduce the aggregate
shares in the population q(i) as close as possible. A multinomial
speCification with a fUll set of alternative speCific constants will
always reproduce the sample shares exactly which can be seen by adding
up the first order conditions of the MNL-like11hood function with
respect to the alternative specific dummies. This property is not
carried over to the nested model. Anas (1982) gives some numerical
examples for this bias. However, a fUll set of alternative specific
constants still saturates the model and we can always solve the
non1inear system of M-l equations in these constants to adjust the
aggregated shares. This suggests the following two stage procedure:
first we estimate all parameters freely; then, we solve this
likelihood
This will
the slope
nonlinear equation system evaluated at the slope parameters of the
first stage. The second step can be achieved by minimizing the sum of
squareO deviations of fitted to actual aggregated shares. This two
stage procedure is consistent, but does not provide efficient
parameter estimates. Usually, the adjustment necessary is very small,
and so the loss in efficiency.
A more satisfactory approach is to maximize the
function subject to the B-1 constraints f(i)=q(i), i=2 ••M.
yield efficient estimates (Coslett, 1981) where also
parameters embody the constraints, not only the constants.
- 52 -
Unfortunately, the nonlinear equation system can not be solved
analytically, making a costly constraint maximization necessary which
involves additional M-l nuisance parameters and in general the
solution of a saddlepoint problem as opposed to a simple maximization
problem. Furthermore, the application of KUhn-Tucker type algorithms
is not possible because the constraints f(i)=q(i) are highly nonlinear
in the alternative specific constants. We will only use the two stage
procedure. We apply this procedure in Chapter Five to adjust our
baseline estimates before making predictions and policy simulations.
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2.3.4 Choice Based Sampling
The problem of fitting the known aggregate sample shares is
related to the problems generated by choice based sampling. Choice
based samples may arise in two ways: the data may originally be
collected by sampling according to the observed choice. This is the
case when we interview a fixed number of homeowners and a fixed number
of renters and these numbers do not reflect the proportions in the
population. Second, we may start from a large random sample.
Typically, however, some choices have very low, others very high
market shar~s. To achieve precise estimates for all choices, the
overall sample size of a smaller random subsample drawn for estimation
has to be large enough that even the smallest cell has a sufficient
number of observations. This will yield very large cell counts for
the popular choices. We can substantially decrease estimation costs
by oversampling the infrequent choices, undersampling the frequent
choices, and then treating our subsample as a choice based sample. We
will make heavy use of this technique in Chapter Five.
Given a choice based sample, the parameters have to be estimated
to predict the population, not the sample shares. Without a
correction, the estimates are inconsistent (HeCkma~1979). Thus the
efficient full information maximum likelihood estimator is again the
Coslett (1981) estimator mentioned in the previous subsection and
involves the solution of a saddlepoint problem with H-l additional
nuisance parameters. Alternative estimators are discussed in Manski
and McFadden (1981) of which we mention the two most important.
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First, we can compensate for choice based sampling by weighting the
observations inversely to the ratio of over or undersampling. This
estimator (weighted exogenous sampling maximum likelihood, WESI1L,
Manski and Lerma~1977) is as cheap to compute as the normal maximum
likelihood estimator. Second, we can maximize the likelihood of an
endogenously sampled observation conditional on its exogenous
characteristics. This estimator (conditional maximum likelihood, CML,
Hsieh, Manski, and McFadde~ 1983) has a slightly more complicated
likelihood function compared to the WESML estimator. Both estimators
yield consistent estimates without the introduction of additional
nuisance parameters, but there are not efficient compared to the
Coslett estimator. However, the efficiency loss seems to be very
small as indicated in McFadden, HSieh, and Manski (1983) or McFadden,
Winston, and Boersch-Supan (1984).
Therefore, and for its simplicity, we will only use the WESML
estimator. The resulting likelihood functioll in our case is
(2.15) L =
where it denotes the chosen alternative of household t
q(i) the proportion of alternative i in population
f(i) the proportion of alternative i in the sample
p(i,b) the choice probability according to (205)
b vector of parameters
The covariance matrix of the estimated b can be derived by an
exact Taylor approximation around the the true parameter vector b*:
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(2.16)
AT HT
where b* lies on a line segment between b and b~.
Under the appropriate regularity conditions (Manski and McFadden
1981), we can apply a uniform law of large numbers (Jennrich 1969) to
show
(2.17) HT ~~> H = E( ---------------- ) ,
and a uniform central limit theorem (Jennrich 1969) to yield
db'
v = E( ----------------- ----------------- )0
(2.18)
where
(2.19)
Thus,
AT ~~> N ( 0 , V )
dW(t) log P(b lt ) dW(t) log P(b*)
(2.20) ~ ( b - b*) --> N ( 0 , H- 1 V H- 1 ).
As a consequence,
(2.21) f(i) f q(i) => H f V,
because H includes the weights linearly, but V quadratically. Thus,
the inverse hessian does no longer provide an estimate for the
covariance matrix of the estimated b. In the estimation, we will use
the sample hessian to approximate H and the sample outer product of
the gradient to approximate V, both evaluated at the optimum.
Tne likelihood function (2.15) is a special case of the WESML
estimator insofar, as we assume independent draws of households t,
each with one choice of its housing alternative. This deviates from
the analysis in Hsieh, Kanski, and McFadden (1983) where multiple cell
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counts m(i,t) are observed. In our case, m(i,t)=l for i=it.the chosen
alternative, a otherwise. In the case of mUlti.ple cell counts, which
are distributed multinomially, the negative covariance between m(i,t)
and m(j,s) may reduce the variance (2.19). Depending on the way the
sample 1s drawn, either E( m{i,t) m(i,s) ) or E( m(i,t) m(j,t» will
have a non-zero contribution.
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2.4 Conclusions
This chapter provided the econometric tools for thiS thesiSe We
will cast all housing alternatives in a finite set of alternatives,
structure them in the form of a hierarchical decision tree, and
calculate the nested multinomial loqit choice probabilities for each
alternativee
These choice probabilities can be rationalized by utility
maximization behavior of the consumers, but only under certain
parameter restrictions. We developed necessary and sufficient
conditions for the consistency of random utility maximization with the
nested multinomial logit specification in the case of dissimilarity
parameters in and outside the unit interval. If we maintain utility
maximization as underlying structural behavior, we can interpret the
v~olat1on of these conditions (the case of Theorem 3) as a hint to
misspec1ficat1on of either the in~irect utility function (2.2) or,
more important, the tree structure. Alternative tree structures may
be derived from the elasticity patterns created by (2.10)~
Because of the inefficiency of sequential estimation procedures
and their inability to embody equal utility weights for prices and
income across tenure and headship clusters, we use full information
maximum likelihood estimation throughout the thesis. This has become
pOSSibl, ~he use of sophisticated numerical procedures.
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2.5 Footnotes to Chapter 2
(1) The requirement to be finite-valued implies that ties in the
pairwise comparison of utilities occur only with probability zero.
(2) We impose linearity and additive separability of the indirect
utility function in the definition of RUM. In the language of
McFadden (1981), such models are defined as AIRUM-compatible.
(3) Note that the definition of the indirect utility function implies
translation invariance of the choice probabilities in the following
sense:
Pu(i) = Pu+c(i) for all constants c and all utility vectors U in RM,
or,
G(y+c) = G(y) + c for all constants c and all vectors y in RM+,
where G denotes the generating function (2.9).
(4) This amounts to including M-l alternative specific constants D;
interacting with the yi and using a common parameters bl for all
alternatives which can be seen by the transformation
Y i· D ; ~ b 1 = Y ~. a; 1 •
(5) The random utility maximization hypothesis as stated in Section
2.2 is only one rationalization of observed choice behavior with the
notion of a homo economicus. Failure of RUM does not necessarily
preclude the possibility that such a model is rational in an axiomatic
sense, i. e., that it fUlfills the axiom of stochastically revealed
preferencesD This is a combinatorial problem of a large dimension.
See McFadden and Richter (1979).
(6) The sum of the squared residuals can be weighted in several ways~
The natural weights are the true choice probabilities. As the best
available estimates, we replace them by their maximum likelihood
estimates. See Amemiya (1981) for alternatives.
~~
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CHAPTER THREE
THE INFLUENCE OF HOUSEHOLD FORMATION ON HOUSING DEMAND
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3.1 Introduction and Review of Earlier Approaches
Does the current rise in rental housing prices discourage
household formation? Was household formation fostered by the falling
real rents during the early seventies? This chapter tries to answer
these questions to give a rationale for the more comprehensive
Oef1nition of housing demand outlined in the first section of Chapter
2. Hew households are formed when existing households split:
children decide to leave their parents' home, or marriages are
divorced, and families, livinq together, decide to undouble.
Conversely, househol~s cease to exist because of death or merger due
to marriage or doubling up. Which of these six mechanisms are
affected by economic circumstances, in particular by housing market
conditions? This seems implausible for death 1, but less so for
marriage and divorce, an~ it is worthwhile to shed light on whether
doubling up, undoubling, and the timing of the childrens' leave from
home is influenced by the price of housing_
Whereas the influence of housing market conditions on household
formation is a rather new topic, the influence of demographic factors
on housing demand is well studied. The early literature on household
formation, larqely written by demoqraphers, concentrated on two
aspects: the rise or decline of the total population size, and the
distribution of age and marital status within the population
(campbell, 1963, an~ Kobrin, 1973 and 1976). But a third aspect is as
crucial in the determination of housing demand: how the population is
divided into households.
second, no
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ThiS third aspect is closely related to
means determines household formation.
the
In
particular, much interest has been devoted to the dramatic increase in
the number of households With only one person, and the corresponding
decline in the proportion of married couples in the total number of
households. Both Changes are larger than the change in the
distribution of aqe and marital status alone would predict, see George
Hasn1ck (1983) or Alonso (1983).
Campbell (1963) used standard demographic techniques to predict
headship rates for a given distribution of age and marital status. He
then compared these ~ates With the ~ctual rates and attributed the
discrepancy to "the development of a taste
independence."
for privacy and
The search for an explanation of this development concentrated on
the rise in real income during the sixties that made privacy and
independence affordable. Beresford and Rivlin (1966) and carliner
(1975) present a verbal discussion of cross-sectional data focusing on
this explanation. Maisel (1960) presents a descriptive analysis of
aggregated time-series data and links changes in headship rates to
cyclical variables like income and unemployment rates.
Three studies apply regression analysis to investiqate the
quantitative nature of this link: Hickman (1974) estimates an
aggregate time-series reqression of headship rates and finds a
positive income effect. However, he does not report standard errors
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of his estimates, so that the significance of his results cannot be
assessed. DePamphilis (1977) attempts a time-series reqression of
headship rates on aggregate income, the number of young adults, and
various interest rate~, with questionable results. Finally, Michael,
Fuchs, and Scott (1980) estimate an aggregate cross-section Berkson
Theil regression of the proportions of one-person bouseholds across
states. Their findings include a significant effect of the income
level in the state. They study variables outside the conventional
demoqraphic and economic categories as well, eo 9., whether the state
has adopted a liberal legislation.
The rise of real income slowed considerably down in the
mid-seventies, however, the upward trend in household formation even
accelerated in this period, see Kitagawa (1981) and Hasnick (1983).
This puts the role of income as the most important explanation for the
growth in household formation over and above demographic changes in
some doubt. Observing the falling real rent level in this perioa 2 , an
apparent conclusion is to attribute the affordability of privacy and
independence not only to the income at disposal, but also to the price
of privacy, the price of housing. A look at the recent development
underscores the importance of this hypothesis: in the first years of
the 1980's we finally observe househol~ formation leveling off. At
the same time real rents started to rise aqain. Does the current
rising rent level discourage househol~ formation?
Housing prices as determinants of householO headship rates are
considere~ already by Hickman (1974)e He estimates a "negligible"
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price elasticity and concludes that price effects are not important or
cannot be separated from income effects. Michael, Fuchs, an~ Scott
(1980) use this arqumentat10n to exclu~e price variables a priori.
Hickman's result 1s confirmed by two studies that use individual
cross-sectional data and venture the difficult task of modeling
household formation behavior per see Ermisch (1981) develops a
microeconomic model of the determination of household size where the
disadvantages of crowding have to be traded off against economies of
scale in a mUlti·~person household. He applies his model on data from
the General Household Survey in Great Britain. Wial (1983) estimated
a multinomial logit choice model among four household types, based on
young unmarrie~ men in the 1970 Census. The choices are to stay with
the parents, form a independent one-person household, or share a
household with one or more other persons.
insignificant price elasticities.
Both studies find
However, Hickman's hypothesis and the two behavioral models by
Ermisch and by Wial are contradicted by two studies that use agqreqate
time-series data: Rosen and Jaffee (1981), and Smith, Rosen,
Harkandya, and Ullmo (1982) discover a highly significant influence of
the aggregate rent level on headship rates, even after controlling for
income.
One pur~ose of this paper is to add another piece of evidence to
the contradictory results in the literature. We will use individual
cross-sectional data as Ermisch (1981) and Wial (1983) did, but avoi~
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modeling the household formation process explicitly. As it turns out,
we do in fact estimate highly significant price effects.
The findings of Rosen and Jaffee (1981), Smith et. ale (1982),
and of this paper establish a causal relation from the housing market
on household formation in the opposite direction of the well studied
influence of demographic variables on household formation and housing
demand. However, a simultaneous interaction between housinq markets
and household formation behavior has major implications for estimation
and prediction of housing demand. The concept of households as basic
sampling units in data collection and econometric estimation is
blurred because households may consist of independent members who find
together and break off for endogenous reasons. Thus, a sample of
households can not be considered a random sample for the purpose of
housing market ana1ysis~ Estimation results will biased due to a
similar kind of sample selection as studied by Heckman (1979).
Therefore, prediction and poliCy analysis will be biased as well. For
instance, if privacy as an economic good complements housing, then a
housing allowance program may foster household formation rather than
induce moves of existing households into higher quality dwellings.
Conversely, the current cuts in spending on public housing programs
may greatly increase the number of households that "double up·v.
An analysis without the consi~eration of household formation may
not only mispredict behavior quantitatively, but also qualitatively.
Using Sweeney's (1974) commodity hierarchy model of the housing
market, conventional analysis will predict an upwarO demand shift
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along the quality/size categories in response to a housing subsidy.
However, if housing allowances foster household formation, just the
opposite may occur: existing households in large units will split up,
and demand is increased in the lower categories of the hierarchy.
Note that an accompanying supply program, desiqned to cushion the
excess demand and based on conventional analysis, would fail. The
provision of publiC housing with large units will not only be a waste,
hut even increase excess demand at the relevant level in the
quality/size scale.
How should we design a model of housing demand that is able to
answer the question of how price responsive household formation is?
First, it should have a smaller decision unit than the household,
second, it should have doubling up as an alternative to the
conventional types of housing. We wi11 use the concept of the
family-nucleus (Pitkin, 1980) to define our decision unit, and we will
use discrete choice analysis and include the choice of doubling up.
We will apply such a model to four representative population strata:
(1) Young unmarried male and female without children, aged 20-34
(2) Harried couples with one or two children, aged 35-59
(3) Elderly married couples without children, aged 60 and above
(4) Widowed, divorced, and separated women without children,
aged 60 and above.
The model is estimated for the three Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas of Albany-Schenectady~Troy, New York; Dallas, Texas; and
Sacramento, California, representing the Northeast, the Sunbelt, and
the West Coast. The estimates are based on the Annual Housing Survey
SHSA cross-sections in 1976 and 1977.
- 70 -
We then apply the estimates to simulate changes in the tax and
subsidy structure for housing consumption. In the first case the
model simulates the impacts of a simple housing allowance program
along the lines of the housing gap formula applied in the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program in 1973-79. Second, the local property tax
rate is assumed to be a half of its actual rate in 1976-77. Finally
the model analyses the effect of reducing the highest marginal tax
rate of the federal income tax from 70 percent to 50 percent. For all
three changes, we calculate the resulting distribution of the
population among the different housing alternatives and study the
actual moves that take place in response to these changes with the
focus on the response of headship rates to price changes induced by
the simulations.
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3.2 Household Decomposition into Nuclei
Conventional housing demand analysis is based on households.
Households are the sampling units of almost all available housing data
bases. However, if household formation is endogenous, the decision
unit must be smaller than the household. In fact, the correct
decision unit is every housing consumer who could form his own
household. We will call this decision unit "nucleus" (Pitkin 1980).
A nucleus consists of a married couple or a single individual together
with all its own children below a certain age (say, 18 years).
Children above this threshold are considered grown-up and, as
potential household heads, form a new nucleus, even if they (still)
live in their parents' household. Similarly, households that consist
of several adults are split up into several nuclei, both when the
members are related or unrelated to each other. Examples are elderly
parents in the househol~ of their children, or roommates. This
construction assumes death, marriage, and divorce 3 as given from the
view-point of housing market analysis, but allows for the endcgeneity
of doubling up and undoublinq, and it also considers endogenous the
decision of adult children to stay at or leave home.
Accordingly, there are five types of households:
(1) households consisting just of one nucleus,
(2) parents With their adult children,
(3) households composed of nuclei With family-relations,
(4) households composed of nuclei without family-relations,
(5) complex households, i.e., combinations of the latter
three types.
Pitkin (1980) presents a variety of behavioral hypotheses for these
five types of households, and provides a descriptive analysis of
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tren~s in household composition. Pitkin and Masnick (1980) use the
nucleus approach for housing projections in the United States.
Each nucleus chooses its housing accommodation: it either shares
housing within an household composed of several nuclei, or heads its
own household. In the latter case, the nucleus has to decide which
housing unit in terms of tenure and dwelling size.
The basic idea of this approach is to avoi~ the difficult task of
constructing a behavioral model of the determination of the household
size per se (as Erm1sch 6 1981), or a model of the matching of nuclei
(as Wial, 1983). The estimation of the resulting structural form
tends to be unsatisfactory because of the high noise to signal ratio
given our poor knowledge about these mechanisms. In addition, the
approach is applicable to data on the microlevel which allows us to
use the rich information provided in surveys and to avoid the typical
biases in the use of aggregated data in housing demand studies (see
Polinsky and Ellwood, 1979). The split-up of households into their
true underlying decision units and the creation of the
headship/non-headship dichotomy can be interpreted as a reduced form
of the above mentioned behavioral models of household production and
formation.
The data ~ase of our empirical research is the Annual Housing
Survey by SKSA, cross-sections of 1976 and 1977. Sampling unit of the
ARB is the household. However, the composition of each household is
well documented. This allows us to detect other adults in the
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household with their children, and to create a data record for each of
these subnuclei in addition to the head nucleus. The explanatory
variables have to be split up according to this partition. All
demographic variables and the most important incom~ sources are
reported for each household member. Some income sources are only
reported for the household as a total, but in very specific income
categories. However, with the demographic characteristics of each
person, it is possible to employ a very accurate income allocation
scheme for these income categories. For housing costs, it is
suggestive that the nuclei pay their shares in proportion to the
number of adults and children in the nucleus 4 ,5.
This reduced form approach does not come without its costs.
Information is lost by splitting up households into independent nuclei
and separating them into different strata: e. 9., it seems a
valuab1e piece of informat1on q whether an adult child has parents with
a large house in town or not. However, this is a supply factor in the
provision of non-headshipe As we set out in the introduction, our
model is desiqned to describe "potential" housing demand under perfect
elastic supply. Furthermore, the housing alternative ,unon-head" is a
single category for a variety of rather different possible
multi-nuclei households. As a special problem, the entire concept of
headship is blurred in households of roommates, where no clear
subordination eXists. However, this problem is in so far irrelevant,
as in the case of roommates income and demographic characteristics
will be very close, and we can thus pick a hea~ at random.
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3.3 SpeCification of the Decision Tree and the Variables
Each nucleus chooses whether to head a household or shelter in an
eXisting household, if one chooses to head a household, then the
~ecisions are whether to rent or own a dwelling, and what quality and
size the dwelling should be. As a simple measure of quality and size,
we use the number of rooms and the type of the building. A household
chooses among three size categories and between single-family detached
houses and multi-family houses, in particular apartment buildings. We
can arrange the choices in form of a decision tree as depicted in
Fiqure 3-1. "Small" refers to dwellings with up to four rooms,
"medium" to dwellings with five or six rooms, and "large" to dwellings
with at least seven rooms 6 •
Some of the alternatives are fairly scarce, e.g., renting large
apartments or single-family homes, so some alternatives have to be
consolidated for a reliable estimation. This consolidation depends on
the stratum. Furthermore, no cost data are available for
owner-occupied dwellings in multifamily buildings, which forced us to
omit these alternatives from the choice set. A more satisfactory
approach would be to estimate the cost data for multifamily dwellings
by hedonic regressions, or to explicj.tly model the missing
alternatives in the definition of the choice probabilities. But the
problem is a minor one for Dallas 1976 and Sacramento 1977, where
these alternatives count for only 0.5 and 008 percefi~ of all choices;
it might bias o~r results only for Albany, ,where 6.9 percent of all
nuclei chose cooperatively owned multi-family buildings. The final
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FIGURE 3-1: BASIC DECISION TREE AND NOTATION OF ALTERNATIVES
============================================================
Headship:
Tenure:
Structure:
Size: + + + + + + ~ ~
SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE NH
MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM
~ 2 3 4 5
Head
5
o SF H
6 7 8
8
a SF M
9 10 1.1 12
11
o SF II
13
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FIGURE 3-2: DECISION TREES FOR THE DIFFERENT STRATA
========~=====~========~==~==============~=========
(1) YOUNG SINGLES:
NH OWN
+
+
R SF R HF.S R MF.L
(2),(3) FAMILIES AND ELDERLY COUPLES:
/I+~ I /\+ 1 ~ +
o SF.S o SF.M o SF.L R SF R KF.S R MF.L
(4) WIDOWS:
NH o SF.S 0 SF~M 0 SFoL
+
R SF
1\
R MF.S R MF.L
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decision trees aLe depicted in Figure 3-2.
exper~ent with other decision trees.
In Chapter 5, we will
The choice among the alternatives will depend on the following
demographic variables: (1) age of head of nucleus, (2) sex of head of
nucleus, (3) marital status of head of nucleus, (4) race of head of
nucleus, (5) number of children in the nucleus, as well as on
financial variables of (6) after-tax user-cost and (7) income. We
pursue the approach of de Leeuw (1971) and Quigley (1979) and assume
different demand functions for nuclei with different demographic
characteristics. Accordingly, we stratify the sample with the first
five demographic variables. This approach is equivalent to the use of
dummy variables for each of the strata which interact with all
regressors to accommodate the unknown nonlinear functional form (see
Li , 1977), in which the demoqraphic variables enter the equations for
the choice probabilities.
Of all possible strata, this paper examines demand functions for
four representative strata:
(1) Young sinqles: unmarried white male and female without
children, aged 20-35,
(2) Middle-aged families: married white couples with one or
two children, aged 35-59,
(3) Elderly couples: married white couples without
children, aged 60 and above,
(4) Widows: widowed, separated, and divorced white females
without children f aged 60 and above.
The financial variables, income and user-cost, enter the demand
functions directly. User-cost (UC) must be distinguished for renters
and owners. For renters, the user-cost is simply gross rent. For
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owners, the user-cost has a number of components (see for example,
Hendershott and Hu (1979) or Follain (1982»:
UC(own ) = maintenance + insurance + utility-payments
+ mortqage-rate * ~ebt
+ property tax rate * value
- tax savinqs from federal income tax deductions
+ T-Bill-rate * equity
- rate of appreciation * value
where the tax savings on the federal income tax is the sum of the
local property tax and the mortgage interest, multiplied by the
appropriate marginal tax rate. Note that federal income tax savings
depend through the marginal tax rate on such nucleus characteristics
as income and number of children. Furthermore, we assume different
interest rates on debt and on equity to account for the effect of
inflation on fixed-rate mortgages.
The user-cost of owners consists of two types of cost which the
nucleus perceives differently: Maintenance, mortgage costs, property
taxes and federal income tax savings are easily perceived as costs,
whereas capital gains from appreciation are uncertain and opportunity
costs of equity are a rather cloudy concept for non-economists. We
therefore split up user-cost in two components:
UC(own) = OOPOCK(own) + RETURN(own),
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where the "out-of-pocket cost Ii is composed of:
OOPOCK(own) =maintenance + insurance + utility-bills
+ local property tax + mortgage-rate * debt
- federal income tax savings,
and the return from the asset homeownership is defined as:
RETURN (own) = rate of appreciation * value
- T-Bill-rate * equity.
For fully rational housing demanders, the coefficients for OOPOCK and
RETURN should be of equal magnitude and opposite sign. For renters,
we set RETURN to zero.
The Annual Housing Survey qives us rather precise data for
out-of-pocket costs. The return variable has to be constructed with
external information: appreciation is based on the difference in
house values between the Annual Housing Survey 1976/77 and the 1970
Census, converted into yearly rates. This rate varies by SMSA and by
type of dwelling. Equity costs are calculated from the value-to-loan
ratio in the Annual Housing Survey, multiplied by the interest on
five-year U.S. treasury bills. Both appreciation rates and equity
costs suffer from serious data problems: loan-to-value ratios are
often not reported, making constructed SUbstitutes necessary, and the
available appreciation rates vary only by SMSA, but not within SMSA.
Given the cross-sectional data, the choice among the housing
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alternatives is a hypothetical one: we observe each nucleus With its
chosen alternative and its attributes like user-cost, do not observe
the attributes of the alternatives that the nucleus rejecteds We take
as these attributes the averages in the cross-section confined to
recent movers. Underlyinq is the notion that a household collects its
information on prices of other units by skimming through the ads in
the newspapers and listeninq to the experiences of friends and
neighbors who just move~. Mean prices of recent movers seem a
plausible approximation to the current spot market prices. Note
however that the comparison of spot prices With the prices tenants pay
after a considerable length of tenure may bias the estimated price
response. Specifically, the presence of tenure discounts in the
rental market will result in exaggerated price elasticities because we
compare the averaqe household With price pol(1+0L) for the tenure
discount QL after an av@rage length of tenure L With the recent mover
With price Po. Thus, the average price elasticity is overestimated by
a factor of ~+dL. This factor can roughly be estimated by dividing
the tenure discounts reported in Table 4-2 by the mean length of
tenure. Based on the conservative hedonic estimates by Follain and
Malpezzi (1980), this bias amounts in Albany to about 9.5 percent, in
Dallas to 1.5 percent. of the estimated price coefficient for OOPOCK.
The estimations by ~alpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) predict
considerably higher tenure discounts, implying an upward bias of 25
percent in Albany, 5 percent in Dallas, 7.5 percent in Sacramento.
ThUS, we should be careful to take those numbers in account when
interpreting the numerical size of our results. The responses on
exogenous price shocks are proportional to the price elasticitYt hence
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these biases translate in an exaggeration of the predicted reaction to
tax and subsidy changes in the order of the above-mentioned
percentages. However, in Section 3.5 through 3.7 we will see that
these biases do not change our qualitative conclusionsG In
particular, the most striking results will be found in Dallas and
Sacramento where the overestimation is least. Chapter 4 describes the
estimation of tenure discounts in more detail and provides some
critique of the quoted estimates and a more general discussion about
problems related to the description of intertemporal processes by a
static moael. Finally, in Chapter 5, we explicit1y correct housing
prices for the presence of tenure discounts.
For the hypothetical loan-to-value ratios, we assume a 20 percent
downpayment for young singles, and 99 percent for the elderly
households, which takes into account the avai1ability of mortqage
loans to the different age groups. This assumption is not critical to
the estimates, but is confirmed by cross- tabulations of' recent
movers.
Finally, income is defined as the current total gross income of
all nuc1eus members. Due to the nature of a choice between discrete
alternatives, income enters the demand functions interactively with
alternative-specific dummies. Furthermore, income influences the
out-of-pocket costs of homeowners because federal income tax saVings
depend on the marginal tax rate, i.e., on gross income.
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3e4 Baseline Estimates
The parameter estimates and summary statistics are tabulated in
Tables 3-3 trough 3-6 for each of the four strata. The parameters
represent the taste weights of the respective explanatory variables in
the deterministic part of the indirect utility function. T-statistics
are given in brackets, and are evaluated at zero for the taste
wei.ghts. Note that income Y interacts with alternative specific
dummies, where we use the same mnemonics for the alternatives as in
Figure 3-2. The final parameters are the similarity parameters that
express the degree 9f closeness in the respective clusters (See Figure
3-2). T-statistics for the similarity parameters are evaluated at
one 1 using the multinomial logit case as a benchmark. Three scalar
measures of performance or fit are used, see Section 4 in Chapter 2
for a discussion.
The model achieves a surprisingly high prediction accuracy in
terms of all three measures of fit. This is surprising because of the
small number of explanatory variables and the simple specification.
The model performs poorest in the strata of young sin91~s and in the
family stratum in Albany. The first is not astonishing: a static
model can hardly capture changes in housing consumption in this period
when the nucleus is establishing its own existence. These strata are
also very heterogeneous and include children still living With their
parents, student roommates, and singles in their thirties. The poor
performance in the case of families With one or two children in Albany
may be attributable to the misspecification of the decision tree where
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Table 3-3 : NMNL Parameter Estimates
~------~---~----~~--~~-~-----~~~-~~--~-~~-~-------~------~---~~--~--~~~-
"Young Singles r, : Unmarried, Age 20-35, No Children
ALBANY DALLAS SACRAMENTO
OOPOCI< -0.69598 -1.18246 -1.56947
(10.04) ( 9.96) (13.29)
RETURN 0.13156 0.12316 0.20421
( 1.55) ( 1.45) ( 2.97)
YNH -0.02006 -0.13204 -0.14574
( 1.65) ( 6.88) ( 5.36)
Y 0 -0.00196 0.00894 0.02125
( 0.09) ( 0.43) ( 0.65)
Y R SF 0.01213 -0.02375 0.01408
( 1.87) ( 1.61) ( 0.62)
Y R MF.S 0.02282 0.0421.2 0.03539
( 4.07) ( 3.38) ( 1.59)
TH R MF 0.20422 0.42742 0.45242
(26.81) ( 8.05) ( 7.08)
TAU HEAD 0.14958 0.32322 0.37700
(28.96) (13.17) (12.48)
LOGLIK -616.591 -421.180 -457.465
LOGLIK 0 -1401.82 -925.427 -1.199.03
RHO_SQ 0.56 0.545 0.618
%CORRECT 82.9% 73.2% 81.2'0
NOBS 871 575 745
In brackets: t-statistics around zero or one
LOGLIK = loqlikelihood at optimum
LOGLIK 0 = loglikelihood at zero
RHO_SQ- = 1.0 - LOGLIK/LOGLIl<_O
'CORRECT = percentage of correct ex post predictions
NOBS = number of observations
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Table 3-4 : NHNL Parameter Estimates
~---~-~~--------~-~--~-~~~--~----~-~-~~ - ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ --~~-~ -~-
"Families": Harried, Age 35-59, 1-2 Children
OOPOCK
RETURN
Y 0 SF.S
Y a SF.M
Y 0 SF.L
Y R SF
Y R MF.S
'J~H R MF
TH 0 SF
LOGLIK
LOGLIK 0
RHO_SQ
'CORRECT
NOBS
ALBANY
-0.92185
( 4.91.)
-0.69255
( 3.55)
-0.99077
( 4.35)
0.07448
( 3.12)
0.22973
( 6.19)
-0.00667
( 0.37)
-0.10296
( 1.86)
0.74920
( 0071)
5.03934
( 8.77)
-357.208
-627.116
0.43
78.9%
350
DALLAS
-3.55522
( 5e87)
1.07524
( 5.08)
-0.70474
( 4.69)
0.05039
( 1.20)
0.20642
( 3.56)
-O~02i19
( 0.63)
0.18602
( 1.69)
2.25563
( 0.86)
2.73284
( 3.21)
-121.134
-584.114
0.793
90.8%
326
SACRAMENTO
-2.81777
( 6.28)
0.63690
( 3087)
-0.32266
( 1..91)
0.15820
( 1.21)
0.27165
( 2.08)
0.18802
( 1.49)
-0.00061
( 0.00)
1.74344
( 1 .. 06)
2.20262
( 2.97)
-127.350
-580.530
0.781
90.9%
324
In brackets: t-statistics around zero or one
LOGLIK = loglikelihood at optimum
LOGLIK 0 = loglikelihood at zero
RHO_SQ- = 1.0 - LOGLIK/LOGLIK_O
'CORRECT = percentaqe of correct ex post predictions
NOBS = number of observations
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Table 3-5 : NMNL Parameter Estimates
~~~~~~~~~~~--~-----~~--~~--~~--~-~--~~--~~--~~~-----~~---~---~~~------~-
"Elderly Couples": Married, Age 60+, No Children
ALBANY DALLAS SACRAMENTO
OOPOCK -3.61354 -2.35330 -3.21796
( 8.29) ( 6.66) ( 6.49)
RETURN 0.52908 0.68032 1.02552
( 2.27) ( 4.27) ( 4087)
Y 0 SF.S -0.26210 -0.19193 -0.21797
( 4.15) ( 2.05) ( 2.68)
Y a SF.M 0.16994 0.08080 0.07719
( 3.96) ( 1.02) ( 1.11)
Y 0 SF.L 0.30284 0.25677 0.25455
( 4.94) ( 2.67) ( 3.05)
Y R SF 0.031.69 0.03272 0.11807
~ 0.59) ( O.42) ( 1.61)
Y R HF.S -0.08036 0.01.262 -0.14165
( 1.17) ( 0.15) ( 1.01)
TH R MF 3.02968 2.08399 3.39293
( 2.93) ( 1.49) ( 1.85)
TH 0 SF 1.41709 0.87605 0.47555
( 1.36) ( 0.49) ( 1.73)
LOGLIK -153.730 - 77.926 - 62.706
LOGLIK 0 -582.322 -458.690 -519.610
RHO_SQ 0.735 O~83 0.88
%CORRECT 86.8% 90.2% 91.7%
NOBS 325 256 290
In brackets: t-statistics around zero or one
LOGLIK = loglikelihood at optimum
LOGLIK 0 = loglikelihood at zero
RHO_SQ- = 1.0 - LOGLIK/LOGLIK_O
%CORRECT = percentage of correct ex post predictions
NOBS = number of observations
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Table 3-6 : NMNL Parameter Estimates
====================================
"Widows": Widowed, Divorced, Seearated, Age 60+, No Children
OOPOCK
RETURN
YHH
Y 0 SF.S
Y 0 SF.M
Y 0 SF.L
Y R SF
Y R MF.S
TH 0 SF
TH R MF
TAU HEAD
LOGLIK
LOGLIK 0
RHO_SQ
"CORRECT
NOBS
ALBANY
-2.9231.3
( gaSl)
0.28555
( 2.65)
-0.68624
(10.42)
-0.23088
( 4.71)
0.22788
( 6.47)
0.39921
( 5.73)
0.01295
( 0.34)
-0.02053
( 0.63)
1.48636
( 1.75)
1.48222
( 1.73)
0.48036
( 5.79)
-311 • .114
-1037.1.7
0.70
89.0%
533
DALLAS
-~.74357
( 7.17)
0.16035
( 2.17)
-0.49553
( 4.77)
-0.16355
( 1.95)
0009891
( ~.36)
0.20989
( 2009)
0.06526
( 0.89)
0.04518
( 0.59)
0.60497
( 2.10)
1.48958
( 1.12)
0.45743
( 6.31)
-199.974
-646.042
0.69
88.3%
332
SACRAMENTO
-3.65622
( 7.61)
0.61589
( 4.84)
-0.83475
( 6.47)
-0.27639
( 3.12)
0.16234
( ~.g9)
O~43735
( 2.88)
0.01310
( 0.21)
-0.00102
( 0.01)
1.03269
( 0.07)
0.47043
( 4.21)
- 94.920
-651.880
0.85
82.6\
335
In brackets: t-statistics around zero or one
LOGLIK = loglikelihood at optimum
LOGLIK 0 = loglikelihood at zero
RHO_SQ- = 1.0 - LOGLIK/LOGLIK_O
%CORRECT = percentage of correct ex post predictions
NOBS = number of observations
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I
the alternative of owning cooperatively is not included.
Table 3-7 shows the prediction success table for the stratum of
unmarried elderly in Sacramento, based on the criterion (2.14). The
diagonal dominance reflects the
off-diagonal elements represent
high
the
prediction accuracy. The
mispredictions: the model has
some difficulties in discriminating between small rental housing and
non-headship, which may reflect the crude reauced form specification
of the household formation process.
The main result is the significance of the price variables in all
strata. The out-af-pocket costs are highly significant, while the
RETURN variable is somewhat weaker. Note that the hypothesis of
rationality ~- i.e., equal magnitude and opposite signs for the taste
weights of OOPOCK and RETURN ~~- is rejected; considerably more weigrt
is given to easily perceived out-of-pocket costs as opposed to
appreciation minus equity costs. One should keep in mind, however,
the difficulties of constructing the RETURN variable. Note
furthermore that RETURN is 1east significant for the young singles,
the strata most affected by liquidity constraints, rendering the
rationality hypothesis inappropriate and introducing a lot of noise.
Note the similarity between the estimates for elderly couples and
elderly widows: taking into account the different choice sets (a
large proportion of widows live in their children's homes), it
reflects the stability of the taste weights during old age.
The income dummies have a threefold function. First, they
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Table 3-7: Example of a Success Table and a Full Elasticity Matrix
~=================================================================
Stratum: Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Age 60+, No Children
SMSA: Sacramento
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE:
OBSERVED PREDICTED ALTERNATIVE
ALT. I NH O_dF.S O_SF.M O_SF.L R_SF R_MF.S R_MF.L
-------+----------------------------------------------------
NH 73 1 a 0 0 10 0
o SF.S 1 32 a 0 0 1 0
o SFoM 0 0 77 0 0 1 a
o SF.L 0 0 0 19 0 0 0
R SF 2 0 0 0 25 1 0
R MF.S 17 0 0 0 1 70 0
R MF.L 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
-------+---------~------------------------------------------
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED
MEAN INDIVIDUAL ELASTICITIES:
88.96 %
VARIABLE ALT • I
OOPOCK NH
OOPOCK a SF.S
OOPOCK 0 SF.M
OOPOCK 0 SF.L
OOPOCI< B SF
OOPOCK R MF.S
OOPOCK R MF.L
RETURN 0 SF.S
RETURN 0 SF.H
RETURN 0 SF.L
Y NH
Y 0 SF.S
Y 0 SF.X
Y 0 SF.L
Y R SF
Y_R_MF.S
Y SUII
CHOICE PROBABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE:
NH O_SF.S O_SF.M O_SF.L R_SF R_MF'.S R MF.L
-2.814 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739
0.420-12.898 -4.671 -4.671 1.876 1.876 10876
0.918 0.389-12.540 0.389 1.968 1.968 1.968
0.235 0.195 0.195-23.002 0.502 0.502 0.502
0.287 0.670 0.670 0.670-19.015 0.670 0.670
1.315 4.097 4.097 4.097 4.097-10.477 -3.161
0.103 0.322 0.322 0.322 O~322 -0.317-10.964
-0.200 2.759 0.892 0.892 -0.634 -0.634 -0.634
-0.429 -0.345 1.711 -0.345 -0.915 ~0~915 -0.915
-0.120 -0.112 -0.112 2.316 -0.256 -0.256 -0.256
-4.422 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588
0.187 -2.059 -0.453 -0.453 0.452 0.452 0.452
~O.330 -0.242 0.702 -0.242 -0.704 -0.704 -0.704
-0.302 -0.281 -0.281 2.261 -0.642 -00642 -0.642
-0.005 -O~012 -0.012 -0.012 0.155 -0.012 -0.012
0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.009 -0.003
-4.871 -2.002 0.548 2.146 -0.147 -0.326 ~O.320
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reflect the relative price of housing with respect to all other goods.
In addition, they indicate the attractiveness of the various
alternatives relative to large rented apartments, measured in money
terms. In absence of any other alternative-specific dummies, they
also pick up all other non-measured advantages and disadvantages of
the include~ alternatives relative to large rented apartments. ThUS,
one'should be careful not to rush to conclusions about pure income
effects. Introduction of altgrnative-specific dummies in several test
strata reduces the income parameters, but leaves the price variables
virtually constant. Because the focus of the simulations is on
relative prices rather than on income, we avoided the costly inclusion
of a1ternative specific dummies.
The attractiveness of the alternatives measured by the taste
weights of the income dummies corresponds to a priori assessment.
Note that most of the rented single-family houses are small houses,
thus their negative weight for families With one or two children.
The last two coefficients in Tables 3-3 through 3-6 are the
weights of the inclusive values or similarity coefficients. Note that
four of the similarity coefficients are significantly larger than one
(at the 5 percent level). This implies that in these strata the
compatibility With the underlying microeconomic theory of random
utility maximization must be explicitly checked for the given data and
is not automatically guaranteed as in the other strata (see appendiX) 0
In fact, the test rejects this compatihility. Note that the
microeconomic theory described above is based on static utility
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maximization. Note furthermore that failure of the test occurs in the
strata where people move considerably less frequently than in the
strata of young singles, where the similarity parameters are in the
unit-interval. The rejection thus could be interpreted as a hint that
optimization is done aynamically and that the model in these strata
should be interprete~ as only a reduced-form description of the
steady-state as opposed to a structural static choice model.
To gain some intuition for the magnitudes of the coeffiCients, we
calculate the elasticities corresponding to the parameter estimates of
Tables 3-3 through 3-6. OWn price elasticities and income
elasticities, tabulated in Table 3-8, refer to a change of the
probability of choosing alternative i, when OOPOCK or RETURN in
alternative i is changed. The income elasticities in Table 3-8 are
the sum over the elasticities of all income dummies. In Table 3-7 p
the complete matrix of elasticities is presented for the stratum of
unmarried elderly in Sacramento. The pattern in the price
elasticities across alternatives reflects the structure of the
decision tree. Particularly interesting is the first column of price
elasticities, referring to the probability to choose non-head status.
As closest sUbstitute for this alternative emerges renting small
units, as expected. The large cross elasticity of 1.315 once more
reflects the price responsiveness of household fo~mation. The cross
elasticity with respect to renting large units can be decomposed into
two components: a positive component for the sUbstitution effect, and
a negative part for a supply effect. Large rental units constitute
the supply for non-headship possibilities, therefore, their price will
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Table 3-8: Own Price and Sum of Income Elasticities
~~~~--~-~~~~-~-~--~~~-~~---~~~~~~~~~~------~~-~--~­-~-~~--~-~~----~~---~~---~~~-------~-~--~-----~~~~~
PROS I NH o SF.S o SF.M o SF.L R SF R MF.S R MF.L
--------+----------------~-------_._~-----------------------------
AlbanYr Young Singles:
OOPOCK -0.395 -19.596 -12.973 -2.463 -7.227
RETURN 0.0 3.675 0.0 0.0 000
INCOME -0.083 -O~591 -0.101 0.238 -0.343
Albany, Families
OOPOCI< -0.209 -0.686 -0.898 -2.460 -2.517 -20169
RETURN -0.468 -0.386 -0.415 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -4.835 -0.132 0.553 -3.394 -6.250 -3.193
Albany, Elderly Couples:
OOPOCK -3.765 -6.222 -11.998 -1.0.187 -4$517 -5.160
RETURN 0.791 0.379 0.653 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -4.214 0.028 1.333 -1.788 -2.944 -2.574
Albany, Widows:
00POCK -2.430 -6~984 -7.529 -11.861 -J.6.940 -5.979 -6.016
RETURN 0.0 -0.914 -0.292 -0.418 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -3.694 -lQ284 0.359 0.973 --0.428 -OG737 -00664
Dallas, Young Singles:
OOPOCK -0.632 -16.494 -8.392 -3.031 -7.641
RETURN 0.0 2.165 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -0.669 -0.037 -0.710 0.625 -0.030
Dallas, Families:
OOPOCK -201.67 -3.366 -6.141 -8.548 -4.786 --8.590
RETURN 1.531 1.335 1.451 OGO 0.0 0.0
INCOME -7.663 -1.343 1.138 -2.536 -4$690 -2.513
Dallas, Elderly Couples:
OOPOCK -4.581 -5.189 -18.934 -50798 -4.,316 -4.31~
RETURN 2.064 1.313 2.497 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -5.462 -0.667 2.427 -1.337 -1.676 -1.770
Dallas, Widows:
OOPOCK -1.431 -5.806 -8.680 -24.426 -8.964 -5.162 -4.867
RETURN 0.0 0.816 0.682 lCII016 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -2.823 -1.958 0.457 1.478 0.341 0.005 -0.164
--------+--------------------------------------------------------
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Table 5: Own Price and Sum of Income Elasticities (cent'd)
~--~---~~-----~~~~--~---~~~-~~~-~-~~~~-~~-~~-~~~-~--~~-~~­--~~~-----~~~------~----~~----~----~~~--~----~~-~~-~-~-~~-
PROS I NH O_SF.S O_SF.M O_SFGL R_SF R_MF.S R_MF.L
--------+----~---------------------------------------------------
Sacramento, Young Singles:
OOPOCK -0.728 --160459 -10.046 -3.563 -9.519
RETURN 0.0 2.939 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -0.513 0.279 0.181 0.468 0.064
Sacramento, Families:
OOPOCK -2.570 -2.862 -4.790 -6.922 -5.222 -50358
RETURN 1.215 0.844 1.112 0.0 0.0 0.0
INCOME -5.563 -0.550 0.632 -0.397 -4.727 -4.719
Sacramento, Elderly Couples:
OOPOCK -13.100 -9.361 -42.173 -8.112 -4.318 -5.485
RETURN 504;9 2.490 8.194 0.0 0.0 000
INCOME -7.813 0.672 5.770 0.765 -2.055 -1.484
Sacramento, Widows:
OOPOCK -2.814 -12.898 -12e540 -23.002 -19.015 -10.477 -10.964
RETURN 0.0 2.759 1.711 2.316 O~O 0.0 0.0
INCOME -4.871 -2.002 0.548 2.146 -00147 -0.326 -0.320
--------+----------~---------------------------------------------
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be negatively correlated to the choice probability of not form~ng an
household. Both effects together seem to cancel out, reflected in the
insignificant value of 0.103.
If we compare the own elasticities across strata, the following
general pattern emerges: the strata of young singles and elderly
widows are the most price-responsive, especially in the owner
alternatives, reflecting a priori knowledge of inertia and mobility in
the different strata. Return from the asset homeownership eXhibits a
strong life-cycle behavior, and is thus higher for young people with a
long decision horizon than for the elderly. Headship rates are highly
responsive to prices for both young singles and elderly widows.
Finally, note again that the income elasticities measure not only
income but also pure alternative specific effects due to their
interaction with alternative specific dummies.
The elasticity pattern is fairly stable across the three SMSAs,
in spite of their very different distribution of housing alternatives.
This provides some confidence in the robustness of the model. As a
qenera~ pattern, housing demand reacts most to prices in Sacramento
and least in Albany, suggesting the more flexible nature of the
housing market in California compared with New England.
holds for both out-of-pocket costs and returns.
Summing up, we observe the following:
The pattern
o Relative prices significantly determine housing choices
for given demographic variables.
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o Household formation, in particular, is highly responsive.
o Out-af-pocket costs have higher taste weights ~han return
from horneownership.
o Among strata, young singles and widows are more price
responsive than the relatively inert strata of families and
elderly couples.
o The sensitivity to RETURN shows the expected life-cycle
behavior.
o The general pattern of elasticities is fairly stable
across markets, with Albany behaving least flexibly and
Sacramento the most.
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3.5 A Housing Allowance Program
The estimation results show a strong responsiveness of household
formation to housing prices. It is now interesting what the
consequences of endogenous household formation rates are in
quantitative terms. Do the price coefficients, highly significant as
they are, in fact translate into a reassessment of policy analysis?
We will use the estimation results for three comparative static
experiments of pub1ic intervention in the housing market~ housing
allowances, local property taxes, and the deduction from the federal
income tax. These experiment~ are exercises in comparative statics
and have thus to be interpreted as long-run responses, leading to a
new steady state equilibrium. Furthermore, the results are based on
the partial analysis of only the demand side in the preceding
sections. Thus, we implicitly assume a perfect malleable housing
stock and disregard all transitional phenoma like inertia of mobility
and transaction costs.
Between 1973 and 1979 5 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development conducted a large scale Experimental Housing Allowance
Program. Kennedy (1980) describes in ~etail the design of the
program, and a good survey of the sUbsequent discussion and critique
is given in Bradbury and Downs (1981). Somewhat surprising is the
fact that all components of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program
ignored the feedback of housing allowances on household formation.
One focal point in this section is the question of how much
improvement in housing conditions comes through increased headship
- 96 -
rates over and above moves of existing households into larger
dwellings.
The following simulation assumes a so-called housing gap formula
for the calculation of the allowances. First, for each family size _
and site a benchmark rent is calculated, representing the "fair cost
of standard housing." Then a minimum standard of quality is
established, with only dwellings above this standard eligible for the
subsidy. Finally, a linear tax is levied on the allowances in such a
way that people with no (adjusted) income will receive the full rent
for standard housing, whereas people above a certain income level will
receive no allowances at al1~
If the minimum standard is measured as a fraction a of the fair
cost of standard housing C, and tbe upper income limit is a multiple b
of C, then the housing allowance for a household with income Y and
rent R is:
o if R < aC
o if Y > be
C-Y/b otherwise.
To perform a realistic experiment, we use the settings a=O.7, b=4.0,
and C from the Experimental Housing Allowances Program, where C was
ta14~en from the Pittsburgh demand experiment and inflated by a yearly
as well as inter-SMSA rent index as follows:
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FAIR MONTHLY RENTS I PITTSBG 75 DALLAS 77 ALBANY 77 SACRAM 76
NO. OF PERSONS:
-------------------+-----~-----------------~---------~-----------
1 $ 115 $ 150 $ 130 $ 140
2 130 180 160 170
3-4 150 200 180 190
5-6 170 225 205 215
7+ 205 275 245 260
-------------------+-------~---------------------------~---------
Housing allowances introduce nonlinearities in the bUdget set,
see Hausman and Wise (1980) or Venti and Wise (1982). They can be
handled fairly elegantly in discrete choice models by changing the
prices of the housing alternatives differently rather than by adding
the allowances to the income.
Table 3-9 lists the predicted shares of the housing alternatives
before and after the introduction of the housing allowance program.
Given the static nature of the model, this reflects a change between
steady-states. The shares are calculated as means of the individual
choice probabilities. Table 3-10, in turn, tabulates the moves
according to the individual predictions.
Our main result is the strong impact of housing allowances on
headship rates: about half of the people who lived in some sort of
shared accommodations created their own households in response to the
housing allowance program. Most of these nuclei in the strata of
/
young singles have little or no income, thus their rent net of the
housing allowance is virtually zero. More surprising is the strong
response in the strata of elderly widows, where the non-head share is
far less and the income higher than among the young singles, the share
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Table 3-9: AGGREGATED SHARES: HOUSING ALLOWANCES
=================================================
Stra Alt. I ALBANY DALLAS SACRAMENTOtum before after before after before after
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
YSL HH .6331 .4780 .5507 .3226 .6262 .3067
o SM
o HE .0092 .0092 .0224 .0219 .0425 .0409
o LA
R SF .0123 .0159 .0478 .0913 .0508 .0772
R 8M .2815 .4041 .3438 .5046 .2642 .5396
RLA .0637 .0928 .0353 .0596 .0163 .0356
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
FAX HH
o SM .0182 .0149 .0440 .0272 .0320 .0210
o ME .3310 .3270 .4439 .4370 .4772 .4682
o LA .4997 .4969 .4085 .4046 .3852 .3831
R SF .0546 .0572 .0639 .0694 .0780 .0772
R 8M .0161 .0207 .01.52 .0299 .0219 .0394
R LA .0804 .0833 .0244 .0320 00056 .0111
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
ELC NH
o SM .1251 .0920 .1443 .1174 .1450 .1191
o ME .4050 s3830 .5446 &5316 .6667 .6418
o LA ~2773 .2683 .2014 .2004 .0750 .0746
R SF .0174 .0193 .0420 .0517 .0531 .0595
R 8M .0870 .1225 .0484 .0686 .0335 .0613
R LA .0882 .1.149 .0192 .0302 .0268 ~O437
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
WID NH .2757 .1300 .21.30 .1005 .2745 .J.068
o 8M .0694 .0387 • .11.65 .0562 .1105 .0946
o ME .1602 .1.398 .31.44 .2875 .2281 .2232
OLA .0985 e0909 .0486 .0453 .0562 .0558
R SF .0273 .0286 .0737 .0953 .0729 .0777
R 8M .2340 .3636 .1.842 .3039 .2437 .4160
R LA .1348 .2084 .0496 .1133 .0140 .0259
-----------+--------------+_.._-------------+---------------
First column : predicted shares of housing alternatives
before housing allowances.
Second column: predicted shares of housing alternatives
with housing allowance program in effect
(housing gap flormula: P = C - Y/b).
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of non-heads is nevertheless drastically reduced in response to the
subsidy. We conclude once more that headship rates are important
endogenous variables in the housing market.
Within the rental sector, only few moves occure The mobility
rates induced by the housing allowances (Albany 0.047, Dallas 0.057,
Sacramento 0.055) are very close to those measured in the demand part
of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program by MacMillan (1980)
i.e., Pittsburgh Os045 and Phoenix 0.101. Note again the difference
in the price sensitivity between the Northeast and the S~uthwest.
Unlike the Experimental Housing Allowance Program, our simulation
offered allowances for rental housing to everybody in the population,
changing the balance in the tenure choice in favor of rentinge As a
response, we observe a retatively large number of moves from the
owner-occupied section into the rental section of the housing market.
The mobility rates for the shift from owning to renting induced by the
allowances are between 0.125 for Sacramento and 0.189 for Albany.
Note the lower rate for Sacramento, reflecting the high valuation of
owner-occupancy in the West relative to the Northeast.
Hoves from owner-occupancy into the rental market have two
important fiscal side-effects: on the federal level, some money given
for housing allowances is retrieved through lower mortgage and
property tax deductions from the federal income tax. More important
is the spill-over effect at the local level of reductions in local
property taxes. Table 3-11 lists these fiscal repercussions created
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Table 3-10: Predicted Moves in Response to Housing Allowance Program
-~~----~-~~~---~--~-~~~~~~~~--~--~~~-~--~~~~-----~-~-~--~-~------~-----~--~----~---~-----~------~~--~-~----------~~--~~---~-----------~~
Stratum from NH O.S O.M D.L R.SF R.KS R.ML
-~~-~-~---------~~---~~--~~~~-~-~---~----~--~--~--~-~----------~
Albany, to R SF 1 0 0 0
Young Singles to R MF.S 309 0 0 0
to R HF.L 3 0 0 0
Albany, to R SF 0 a 0 0 0
Families to R HF.S 9 3 a 3 3
to R MF.L 0 0 3 0 3
Albany, to R SF 0 0 a 0 0
Elderly Couples to R MF.S 24 28 3 0 0
to R MF.L 6 0 a 0 0
Albany, to R SF 0 0 0 0 0 0
Widows to R MF.S 156 11 26 11 0 4
to R MF.L 0 0 0 2 a 2
Dallas, to R SF 4 0 0 0
Young Singles to R MF.S 426 0 0 0
to R MF.L 2 0 0 0
Dallas, to R SF 3 0 0 0 0
Families to R MF.S 18 6 0 3 0
to R MF.L 0 0 0 0 0
Dallas, to R SF 8 0 0 0 0
Elderly Couples to R MF.S 35 0 0 4 0
to R MF.L 0 0 0 0 0
Dallas, to R SF 18 0 0 0 a a
Widows to R MF.S 172 33 1.2 3 12 0
to R MFoL 0 0 0 a 0 0
Sacramento, to R SF 9 0 0 0
Young Singles to R MF.S 525 1. 3 1
to R KF~L 1 0 0 0
Sacramento, to R SF 3 0 0 0 0
Families to R MF.S 16 6 3 9 0
to R MF.L 0 0 0 0 0
Sacramento, to R SF 7 0 0 0 0
Elderly Couples to R MF.S 31 1.7 0 3 0
to R MF.L 0 0 0 0 a
Sacramento, to R SF 0 0 0 0 0 a
Widows to R !IF.S 194 3 3 0 3 0
to R MF.L 0 0 0 0 0 0
~~~-~~--~--~~-~~--~--~~------~---~~~~----~~~--~-~~-~-~-~-~-~---~
Notes: predicted moves, normalized for 1000 nuclei per stratum
- 101 -
Table 3-11: FISCAL INCIDENCE BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS AND STRATA
======================~=====================================
Stratum Level of
Government
Housing
Allowances
Property
Tax Cut
Fed. Income
Tax Change
Albany, Young Singles:
Federal, direct subsidy 638.60 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy 0.0 -1.02 -0.91
Local, lost property tax 0.0 5.20 0.0
Albany, Families
Federal, direct subsidy 50.16 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy 0.0 -110.4 -33.73
Local, lost property tax 12.30 433.9 1.94
Albany, Elderly Couples
Federal, direct subsidy 60.52 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy -0.98 -77.54 -26.83
Local, lost property tax 44.31 357.57 9.05
Albany, Widows
Federal, direct subsidy 274.65 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy -0.33 -14.24 -6.28
Local, lost property tax 39.37 80.87 3.81
Dallas, Young Singles
Federal, direct subsidy 823.08 Q.Q 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy 0.0 -0.79 -0863
Local, lost property tax 0.0 3.73 0.0
Dallas, Families
Federal, direct subsidy 46.24 0.0 0.0
Federal, taX-SUbsidy -0.91 -87.48 -43.63
Local, lost property tax 10.93 286.66 3G73
Dallas, Elderly Couples
Fecieral, direct subsidy 58.22 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy OC)O -47.80 -16.80
Local, lost property tax 12.12 220.49 0.0
Dallas, Widows
Federal, direct subsidy 480.17 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy 0.0 --10.31 -4.21
Local, lost property tax 19.58 123.76 0.0
--~~----~~-------~--~-~-~-~---~--------~~~-~~--------~~~~------
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Table 9: INCIDENCE: BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS AND STRATA (cont'd)
=============================================================
Stratum Level of
Government
Housing
Allowances
Property
Tax Cut
Fed. Income
Tax Change
Sacramento, Young Singles
Federal, direct subsidy 982.60 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy -0004 -3.71 -1.60
Local, lost property tax 1.92 9.72 0.67
Sacramento, Families
Federal, direct subsidy 45.74 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy -2~77 -80.80 -38.42
Local, lost property tax 1.3.70 338.09 7.31
Sacramento, Elderly Couples
Federal, direct subsidy 70.02 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy -1.33 -56.72 -41.30
Local, lost property tax 27.71 289.92 6.66
sacramento, Widows
Federal, direct subsidy 299.39 0.0 0.0
Federal, tax-subsidy 0.0 -13.78 -0.71
Local, lost property tax 2e96 101.39 0.0
Notes: The table lists the direct subsidy in the case of housing
allowances, the indirect subsidy via Federal Income Tax
savings due to deduction of interest and local property
tax, and the local property tax losses to the local
jurisdiction. The unit is $ 1000 for a normalized stratum
of 1000 nuclei, i.e. dollars per nucleus per year. The
numbers are based on the predicted moves of Table 8.
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by the shift of demand 7 • All amounts are normalized to a stratum of
1000 nuclei to allow for comparisons both among strata and among SMSA.
Note that especially for the married strata, the losses in local
property taxes are a sizable proportion of the housing allowances paid
by the federal goyernment.
We can sum up the results of the housing allowance experiment as
follows:
o headship rates are highly responsive to the housing
subsidies,
o mobility rates within the rental market are low and of
comparable size to the findings of the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program,
o greater mobility between renting and owning produces
sizable spill-over effects from federal policy to the local
1evel.
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3.6 Tax Simulations
3.6.1 Cutting the Local Property Tax By One Half
In recent years, some states have passed legislation that
introduces upper ceilings for local property tax rates, e.g.,
Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts.
These ceilings imply a drastic reduction in local property taxes for
given assessment ratios. As a crude approximation of the isolated
impact due to a drastic change in the local property tax rate, the
following simulation predicts the distribution of nuclei into housing
categories assuming a property tax rate of half the level in effect
during the estimation period 1976/77.
Effective property taxes (as percentages of the house values
reported in the Annual Housing Survey) in this period were 2.2 percent
in Albany, 1.3 percent in Dallas, and 1.6 percent in Sacramento. The
proportion of property taxes in the out-Of-pocket cost varies
considerably across strata, mainly due to the variation in mortgage
payments in the life cycle, and less so across housing alternatives;
the overall proportion is about 10 percent. The impact of the
property tax cut is softened by a reduction in the federal income tax
deductions proportional to the marginal tax rate of the household.
Taking this into account, the simulation reduces the cost of
owner~occupancy about 3 percent for the average homeowner. This is a
fairly small change in relative prices considering that the property
tax rate is lowered by 50 percent.
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Table 3-12 lists the distribution of housing alternatives before
and after the property tax change, calculated as means of the
individual choice probabilities. If we concentrate only on the tenure
choice, the share of owner-occupancy increases by:
Stratum Albany Dallas Sacramento
--------------------+--------------------------------------
Young Singles .0050 .0024 .0119
Families .0249 .0213 .0273
Elderly Couples .0670 .0151 .0249
Widows .1080 .0333 .0454
--------------------+--------------------------------------
The impact is of course strongest in Albany where the property tax is
substantially higher than in Dallas and Sacramento. In addition, the
impact is very low for young singles: they have high mortgage
payments and the percentage of property taxes in their total
out-af-pocket costs is very low. The same reasoning explains why the
increase in owner-occupancy is largest for small houses. In addition,
smaller houses are attractive for people with low incomes, for whom
the offsetting effect of decreasing income tax deductions is least.
Finally, we can see the interjurisdictional fiscal effects in the
second column of Table 3-11. In the family strata, the gains for the
federal government by smaller deductions are between 23.9 percent and
30.3 percent of the losses in local proparty taxes. The size of this
spill-over effect depends on two factors: it simply reflects the
relatively high marginal tax rates for these strata, but the gains are
also reduced by the higher share of owner-occupancy in response to the
tax change.
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Table 3-10: AGGREGATED SHARES: LOCAL PROPERTY TAX CUT
======================================================
Stra Alt. I ALBANY DALLAS SACRAMENTOtum before after before after before after
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
YSL NH .6331 .6322 .5507 .5501 .6262 .6227
o 8M
o ME .0092 .0142 .0224 .0248 .0425 .0544
o LA
R SF .0123 .0119 .0478 .0477 .0508 .0494
R 8M .2815 .2791 .3438 .3424 .2642 .2578
R LA .0637 .0627 .0353 .0350 .0163 .0157
-----------+--------------+----------------+---~-----------
FAM NH
o 8M ca0182 .0201 .0440 .0458 .0320 .0378
o ME .3310 .3413 .4439 .4585 .4772 .4899
o LA 04997 .5123 .4085 .4134 .3852 .3940
R SF .0546 00456 .0639 .0530 .0780 .0587
R 8M .0161 .0132 .0152 .0114 .0219 ,,0157
R LA .0804 .0674 .0244 .0178 .0056 .0038
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
ELC NH
o 8M .1251 .1745 .1443 .1529 .1450 .1617
o ME .4050 .4173 .5446 .5503 .6667 e6728
o LA .2773 .2826 .2014 e2023 .0750 .0770
R SF .0174 .O~37 .. 0420 .0374 .0531 .0436
R 8M .0870 .0543 .0484 .0412 .0335 .0246
R LA .0882 .0576 00192 .0159 .0268 .0203
-----------+---------~----+-------------~--+---------------
WIn NH .2757 .2396 02130 .2016 .2745 .2585
o SM .0694 .1606 .1165 .1411 .1105 e1506
o ME .1602 .1746 .3144 .3202 .2281 .2326
o LA .0985 .1011 .0486 .0494 .0562 .0572
R SF .0273 .0254 .0737 .0703 .0729 .0711
R 8M .2340 .1942 .1842 .1703 .2437 .2181
R LA .1348 .1046 .0496 .0450 .0140 .0120
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
First column : predicted shares of housing alternatives
under actual 1977 local property taxes.
Second column: predicted shares of housing alternatives
under only 50% of the 1977 10cal property
taxes.
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We can summarize the results of the property tax experiment as
follows:
o The impact of a strong reduction in the local property
tax is small in the strata with high mortgage payments and
high tax bracketsG It is high for the elderly and for small
homeowners.
o The spill-over effect to the federal government is
sizable. The direct effect through the marginal tax rate is
partially offset by the indirect effect of movers into
owner-occupancy.
- 108 -
3.6~2 Making the Federal Income Tax Less Progressive
The final simulation concerns the change in the federal income
tax law that reduced the highest marginal tax rate from 70 percent to
50 percent. This has two opposing effects on housing consumption:
while high-income people pay fewer taxes the deductions for mortgage
interest and local property taxes are less worth and thus reduce the
tax advantages of ownership. In the following simulation, we isolate
the second effect by holding the income level constant and calculate
the tax savings in the out-of-pocket costs of homeownership assuming
the new tax schedule. We used the feder~l income tax schedule for
1983 and deflated the tax brackets by the Consumer Price Index to the
price and income level of the estimation period.
We can again make the bac~-on-the-envelopecalculation as in the
preceding section: for the very rich, deductions lose 20 percent of
their value. If we assume that a third of the out-of-pocket costs is
deductible, we generate a 7 percent increase in the cost of
owner-occupancy. This is an upper limit: people in lower tax
brackets face a much smaller increase because below the 50 percent
brackets, the marginal tax rates were only very slightly reduced. For
the poor, there is no change whatsoever.
It should be noted that the sample includes only few "very rich"
people-(the 50 percent tax bracket in 1977 was about $ 40,000) because
the selection of strata overrepresents the very young and elderly
nuclei. Table 3-13 shows that the change in the marginal tax rate
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Table 3-13: AGGREGATE SHARES: FLATTER FEDERAL INCOME TAX SCHEDULE
==================================================================
Stra Alt.
I
ALBANY I DALLAS I SACRAMENTOtum before after before after before after
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
YSL NH .6331 .6333 .5507 .5508 .6262 .6269
o SM
o ME .0092 .0088 .0224 .0219 .. 0425 .0408
o LA
R SF .0123 .0124 .0478 .0478 .0508 .0509
R 8M .2815 .2817 .3438 • 344l. .2642 .2651
R LA .0637 .0638 .0353 .0353 .O~63 .01.63
_______ a~ +--------------+---------------_+--------- _
FAM NH
o 8M .0182 .0179 .0440 .0427 .0320 .0297
o ME 83310 .3284 .4439 .4400 .4772 .4734
o LA .4997 .4970 .4085 .4077 .3852 .3833
R SF .0546 .0566 .0639 .0666 .0780 .0830
R 8M .0161 .0166 .0152 .0168 .0219 .0242
R LA .0804 .0835 11)0244 .0262 .0056 .0064
-----------+--------------+----------------+-----~---------
ELC NH
o SM .1.251 .1210 .1443 .1440 .1450 .1438
o ME .4050 .4034 .5446 .5433 .6667 .6645
o LA .2773 82760 .2014 .. 2012 .0750 .0744
R SF .0174 .0177 .0420 .0425 .0531 .0542
R SM .0870 .0905 .0484 .0493 .0335 .0352
R LA .0882 .0914 .0192 .0193 .0268 .0280
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------I
WIn NH .2757 .2760 .2130 .2131 .2745 .2747
o SM .0694 .0676 .1165 ~1163 .1105 .1108
o ME 01602 .1596 .3144 .3136 e2281 .2277
o LA .0985 ~O984 .0486 .0486 .0562 .0560
R SF .0273 .0274 .0737 .0739 .0729 .0728
R 8M .2340 .2351 .1842 .1847 .2437 .2440
RLA .1348 .1359 .0496 .0498 .0140 .0140
-----------+--------------+----------------+---------------
First column : predicted shares of housing alternatives
under actual 1977 Federal Income Tax
schedule (highest marginal tax rate: 70%).
Second column: predicted shares of housing alternatives
under 1983 Federal Income Tax schedule,
deflated by CPI to 1977 levels (highest
marginal tax rate: 50%).
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results in a slight shift from owning to renting. More
comprehensively, the share of renting increases by:
Stratum I Albany Dallas Sacramento
--------------------+--------------------------------------
Young Singles .0005 .0004 .0017
Families .0056 .0061 .0081
Elderly Couples .0070 .0015 .0040
Widows .0026 .0010 .0004
--------------------+--------------------------------------
These numbers are very small: not only very few people are affected
by the change in the marginal tax rate, but these "very rich" people
are also those who are least likely to shift to the rental market.
Within each city, the shifts into rental units basically reflect
the tax brackets which can be seen by a look at the yearly mean income
before taxes:
Stratum Albany Dallas Sacramento
--------------------+-----------------------~--------------
Young Singles $ 5,200 $ 6,700 $ 5,200
Families 22,200 26,400 23:000
Elderly Couples 13,900 15,400 13,700
Widows 5,300 5,600 6,000
------------~-------+----~--~-~----------------------------
But mean income will not tell the entire story because the picture is
complicated by distributional differences within each stratum and
among SMSAs - both in terms of the income distributions and in terms
of mortgage payments. This might explain the large shift to rental
units among elderly couples in Albany.
Finally, the spill-over effects induced by the few moves in the
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rental market are calculated from the predicted moves in a stratum of
1000 nuclei (see the last column of Table 3-11). Note thclt the
already mentioned problems with the small number of affected people
are compounded by the erratic nature of the individual forecasts. The
predicted changes in local property tax payments might therefore be
unreliable. Aggregated over the three SMSAs and over all strata, the
spill-over effect in lost property taxes is about 15 percent of the
income tax deductions saved by the federal government. The latter are
measured after the tax change: the percentage in terms of the direct
effect is lower because the moves into the rental market partially
offset the savings in income tax deductions.
We sum up the Federal Income Tax experiment as follows:
o Flattening the income tax schedule affects relatively few
people and the changes in the aggregate are therefore small.
Too few sample nuclei are affE!cted to allow a reliable
simulation.
o The pure price effect makes the feder'al income tax
deductions worth less at high marginal tax rates. The
resulting shift in the rental market is very small because
the "very rich" people that are affected by the change Cl;re
the least likely nuclei to switch to renting.
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3. 7 C~onclusions
The main conclusion from the baseline estimates and from the
housing allo~ance experiment is the strong response of headship rates
to relative housing prices. Headship rates can not be treated as
exogenous variables. The second conclusion concerns fiscal
federali~;m: in all three fiscal changes, the spill-over effects from
federal fiscal action to the local level and vice versa are of sizable
magnitUdE!S.
Taken as a descriptive device, the model performs well in terms
of fit and prediction accuracy. Simulation results give a fairly
stable pattern across SMSAs. In the case where the simulations
coincide with other published experiments, the results were very
close. All this gives us some confidence in the robustness of the
model and its forecastso
However, one caveat should be made which leads us to the next
Chapter: it concerns the interpretation of the cross-sectional data
as a steady state, especially with using the housing prices as they
are reported in the Annual Housing Survey. The approach ignores all
intertemporal effects that might produce price dispersion or
disequilibria. Spurious price elasticities may come from the fact
that many sitting tenants receive tenure discounts: if we compare the
rent of their actual unit with the hypothetical prices of those not
chosen (measured as the prices paid by recent movers), the eXistence
of tenure discounts will give us a larger price response than if we
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compare the prices with the tenure discounts subtracted. The same
argument holds for other kinds of factors producing price dispersion
in the housing market, e.g., search equilibria, explicit or implicit
long run contract agreements, and rent control. In the following
chapter, we will develop a theoretical model of idiosyncratic exchange
that produces tenure discounts even in the absence of rent control.
We will also find empirical eVidence for tenure discounts: hedonic
regressions produce significant negative coefficients for length of
tenure, indicating an upward bias of the price coefficient.
Estimations by Follain and Malpezzi (1980) translate in a bias of
about 9.3 percent in Albany, only 1.5 percent in Dallas. Estimates by
MalpezZi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) indicate much larger tenure
discounts, yielding an upward bias of about 25 percent in Albany, 8
percent in Sacramento, and 4.9 percent in Dallas. However, even after
subtracting 25 percent of the price coefficients, the main conclusion
of this chapter still holds: household formation is highly responsive
to housing prices, with elasticities and simulation responses smaller
by 25 percent which remains still very large.
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Footnotes to Chapter 3
(1) To take an extreme position: even suicide rates and health
status may depend on housing market conditions as pending eviction or
urban blight.
(2) See Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980, Table 819:
Indexes of Residential Rents in Selected SMSAs: 1970-1980, divided by
Table 811: Consumer Price In~exes Selected Cities and SMSAs:
1960-1979.
(3) This assumption contradicts Hu (1980), who conside~s marriage as
the crucial link between economic factors and household forrnatiQn.
See the discussion of the six mechanisms in household formation at the
outset of this paper - of those seem marriage and divorce (and of
course death) the least likely to be price responsive.
(4) This sharing scheme is realistic for roommates, less so for adult
children living in their parents' household. However, they incur
non-monetary cost in the form of household help etc.
(5) Note that for a common price for all housing units this relation
establishes an identity between the prices of non-heads and heads. In
this case, the price coefficients would not be identified in certain
functional forms of the demand equations. One sufficient condition
for identification independent of the functional form is the presence
of economies of scale in the formation of larger households. In fact,
these economies are likely to eXist and seem to be a major attraction
to share accommodations.
(6) These categories are still fairly large and do not distinguish
quality levels within each size category. This holds for the non-head
category as well where we do not differentiate nuclei according to the
number of nuclei per household. As a consequence for marginal
analysis, OOPOCK measures expenditure rather than price within each
size category. However, the confusion between prices and expenditure
vanishes between the discrete categories of our demand model: in each
category, OOPOCK can be interpreted as the price of a standard bundle
in the category. Note that one reason to use discrete choice rather
than marginal analysis is the assumption that these standard bundles
are qualitatively different and do not only group housing according to
some scalar measure of housing services. In Chapter 5, the standard
bundle of each category is computed and priced as a Lancastrian
commodity, uSing hedonic regressions.
(7) However, the accommodating supply shifts are ignored in this
analysis. The fiscal side-effects between jurisdictions may well be
offset by increased property-taxes paid by landlords. If landlords
overassess their buildings, the shifts in tax revenues depicted in
Table 3-11 are even overcompensated.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DYNAMIC ASPECTS IN THE HOUSING MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
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4.1 Introduction: Market Imperfections and Government Intervention
So far, our empirical results were derived from a single cross
section of the Annual Housing Survey. Implicitly, we assumed that the
observed market outcome represents a stabie steady state with a unique
price for each housing alternative. Thus, we could ignore the time
dimension. In addition, we assumed perfect elastic long run housing
supply. In this chapter, we will examine how violations of those
heroic assumptions affect housing demand estimation. In particular,
we try to shed some light on the eXistence of and causes for price
dispersion. We will concentrate on the rental housing market, where
the above mentioned assumptions seem most likely unrealistic.
Market imperfections abound in the rental housing market. First,
housing is a durable good where prices are not necessarily defined by
one period spot market conditions alone. Second, high monetary and
nonmonetary transactions cost are involved with changing consumption
These two conditions create intertemporal externalities.
Third, property rights of the rental unit are given up only
temporari1y, giving the seller a strong incentive to care who the
is. However, there is uncertainty: the tenants'
characteristics will be revealed only after some time. These two
conditions create an interpersonal externality. We will show that
these externaiities create rental price dispersion.
There are other mechanisms which create a sustained price
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dispersion: costly search for an appropriate housing unit may create
a partition of the market in expensive units which are easy to find,
and well hidden inexpensive units. Prices may vary according to
implicit contracts including maintenance on the tenants side. These
contracts may be correlated With such characteristics as landlord
living in the unit or the landlord being a small private owner.
In addition ~o these deviations from perfect market assumptions
still within the competitive market context, government intervention
regulates competition in the housing market. Government intervention
takes place both on the demand an~ the supply side of the market, in
form of housing allowances, tax subsidies, public housing provision,
and rent control. Again, we will show that government intervention is
able to generate price dispersion in the housing market, intertwined
With the above mentioned market imperfections.
Empirical analysis of government intervention in West Germany
faces the problem of the impossibility of a With and Without analysis,
due to the fact that housing market intervention is basically a
federal function, depriving researchers from regional variation, and
that there is only poor time series data available to exploit the
temporal variation in government policies. However, we will be able
to draw empirical conclusions by comparing evidence in West Germany
With eVidence from the United States where we observe a variety of
local housing policies as well as the total absence of intervention.
This chapter proceeds as follows: First, we will model
mechanisms
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leading to market imperfection, in particular price
dispersion, and collect empirical eVidence for this. Second, we try
to disentangle the effects of government intervention and the effects
of intrinsic housing market imperfections. Often, in particular in
the discussion about rent control, these two sources of inefficiency
are confused, and policy recommendations are easily victims of the
mistake to propose first best solut,ions in this second best
environment. As a case in pOint, we will study a highly controversial
piece of legislation that regUlates the rental housing market in the
Federal Republic of Germany, the "2. Wohnungsraumkuendigungs-
schutzgesetz" (WKSchG), or law for the protection of tenants from
arbitrary eviction. Finally, in the conclusions, we will propose some
ad hoc remedies which will allow estimation of the price elasticities
unbiased from the price dispersion, even if no panel data is available
to explicitly model the underlying intertemporal processes.
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4.2 Empirical EVidence for Price Dispersion
4.2.1 Tenure Discounts
The first example of price dispersion in the rental housing
market are so-called tenure discounts. Tenure discounts are the
phenomenon of a gap between spot market rent and actual rent that
increases with length of tenure. They can be measured as the
difference in rent paid for comparable units by households moved in at
different times. Units are kept comparable by controlling for housing
quality and neighborhood characteristics as well as tenants' and
landlords' characteristicse This is achieved by applying hedonic
regression techniques where a function of the form
(4.1) R = f(Q,N,T,Lit)
is estimated. Here R denotes the rent, and Q, H, T, and L vectors of
housing quality, neighborhood, tenant, and landlord characteristics.
Finally, the length of tenure (denoted by t) enters this hedonic rent
index. The following estimated tenure discounts in West Germany are
calculated from hedonic regressions by Behring and Goldrian (1983),
based on about one percent of all West German households in 1978.
Behring and Goldrian use a semiloqarithmic functional form, where the
length of tenure enters linearly, quadratically, and in form of a
dummy variable for very long length of tenure.
nonlinear time profile of Table 4-1.
ThiS generates the
Already after one year of tenure, tenants pay two percent less
rent than new tenants in comparable units. The discounts increase
until they level off for very long lengths of tenure where they amount
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TABLE 4-1: TENURE DISCOUNTS IN WEST GERMANY
Areas with High Population
Density
Low Population DensityLength
of
Tenure
(Years) City Fringe Environs City Fringe
Rural
Area
2%
10
19
25
2%
10
16
19
2%
11
20
27
2%
9
15
25
2%
8
13
19
1
5
10
14
-------+----------------------------+------------------------+---~---+
2% I
10
17
26
-------+----------------------------+-----------------------~+-------+
Source: Behring and Goldrian (1982).
to savings of up to more than a quarter of the rent which a new
resident would have to pay for the same unit.
We use the s~~e methodology to measure tenure discounts in the
United States, but v in addition, we categorize SMSAs by their rent
control legislation. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 present estimated tenure
discounts for fifty-nine Standard metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSA), calculated from hedonic regressions by Follain and MalpeZZi
(1980) and Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980), based on the Annual
Housing Surveys by SMSA 1974-1977. Follain and Malpezzi (1980)
estimate tenure discounts as a linear function of the length of tenure
only, whereas Kalpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980) use the same
nonlinear specification as Behring and Goldrian (1980). The large
difference in the size of the discounts is disturbing. It might be
attributable to these specification differences. If the true relation
between the discounts and length of tenure is concave, the linear
specification of Folla1n and Halpezzi will be biased downwards for
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TABLE 4-2: TENURE DISCOUNTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1974-76
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical Area
Rent
Control
Status
Tenure Discounts
after 10 Years
(1) (2)
Average
Length
of Tenure
I
----------------------+---------+---_.~---------------+-----------+
Albany, NY * 13.5% 36.4% 6.9
Anaheim, CA * 18.3 25.0 3.3
Atlanta, GA 6.9 21.3 4.4
Boston, MA * * 13.4 30.2 6.9
Chicago, IL 7.7 17.9 6.0
Cincinnati, OH 10.5 27.2 5.2
Colorado Springs, CO 9.3 18.1 3.5
Columbus, OH 8.6 2503 4.6
Dallas, TX 4.1 13.5 3.6
Detroit, HI 9.7 25.5 5.3
Fort Worth, TX 7.1 18.6 3e7
Hartford, CT 9.2 18.8 6.0
Kansas City, KS/MO 10.1 22.0 4.8
Los Angeles, CA * • 10.8 19.0 4.6
Madison, WI 5.6 14.1 4.0
Memphis, TN 8.7 18.4 4.9
Miami, FL • * 8.4 13.7 4.4
Milwaukee, WI 13.2 23.7 5.5
Minneapolis, MN 7.6 13.3 4.3
Newark, NJ ~ * 9.1 18.9 6.6
New Orleans, LA 9.9 24.1 5.7
Newport News, VA 10.1 23.8 4.5
Orlando, FL 4.7 25.5 3.5
Paterson, NJ * * 10.3 19.8 6.6
Philadelphia, PE 704 24.4 6.3
Phoenix, AZ 18.6 22.5 3.6
Pittsburgh, PE 8.2 33~O 6.5
Portland, OR 11.0 22.0 4.4
Rochester, NY * 12.5 22.6 4.5
Salt Lake City, UT 12.3 31.0 4.3
San Antonio, TX 8.9 22.3 4.7
San Bernadino, CA * 12.9 28.9 4.0
San Diego, CA * 11.6 29.5 3.9
San Francisco, CA * * 11.3 22.2 5.4
Spokane, WA 11.9 34.2 4.4
Springfield, MA * 6.6 26.3 7.1
Tacoma, WA 8.1 23.5 3.8
Washington, DC * * 7.5 18.6 5.5
Wichita, WA 11.6 26.3 4.3
-~--------------------+---------+--------------------+-------~---+
Source: (1) Fol1ain and Malpezzi (1980),
(2) Halpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (~980).
Two asterisks denote a strict measure of rent and/or eviction control
One asterisk denotes a weak measure of rent and/or eviction control
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TABLE 4-3: TENURE DISCOUNTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1976-77
Standard
Metropolitan
Statistical Area
Rent
Control
Status 1
Tenure Discounts
after Years
5 10 14
----------------------+-~-------+---------~-------------------------+
Allentown, PA 4.1% 18.6% 32.4% 40.1%
Baltimore, MD * * 2.4 11.5 21.1 27.4
Birmingham, AL 3.4 14.7 23.2 25.6
Buffalo, NY * 4.1 18.3 31.2 37.7
Cleveland, OH 2.2 9.8 16.7 20.1
Denver, CO 3.4 15~3 26.6 32.8
Grand Rapids, HI 3.8 16.9 28.6 34.0
Honolulu, HI * 2.9 1506 33.7 49.9
Houston, TX 4.1 18.2 30.8 36.9
Indianapolis, IN 2.4 10.9 18.5 22.2
Las Vegas, NV 1.9 8.3 14.4 17.5
Louisvi11e, KY 3.4 15.0 25.1 2907
New York, NY * * 3.9 17.9 31.0 38.2
Oklahoma City, OK 3.8 16.5 26.9 30.7
Omaha, NE 2.3 10.5 17.9 21.7
Providence, RI * 4.6 20.5 34.3 4056
Raleigh, He 3.2 1403 24.6 30.0
Sacramento, CA * * 2.8 12.2 19.9 22.9
St~ LouiS, HI 2.4 10.8 18.2 21.5
Seattle, WA 3.3 14.5 24.2 28.4
----------------------+---------+-----------------------------------+
Source: Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980).
Two asterisks denote a strict measure of rent and/or eviction control
One asterisk denotes a weak measure of rent and/or eviction control
TABLE 4-4: AVERAGE TENURE DISCOUNTS BY RENT CONTROL STATUS
Rent Control Status Discounts for a lO-Year Tenure
(1) (2) (3)
-----------~-------------+--------------~---------------------------+
Controlled according to I 10.0% 20&3% 24.0%
strict measure (2.2) (5.0) (6.1)
Controlled according to
weak measure
11.3
(3.1)
23.9
(6.2)
28.6
(6.3)
Uncontrolled Market 9.3 22.7 23.4
(2.9) (5.3) (5.5)
-------------------------+---------~--------------------------------+
Computed from: (1) Follain and Kalpezzi (1980), 1974-76,
(2) Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980), 1974-76,
(3) Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980), 1976-77.
Standard deviation in brackets.
small and medium tenures.
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The estimates by Malpezzi, Ozanne, and
Thibodeau may show an upward bias because of collinearity with their
identically specified concave age of dwelling variable so that some
impact of old structures pollutes the tenure discounts. Goodman and
Kawai (1982) produced linear estimates for 19 SMSAs in the Aunual
Housing Survey of 1977-78 which are almost identical to those reported
in Table 4-2. Barnett (1979), Noland (1980), and Lo~ery (1981) in
turn reproduce estimates similar to the nonlinear specification of
Table 4-2. Guasch and Marshall (1983) mention the possibility of an
upward bias in all these estimates due to sample selection adverse to
movers in response to low tenure discounts. Their empirical results,
however, were inconclusive 1 • For this Chapter, we are less interested
in the actual size of the discounts as their relation with rent
control. As we will see in Table 4-4, our conclusions hold for botb
the linear and the nonlinear specification.
In the United States, rent and eviction control legislation is at
the discretion of the state or even municipal ~evel of jurisdiction.
Information about the presence of controls is collected from Braid
(1980), Thibodeau (1981), and the Wational Multi Housing Council
(1982). We use two measures to assess whether the market ~as
influenced by rent or eviction control~ The stricter measure includes
all SHSAs, in which rent control was in effect in at least one
jurisdiction. These SMSAs are marked in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 by two
asterisks. The weaker measure is denoted by one asterisk. It marks
an SMSA where state legislation made rent control easy to introduce.
Included into this category are also SMSAs, in which rent control was
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a "big 1ssue" and was rejected only by a small margin. Thus the
prespnce of at least one asterisk indicates a SMSA where landlords
faced or IJerceived an incentive to restrain rent increases and
eviction.
Does rent control affect tenure discounts? Even in SMSAs where
no jurisdiction ever had some kind of rent control, e. g., Phoenix and
Milwaukee, we observe substantial tenure discounts. Table 4-4 lists
the average tenure discounts and their corresponding standard
deviations~ by rent control status, time period, and specification.
Average tenure discounts tend to be higher under effective or likely
rent control, but none of the differences is statistically
significant: the hypothesis that tenure discounts are not affected by
rent control at all can not be rejected. Note that this result holds
under both specifications of the hedonic index and in both time
periods of Tables 4-2 and 4-3.
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4.2.2 Landlord Characteristics and Search
Price dispersion in the rental market may not only be generated
by the intertemporal process in which the landlord grants tenure
discounts to the tenant, but by all mechanisms that create som~ torm
of partition of the rental market and therefore produce a possibility
for sustained cross sectional price variation.
The first partition to be discussed in this subsection concerns
landlord characteristics: landlords with only a few units to lease or
landlords who live in the building where they rent out the remaining
units may behave qUite differently from large scale 1andlords who
administer their unj,ts by a house manager. Second, private landlords
may have a different behavior than institutions like the public sector
housing companies in England or West Germany. Confirming evidence is
presented in Tables 4-6 and 4-7.
On average over the 59 SMSA's in the survey of Malpezzi, Ozanne,
and Thibodeau (1980), we find a rent reduced by 2.8 percent ceteris
paribus when the landlord is present in the building- The evidence,
however, is weak: it is significant only in 21 of the SMSA'St
insignificant in 37 f and has a significant but reversed sign in one
SMSA. In our estimations, reported in Section 5.5.1 in Chapter Five,
we present similar eVidence with a significant discount in three out
of four SMSA'se The pattern of discounts granted hy a private
landlord in Germany is much clearer, see Table 4-7. In cities
situated in regions with high population density comparable to u.s.
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TABLE 4~6: DISCOUNTS, WHEN LANDLORD IS PRESENT IN BUILDING
~======~===============================================~==
Mean over 59 SMSA's in the U.S$ 1974-1977 1
Boston 1977 2
Dallas ~977
Los Angeles 1977
Minneapolis!St.Paul 1977
-0.028
-0.039
-0.056
-0.042
-Oe0012
(2.59)
(1.66)
(2~04)
(0$06)
TABLE 4-7: DISCOUNTS, WHEN LANDLORD IS PRIVATE PERSON
=====================================================
West Germany 1978 3 : Hiqh Density Region, City
Fringe
Environs
Low Density Region, City
Fringe
Rural Rtegion
TABLE 4-8: P:REMIU" FOR MOVERS FROM ClUTSIDE SMSA
============:=====~:=================:=:============
Bos;ton 1977 4
Dallas 1977
:Los Angeles 19'77
Ilfi.nneapolis/St 4t Paul 1977
-0.127
-0.139
-0.097
-0.144
-0.084
-0.174
0.041
0.026
0.017
0.030
(31.99)
(15.85)
( 5.54)
(16.06)
( 8.27)
(15 .. 41)
(2977)
(1.80)
(1.14)
(2 .. 15)
C,olefficients repreSE!nt hedonic reqression coefficients of a semi-
logarithmic ferm, i. e. percentage discounts or premiums on the rent.
T~statistics in brackets ..
SC)l.u:·ce: (1) Malpezzi, ()zanne, and T1hibodeau (1980),
(2) Olin HeCla,nit::: Esti'rnati,ons in Section 5.5.1,
(3) Behrinq and Goldrian (1983),
(4) O",n Hedol1i(~: Esti:mcltions in SecticJn 5.5.1.1 based on recent
m(:>vers orllj;' ..
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SMSA's, we measure a discount as large as 13 percent and highly
siqnificant.
All these hedonic coefficients measure discounts on the rent over
and abOve the tenure discounts already correcte~ for as reported in
Tables 4-1 through 4-3g However, they may be related to the emergence
of tenure discounts as an amplifying factor. The line of reasoning
follows Williamson's (1979) notion of idiosyncratic exchange: the
landlord-tenant relation will be more affected by idiosyncrasies of
either tenant or landlord if the latter is present in the bUilding or
a private person. It would be interesting to study the interaction of
the intertemporal phenomenon of tenure discounts with the cross
sectional phenomenon of "landlord-present-discounts". However, this
would require panel data which is not available, so that we cannot
pursue this topic further.
A second partition of the rental market which is able to produ~e
price dispersion is relatea to search. Finding a new housing unit is
a costly process and people will trade off housing characteristics
including price with search costs. This argument follows Loikannen's
(1982) suggestion that people searching under time pressure choose
suboptimal housing bundles. This would imply
differential between people with high and with low
on average a rent
search cost. In
particular, we might partition the rental market of recent movers in
those who move from outside the SHSA and those who move within the
SMSA. The latter group will have lower search cost due to more
information than the former. One might even think of inter-SMSA moves
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as a two stage process where under time pressure a sUboptimal unit is
chosen for a short initial period. Then, from this base, a search for
the optimal unit is started, with no time pressure and accumulated
information. The fol1o~ing simple model illustrates our point.
Let us assume a fixed supply of N vacant housing units in the
SMSA, where a fraction c are good values ("bargains"), and (l-c)~N
units are lemonso However, at the time of the search, lemons and
barqains can not be distinguished by the searcher.
For simplicity, we assume an equal number of N movers, out of
Which a fraction 9 ("greenhOrns") come from outside the SMSA, and the
remaining (1-g)*N persons are intra-SMSA movers. The movers from
outside the SMSA have one period to find a place to live, then they
stay further b periods in the city, then die or migrate. We will
consider a steady state: a stable distribution of greenhorns and
in~ra-city movers implies g=l/b. If a greenhorn picks a bargain, he
stays there for the remainder of his life. Otherwise, he will start
his second stage search for a better value. Thus, we have b vintages
of people:
1: greenhorns,
2: insider with one chance to recontract,
b: insider with b-l chances to recontract.
For stationarity, we assume that each vintage has the same size.
In addition, let us assume for the beginning that all searchers face
the same prObability to piCk a lemon. Then (1-c) i persons of vintage
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i still live in lemons. In a cross section of all movers and sitting
tenants, the proportion of people living in bargains is
..,
(4.2) p = 1. - l./b ~ (l-C) 1+1
r-o
11-.
= C/b ~(b-i)(1.-C) i > c
i.o
This steady state "price dispersion" between new movers and all
sitting tenants just reflects the accumulated chance to recontract.
This dispersion will be even greater if the probability to pick a
lemon ~is larger for greenhorns than for insiders.
This simplistic model implies a division of the market into two
categories: A segment with long-run leases, relatively low rents for
a standard unit, occupied by a majority of tenants already living a
long time in the SMSA; and a segment with short-run leases, higher
rents, and a majority of tenants moved in from outside the SMSA.
This hypothesis can be sUbstantiated by eVidence from hedonic
estimation, see Table 4-8. Using the functional speCification of
Section 5.5.1 in Chapter Five, we include an indicator variable for
movers from outSide the SMSA, and restrict the estimation to recent
movers {within twelve month). We estimate a premium charged to movers
from outside the SMSA which ranges from 1.7 percent in Los Angeles to
4.1 percent in Boston, the latter siqnificant at the 99 percent level.
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4.3 Rent and Eviction Control in West Germany
What implications have the deviations from textbook economics
listed in the preceding section on the analysis of rent control? As a
case in point, we will study a hiqhly controversial piece of
legislation that regulates the rental housing market in the Federal
Republic of Germany, the "2. Wohnungsraumkuendigungsschutzgesetz"
(WKSChG), or law for the protection of tenants from arbitrary
eviction. This law is in effect since January 1975 2 • The law
consists of two - stylized provisions: eviction of tenants 1s
prohibited, and the rent is indexeO once the tenant moved inc
However, when a new tenant moves in, the rent can be set freely3.
Hore precisely, eviction is only permitted, if (1) the tenant
breaches his contract (e. g., does not pay his rent), if (2) the
landlord himself or a close relative wants to move into the unit, or
if (3) the landlord is substantially inhibited in the appropriate
economic usage of the lot (e. g., conversion into office space in
areas assigned by zoning laws as a business district)4. The rent
regulation permits the landlord to pass on cost increases and some of
the cost of upgrading. In total, he may raise the rent up to the
level of a standard rent that is defined by the average rent of
comparable units, allowing him in addition to passing costs also to
skim off some of the appreciation. However, a time consuming formal
procedure is required for any rent changeS. Thus, the rent level for
sittinq tenants can be described as lagged average rent of comparable
units.
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The law is highly controversial: proponents argue, it is
necessary to counterbalance the weak position of tenants in a sellers'
market by an regulated pricing scheme. Specifically, it is claimed,
that without the price regulation a landlord can exploit the exit
barriers of high moving costs giving him a sort of local monopoly
power. We will argue that ~he eXistence of tenure discounts
contradicts this claim by showing that also the landlord faces exit
barriers in terms of costs of uncertainty. A second point concerns
the eviction control: eviction, arbitrary in the sense of justified
or UnjUstifie~6 discrimination, inflicts high moving costs on the
tenant. The legislation would eliminate or at least restrict the
landlords' discriminatory behavior, reduces moving costs, and
therefore makes tenants better off. On the hand, opponents argue,
that crucial property rights - the right to evict an unpleasant tenant
- are only given up against compensation for the money value of those
rights in terms of higher rents and depressed supply, which, as they
claim, will ultimately reduce tenants' utility. We Will show that the
the claim of higher rents and depressed supply holds. However, the
latter conclusion is not necessarily correct, because the balance
between the value of reduced moving for the tenants and the value of
restricted property rights for the landlords is affected by the
externalities enumerated above. In fact, rent and eviction control
can make both tenants and landlords better off by reducing the
distorting effects of those externalities.
We will first examine the part of the German tenants' protection
legislation that controls the rent level. As was pointed out in the
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introduction, though the rent for sitting tenants is regulated, the
initial rent can be set freely. Eekhoff (1981) shows that the primary
effect of this price regulation is a heavily front-loaded payment
sChe~ule, depicted in Figure 4-5, to keep profits at the
pre-leq1s1at1on level. Losses (B) in the secon~ phase of the lease
are compensates by profits (A) from the hiqh initial rent in the first
phase.
Rent Spot market rent
Lagged spot
market rent
I
I
I
I
I I
+----------+----------+--------------+------------- TimeI Phase 1 I Phase 2 I
Figure 4-5: Effect of the Price Regulation. (Source: Eekhoff 1981)_
This brings us to the topiC of tenure discounts: the pricing scheme
of Figure 4-5 implies that the rent of sitting tenants in terms of the
initial rent is a falling, then constant function of the length of
tenure. Thus, the price regulation in the German tenants' protection
legislation seems to be a perfect explanation for price dispersion in
the form of tenure discounts. This, however, seems rushing to a wrong
conclusion: significant tenure discounts are also present in
metropolitan areas in the Unite~ States, even where no rent and
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eviction control ever has been in effect. In turn, if tenure
discounts in~eed exist independently of rent control and are as
substantial as indicated by the eVidence of Tables 4-1 through 4-3,
then the analysis of rent control must take into account the
mechanisms that produce those discounts.
The second part of the West German tenants' protection
legislation, the eviction control provision, stirs most of the heat of
the emotional debate on either side. obviously, because it concerns
the sUbtle balance between two vital rights. On one side, there is
the tenant's right of the invulnerability of his dwelling, sometimes
interpreted as the right to stay in the dwelling, along the lines of
positive prescription. Its economic value is expressed in the
psychological and monetary moving costs inflicted on the tenant when
forced to move. On the other side, we have the landlord's right to
dispose of his property. Its economic value is expressed in the
increased psychological and monetary maintenance costs inflicted on
the landlord, when forced to keep a costly or unpleasant tenant. An
economic analysis of the tenants' protection legislation must take in
account the economic values of those rights and how they are affected
by the 1egislation.
Ohviously, the restriction of the landlord's property rights only
matters, because tenants are different, but do not reveal these
differences at the time when the rental starts. Eviction is the
1andlords' instrument to cope With that uncertainty. EViction control
deprives the landlord of this instrument. Thus, a model to analyze
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the rental market and eviction control must include heterogeneous
landlords and tenants, and it must include uncertainty about the type
of tenant/landlord in the initial perioda
Finally, the interest of landlords for a matchinq tenant, and the
interest of tenants not to move too often, coincides, once tenant and
landlord realized that they are matching_ This provides a basis for
an externality: the tenant will bett~r maintain the unit, reducing
the costs for the landlord. The landlord in turn will want to keep
the tenant, for instance by giving him tenure discounts, reducing his
probability to move out. The landlord has two incentives ~o do so:
first, he will reward the tenant's good care for the unit, second, he
saves the uncertainty of gambling for a new good tenant. Eviction
control yields a positive probability for the landlord to still have a
bad tenant in the second period. Thus, tenure discounts might become
an even more important instrument for the landlord, once he is not
permitted to eVict.
In the following section, we will construct a model around those
hypotheses, concentrating on the link between tenure discounts,
heterogeneous tenants and landlords, and moving costs'.
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4.4 A Microeconomic Model of Landlord-Tenant Relations
Let us assume a rental housing market with four different agents:
(1) Landlords of type A,
(2) Landlords of type S,
(3) Tenants of type A,
(4) Tenants of type B.
We will consider two time periods. The landlords supply N housing
units, where N is large, but fixed over this two periods. The
proportion of type A tenants on the market in period 1 and 2 will be
denoted by a1 and a2' respectively, and the corresponding proportions
of type A landlords by b 1 and b2. Though the number of housing units
is fixed, the service stream generated by each unit is variable and
reflects the quality of the dwelling unit. The housing stock is
durable in the sense that once the landlord has decided on the quality
level of his unit, this level will stay put over both periods.
Similarly, we assume that the tenant, once having chosen his optimal
quality level, Will not change his mind in the second period. The
difference between both periods will become clear later. We denote
the quality level or service stream of a housing unit by h. The
landlord recieves profits P(h) from the dwelling he is leasing, and
the tenant enjoys uti1ity U(h,x) from the stream of housing services h
and from the consumption of other goods, denoted by x, which he can
afford after having spent his income y on housing.
The difference between the types of landlords and tenants consist
in the monetary and non-monetary maintenance cost of the dwelling
unit. If landlord and tenant match these costs will be lower as
compared to the case of a mismatch. A landlord of type A faces costs
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CAA(h) to supply a unit of quality h to a type A tenant, cAs(h) to a
type B tenant. Analogously: a landlord of type B has costs CBA(h) and
Caa(h) for type A and type B tenants, respectively. We will view the
world of our model through the eyes of a type A landlord and tenant,
and assume complete symmetry for type B persons. Then, we simply
denote the costs in a match by CA(h) = CAA(h) = CBB(h), and the costs
in a mismatch by cs(h) = CAs(h) = CBA(h) > cA(h). Tenants are assumed
to be indifferent With respect to the type of their landlord.
The two periods are short enough to keep our assumptions of a
fixed stock, durable quality, and lasting preferences sensibl~.
Furthermore, we are not interested in the division of consumption
across the periods and assume that landlords and tenants have a common
discount rate which is equal to the interest rate. The only purpose
of dividing the short ru~ horizon into two periods is the information
available to the agents in the market. At the beginning of the first
period, landlords and tenants are unable to identify the other party's
type. Only after the first period, the types are revealed.
Rental contracts are made at the beginning of the first period.
A contract (r,h) lays down the rent r for a dwelling With quality h.
Both parties may breach the contract after the types are revealed at
the beginning of the second period: the landlord is allowed to evict
the tenant, and we will assume that he will do so in the case of a
mismatch 8. A tenant does not care about match or mismatch, but he may
breach the contract for some exogenous reason, say, to migrate because
of a job offer. We will denote the probability of such an event by
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Po- However, the tenant will actually move only if th~ attractiveness
of the job offer outweighs the opportunities he may have in his
current housing unit. This is the point where tenure discounts enter:
the landlord may reduce the rent in the second period by an amount t,
and this tenure discount will negatively influence the probability of
moving. We will denote this moving probability by Pm(t) with
Pm(O) = Po and Pm'(t) < o. This tenure discount is entirely at the
discretion of the profit maximizing landlord. A priori, it can be
positive or negative.
The rental contract is a contingent contract in the sense that
the rent-quality relation is determined taking in account the possible
events at the transition between the two periods. Table 4-9 gives a
survey of all possible events with their respective probabilities.
Competition among the large number of landlords and tenants will
produce. an equilibrium rent level r corresponding to an eqiulibrium
quality level h 9 • Once the quality of the match is revealed, landlord
and tenant form a sort of bilateral monopoly. As we defined the
contract (r,h), this situation is anticipated in the competitive
bargaining process before the initial period starts and the rent level
adjusted acc~rdin9ly. Therefore, the bilateral monopoly does not
result in a bar;aining game in the second period when match or
mismatch is revealed, and we can avoid specifying bargaining rules
with their arbitrariness 10.
The contingent market approach does not resolve the market
failure intrinsic in the model constructed so far. The tenant type is
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TABLE 4-9: SPECIFICATION OF EVENTS FOR TYPE A LANDLORDS AND TENANTS
----~-------~~---~~-~--~~-~------~-~-~-~~-~~~----------~-~~---~~~~~~ ~- ~ ~~ - ~ - ~~--~-~-~-~---~~-~~~-- ~ _._ ~ - ~ ----
(1) LANDLORD:
case Tenant Mcw;e Probability Rent Costs
in in In
Period Period Period
1 2 1 2 1 2
-----+--------+-------+---------~---------+--------+--------+
1 A A stays a 1(l-Pm(t» r r-.t CA CA
2 A A moves a 1Pm(t)a2 r r CA CA
3 A B moves a 1Pm(t) (1--a2) r r CA Cs
4 B B stays (1-a1) (.l-SPm(O») r r ca Cs
5 B A moves (l-a 1 ) spm(0) a 2 r r Cs CA
6 B B moves (l-a1)SPm(O) (l-a2) r r Cs Cs
-----+--------+-------+-------------------+--------+--------+
(2) TENANT:
Case Landld
in
Period
1 2
Move PrObability Rent
in
Period
1 2
Moving
Expen.
Period
2
-----+--------+-------+-------------------+--------+--~-----+
1 A A stays b 1 (l-Pm(t» r r-t
2 A A moves b 1Pm(t) b2 r r
3 A B moves b1Pm(t) (.l-b2) r r
4 B B stays (1-b1) (l-SPm(O)} r r
5 B A moves (1-b1)SPm(O)b 2 r r
m
m
m
6 B B moves (1-b1)SPm(O) (1-b 2) . r r m
I
-----+--------+----~--+-------------------+--------+--------+
a1: Proportion of tenants type A in period i,
bi: Proportion of landlords type A in period i,
Pm(t) with Po=Pm(O): Moving prObability,
s: Rent and eviction control parameter (S=l/po <=> no control,
S=1 <=> reguated market)
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revealed only after the first period and only to his landlord. There
will be no market emerging for the information of match or mismatch
because other landlords are unable to identify both the tenant's type
an~ the type of their fellow landlorde A second external effect is
introduced by the moving prObability Pm(t). The expected utility of
the tenant is a function of the probability density of the possible
future states of the world, and this density depends via Pm(t) on the
tenure discounts t granted at the discretion of the landlord.
Both externalities create a "second best environment" in which
the classical welfare theorems do not hold, and it is this environment
in which we want to analyse regulation of the rental housing market.
Rent and eviction control will be introduced in Section 4.5. We
define rent and eviction control as follows:
(1) The landlord is not permitted to breach the rental contract.
(2) The landlord is not permitted to charge a rent premium in the
second period, that is, negative tenure discounts are unlawful.
We can combine the regulated and unregulated market setting by
1ntroducing a rent.and eviction control parameter s. If eviction is
at the 1andlords discretion, this parameter is set to l!po, otherwise
s=l. With this definition, the tenant's moving probability in the
case of a mismatch can be written sPo. In the case of a match,
regulation has no influence on the tenant's prObability to leave the
unit Pm(t).
The final ingredient of the model are the expenses which occur to
the tenant if he moves. We will denote the movinq expenses by m, and
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assume t.hat they are a lum\psorn~~ amount and independent of the cause of
ttle movEl which Jnaty be the lnew job or eviction.
We can enUDle.l:-atC! all possible events itt the transtion from period
3. 1:'0 perioo 2:
(1) There is either a match or a mismatch in the first period;
(2) The tenant either moves after the first period or stays in the
unit;
(3) If he moves, there will be either a match or a mismatch in the
second period.
The probabilities for the events and the corresponding realization of
rents, maintenance costs, and moving expenses are given in Table 4-9.
Two asymmetries may be worth noting. First it is not necessary
to introduce the possibility of a rent premium in the case of a
mismatch: if the market is unregulated, the landlord will evict the
tenant; under rent and eViction control, such a premium is unlawful.
Second, we did not introduce physical turnover costs fer the landlord,
say the cost of a vacant unit. However, the difference between the
certain maintenance costs for the current tenant and the expected
costs with an unknown tenant can be interpreted as turnover costs.
For a < a2 < 1 this difference is positive for a matching, negative
for a non-matching tenant. Thus, in case of a match, this difference
constitutes an "exit-barrier" for the landlord as do the moving costs
for the tenant. The introduction of physical moving costs will only
strengthen results which we will derive from this eXit-barries and is
thus unnecessary. In case of a mismatch, the cost difference is
negative and thus provides an incentive for the landlord to breach the
contract.
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Turnover costs will weaken the assumption that all
mismatches will be severed in unregulated markets. To put results in
the proper perspective, we can interpret the second period costs of a
good tenant CA as including turnover costs. The eXit-barriers -- the
cost difference CA-CS for the landlor~ an~ the movinq expenses m for
the tenant -- are the main parameters for the interpretation of the
model and will play a key role when we evaluate the welfare qains and
losses from rent and eviction control.
In the following Sections, we will study the landlord's and the
tenant'~ optimization problem in more detail, and then define a
suitable equilibrium concept for the two period model.
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4.4.1 The Landlord
We will examine the landlord's behavior first, an~ look at a
landlord of type A who considers tenants of type A as good, tenants of
type B as bad tenants. At the beginning of the first period, he
maximizes his expected profits with respect to the quality level hand
the tenure discounts t which he will grant in case the tenant turns
out to be a good tenant:
(4.3) max E [ P(h,t) ]
h,t
From Table 4-9, we compute the expected profit function
(4.4)
pE(h,t) = a1 (l-Pm(t» [(l+e)rh - (l+e)CA(h) - eth]
+ a1Pm(t) a2 [(l+e)rh - (l+e)cA(h) ]
+ a1Pm(t) (1-a2) [(l+e)rh - (l+e)cA(h) - e(CB(h)~CA(h»]
+ (l-ai) (1-St->oa2) [(1.+e)rh - (l+e)Cs(h) ]
+ (1-a1) spaa2 [(l+e)rh - (l+e)cs(n) + e(cS(h)-CA(h»]
where e = 1/(1+1) the discount factor for interest rate i.
Due to the lin~arity of th~ profit function, (4.4) reduces to
(4.5)
with the expected values of rents and costs in period 1 and 2:
r~ = r
r ~ (t) = r - a 1 ( 1 - Pm (t) t
(4.8)
(4.9)
C~(h) = CB(h) + a1 ( CA(h) - CB(h)
c~ (h,t) = cB (h) + PA (t) ( cA (h) - cB (h)
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where
PA(t) = ( a1(1-Pm(t» + a1Pm(t)a2 + (1-a1)SPm(O)a2 )
Maximization of (4.5) with respect to hand t yields the first order
conditions:
(4.10)
(4.11)
r + e r~(t) = c~, (h) + e C~'(h;t)
(l-Pm(t» - Pm'(t)t = Pm'(t) (1-a 2) (CA(h)-CB(h»/h
risking
A large
term and
As a first result, we can characterize the tenure discounts by
equation (4.11).
Theorem 1:
If the cost differences between tenant types are large enough, the
lan~lord will grant positive tenure discounts to keep a good tenant.
More precisely, the optimal tenure discounts are given in implicit
form by
(4812) t = (1-a2) (Cs(h)-CA(h»/h + (l-Pm(t»/Pm'(t)
Note that the first term in (4.12) is positive, the second
negative by our assumption. The 1andlord faces a trade-off between
losing money by qrantinq tenure discounts on one hand and by
to qet a bad tenant in the second period on the other hand.
cost differenc~ in .the first term will outweigh the second
generate positive tenure discounts. However, if the probability of a
bad tenant in period two is very small and the moving prObability
insensitive to tenure discounts, the landlord is better off by
discouraging the old good tenant to qamble for a new good tenant, whom
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he does not have to pay tenure discounts.
To simplify the analysis and to be able to solve (4.12) for the
discounts t, we assume a linear functional form for the moving
probability Pm(t):
(4.13) Pm(t) = Po - kt
= 0
for t < Polk (k>O)
otherwise
Next, we examine the structure of the cost functions. ObViously,
CA(O) = CB(O) = co' the cost of a vacant unit. We have already
defined the type of tenant by CA(h) < cs(h) for h > O. For a well
behaved cost function, we postulate CAw > 0, Cs' > 0, CAw, > 0, Cs" >
o. In addition, it is convenient to assume that the difference
between the costs for different tenure types increases linearly with
the housing unit service stream: Cs(h) - CA(h) = coh > o.
With the linear specifications of Pm and ce-cA' the tenure
discounts are given by:
(4.14)
hence positive for
(4.15) Co >
We can sUbstitute this into the first order condition (4.10) to
obtain the fo11owinq implicit reduced form equation in the landlord's
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housing supply h:
(4.16)
with PA from (4.9).
For the comparative static analysis in Section 4.5 we compute the
following partial derivatives of F with respect to rent r, the
regulation parameter s, and the quality level h:
(4.17)
(4.18)
(4.19)
F r = (l+e) ). 0
F h = -(l+e) C"s(h) < 0
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain an monotonously
upward sloping supply function in the initial rent level r, with the
supply elasticity given by
(4.20) ES =
r F r r/h
=
C· , B (h)
> o.
Finally, we define the elasicity of supply of housing services with
respect to the regulation parameter s which falls from 1 to l!po when
rent and eviction control is introduced:
(4.21.) RS = =
c' • B(h)
> 0 •
Hote that this elasticity is positive and proportional to the cost
differential Co between good and bad tenants.
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4.4.2 The Tenant
We turn now to the demand side. We will look at a tenant of type
A. He chooses housing quality h and consumption of other goods x at
the beginning of period 1 as to maximize his expected utility subject
to a budget constraint. For simplicity, we assume a separable utility
function U(x,h) = u{x) + v(h). Because we are not interested in the
intertemporal distribution of consumption, we define x = X1 + eX2 as
two period consumption and y = Y1 + eY2 as two period income with
e=~/(l+i). Rent is denoted by r, moving expenses by ro, and other
goods are normalized to have unit price. With these conventions, the
tenants maximization problem can be written as
(4.22) max
tl,x
E [ u (x) + v(h) ] s. t. E [ Y - x - rh - m ] = o.
The 10wer part of Table 4~9 specifies the outcomes and probabilities
for all possible events for a tenant of type A. There are three
different outcomes according to the receipt of tenure discounts and
whether the tenant moves. Note that depending on the imposition of
rent and eviction control one of the three outcomes will not occur.
The max1mand of the tenant expands to
V(h) + b1 (l-Pm(t» u(y-(l+e)rh+eth)
(4.23)
We will use the simplifying notation
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to denote the probabilities of the different events for a tenant, and
x = y - (l+e)rh
(4.25)
w(x) = q1 u(x+eth) + q2 u(x) + q3 u(x-ern)
for "normal" consumption and the expected utility from consumption.
The first order condition of (4.23) with respect to h is
(4.26) G = v'(h) - W'(x) (l+e)r - Q1u' (x+eth)et = 0
and defines the implicit ~educed form of the tenant's demand for
housing quality. This gives us the following partial derivatives for
comparative static analysis:
(4.27) Gr = w"(x) (1+e)2rh - W'(X) (l+e) - Q1u"(x+eth)e{1+e)th < 0
(4.28) Gs = (1-b 1)po(1+e)r ( u' {x) - u'(x-em) ) < 0
where the signs are implied by the assumption of well behaved
neoclassical utility functions with v' > 0, u e > 0, V" < 0, and
utI < O. In particular, we have a monotonously downward sloping
demand curve With a demand elasticity of
(4.30) ED =
r Gr
< o.
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In analogy to the supply side, we define the elasicity of demand for
housing services with respect to the regulation parameter s as
(4.31) RO =
s Gs
< o.
Note that this elasticity is negative and roughly proportional to the
moving expenses m, which can be seen from (4.28) when the bracketed
difference in marginal utilities is approximated by u"(x)em.
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4.4.3 Steady State Market Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is characterized by three conditions:
The first condition assures that the number of housing units demanded
equals the number of housing units supplied, for both types of
landlords and tenants. This equilibrium condition of the extensive
margin of course implies a1 = b1 and NT = NL = N, the number of
landlords 11 and tenants. The second condition equalizes demand and
supply of housing service streams at the intensive margin. sA(r)
denotes the optimal housing service supplied by a landlord of type A
at initial rent r, that is SA = h given by equation (4.16). nA(r)
denotes the corresponding demand, given by equation (4.26). Finally,
the third condition characterizes the steady state by a stable
distribution of tenant and 1andlord types.
Note the distinction between the discrete problem of matching the
number of units (=landlords) and tenants, and the continuous problem
of determining the equilibrium housing service level. The latter
condition (4.33) is the sUbstantive equilibrium condition of this
model, the first holds by assumption. The slope of the demand and
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supply functions, given by (4.20) and (4.30), and their monotonicity
quaranty that the cO~ltinuous housing service equilibrium condition
(4.33) yields a well defined and unique equilibrium rent level r. If
the discrete equilibrium condition (4.32) is violated, vacencies or
homeless will emerge, and we have to specify rules for this
disequilibrium. We will not consider this problem in this paper.
The violation of the steady state condition (4.34) can be
interpreted as a kind of adverse selection problem. Let N denote the
population in the housing market under examination, and M denote the
net migration to another housing market, with 91 the proportion of
type A migrants. After one period, Pm(t)a1N is the number of type A
tenants moving within the given housing market. In addition, 91M type
A tenants will move from outside into this market. For type B
tenants, we have sPO(1-a1)N intra-city movers and (1-g1)M inter-city
movers. Thus,
(4.35)
is the second period share of type A tenants on the market. In steady
state, a 1 = a2-
equation
Solving (4.35) for a1 = a2 yields a quadratic
(4036)
H
a~ - ( 1 - ------------- ) a1 - 91 MIN = O.
(Pm(t)-spo) N
Thus, in the absence of migration (M=O), we obtain the corner
solutions a1 = 0 or a1 =1 as steady state shares to which any other
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initial distribution 0 < a1 < 1 will converge. This is due to the
unbalanced shares of movers in each period, Pm(t)/spo, which creates a
selection of bad tenants among movers adverse for the landlords.
We will assume a steady miqration of tenants to produce a steady
state distribution 0 < a1 < 1. For Simplicity and without loss of
generality, we set a1 = 0.5. Now all reactions of type A agents are
mirror-images of their type B counterparts, and it is sufficient to
examine only half of the market.
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4~5 Analysis of Rent and Eviction Control
The eviction and rent control as defined in Section 4.1 is
modelled along the lines of the tenants' protection legislation in
West Germany and has two effects in our model: (1) landlords are not
permitted to evict tenants of a different type, and (2) landlords are
prohibited from charging tenants a premium on top of their second
period rent. Note that the initial rent level is unrestricted and
free to move according to the competitive market equilibrium (4.33).
We model the two effects simultaneously by changing the parameter s in
the specification of the probabilities in Table 4-9. Setting s =
l/Pm(O) corresponds to a housing market without intervention:
mismatches will be severed with probability one, and Case 4 in the
Table will never occur. In turn, setting s = 1 corresponds to a
housing market under eviction and rent control, where the bad tenant
will only move with probability Pm(O) and pays the contract rent r in
period 2. A decrease in s thus corresponds to a step in direction of
rent and eviction control.
Total differentiation 12 of the equilibrium condition (4.33)
yields
(4.37)
(-) 1-1 (-) c+)
dr GsF h - GhFs
= - ----~-------- < 0
Cis GrF h - GhF r
(-I E-) f-) (+)
where the pieces can be collected from equations (4.17), (4.18),
(4.19); and (4.27), (4.28), and (4.29). In terms of the elasticities
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(4.21), (4.22); and (4.31), and (4.32), we can write the impact of a
step in direction of regulation on the rent level as
(-) l+) (-) t+J
(4.38) dr = - r/s ( Ro - Rs ) / ( ED - Es ) ds
Thus, we can describe the first effect of the intervention:
Theorem 2:
The initial rent level for a new lease will rise in response to the
rent and eviction control.
Proof:
The signs in (4.37) and (4.38) follow from the quoted equations, and
imposition of rent and eviction control is equivalent to ds < o.
Note that we can decompose the price change dr in two terms. The
first term includes Ro and is roughly proportional to the moving
expenses ro, see (4.31) • The second term includes Rs and is
proportional to the difference in maintenance costs Co according to
(4.21). Thus, the price change reflects the sharing of the burden and
the gain from eviction and rent control between landlord and tenant,
the gain expressed in the moving expenses saved by the tenant and the
burden in the cost difference inflicted on the landlord.
How does the landlord respond to the imposition of rent and
eviction control?
Theorem 3:
(1) The landlord's supply for housing services will fall in response
to the rent and eviction control.
(2) Under linear cost differences, the tenure discounts will remain
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unchanged.
Proof: We computed the supply effect when defining the elasticity Rs
in (4.21) by applying the implicit function on (4.16):
(4.39) dh =- Fs/Fh = ----------------- ds < 0
(l+e) C"B(h)
The absence of a tenure discount effect is entirely due to the linear
cost difference ea(h) - eACh) = Co = constant which can be seen from
equation (4.14) where all right hand side items are constants.
Supply will ~e depressed, because the legislation imposes higher
costs on the landlord: he looses the economic value of his right to
eVict. To adjust optimal profits under a convex cost function, output
has to go down. The change in tenure discounts for a general cost
specification can be obtained from equation (4.12):
dh
(4.40) ds
ds
The landlord will grant larger discounts in response to the
legislation if the cost difference increases more than linearly with
the housing service stream, and less discounts for a concave cost .
difference. He will do so to counterbalance the changes in cost
differences with a changed moving probability Pm(t): if this
difference decreases due to (4.39) and a convex cost difference, he is
more interested to keep the tenant, and will give him larger
discounts.
The effect for profits is given by the envelope theorem
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(4.41) dP = (l+e)
dr
ds
and consists of two effects of opposite signs. The second term in
(4.41) is negative: the landlord looses because he is forced to keep
a bad tenant, if this tenant decides to stay. ThiS effect is
proportional to the cost difference. On the other hand, he is able to
regain some of the losses through rent increases. As we have seen in
(4.38), we can interpret the first effect as appropriation of some
part of the tenant's advantage from the legi.slation in the form of
lower expected moving expenses.
We now turn to the impact of rent and eViction control on the
demand side of our rental housing market model. We evaluate the
effect on the tenant's utility by applying the envelope theorem on
(4.23):
(4.42) du = ~ W' (x) (l+e)
dr
ds
h ds - (1-b 1)po(u(x)-u(x-em» ds
The first effect in the tenant's utility (4042) is the mirror image of
the first effect in the landlord's profits (4.41). Tenants suffer
from an uti1ity loss due to the increase in in the initial rent level.
This price increase is converted by the marginal utility w'(x) as
defined in (4.25) into utility units. The second effect reflects the
increase in utility due to tbe decreased likelihood of moving, that is
lower expected moving expenses.
approximately w' (x)em, thus
dr
This utility increase is
(4.43) dU!w' (x) = - (1+e)
ds
h ds - (1-b 1) Po em ds
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If we analyze the relative weights of the opposing effect$ in
(4.41) and (4.42), we obtain the main result of this Section:
Theorem 4:
(1) If moving expenses are small relative to the cost differential
between good and bad tenants, both landlords and tenants are worse off
by eviction and rent control.
(2) If moving expenses are large relative to the cost differential
between good and bad tenants, both landlords and tenants are better
off by eviction and rent control.
(3) For a given ratio of moving expenses and differential maintenance
cost~Case (2) is the more relevant the smaller the likelihood is of a
second period match after the severance of a mismatch.
Proof:
We express the utility change (4.42) locally as
da = ( Gr dr/ds + Gs ) x ds
and the profit change (4.41) correspondingly as
dP = ( F r dr/ds + Fs ) h as
To obtain a utility (profit) increase in response to the impOSition
of the legislation (os<O) the bracketed expressions have to be nega-
tive. SUbstitute dr/ds from (4.37). Then
GSF h - GhFs
du > 0 <=> -G r ---_....--.-,-----~ + Gs < 0,
GrF h - GhF r .
and
GsFh - G.,Fs
dP > 0 <=> -F r
_~em.___~____~___
+ F s < o.
GrFt) - G~r
ThUS,
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tiu > 0 <=> dP > 0 <=> Gs/G r > F s/F r •
From (4.19), (4.27), and (4.43):
e (l-a 1) a2 Po
Fs/F r = ~~~-~~~~-~--~--~ Co > 0,
l+e
and
GS/Gr = --------------------~---------~~--------- m > O.
w"(x)rh(l+e) - w' (x) - Q1U" (x+eth)eth
Hence,
du > 0 <=> dP > 0 <=> m > a2 K Co
with
w"(x)rh(l+e) - w' (x) - Q1u"(x+eth)eth
K = -----------~~---------------------------- > 0
U i , (x) ( 1+e ) r
which proves the Theorem.
The result is an example how the intuition from a first best
environment can be misleading in a second best environment. Market
failures occur in the rental housing market because of two
externalities: a missing market for the information of landlord and
tenant type; and an expected utility function of the tenant which is
responsive to the tenure discounts. The fundamen~al welfare theorems
are not valid in an environment with external effects. In Case (2),
interference with the market in form of rent and eviction control
proved to be Pareto superior to laissez faire: the tenants'
protection legislation did not only improve the tenant's welfare but
also the profit£ of the landlords.
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4.6 Conclusions
Using empirical evidence on the eXistence of tenure discounts in
West Germany and the United States we screened the arguments pro and
contra rent and eviction control, specifically the West German
tenants' protection legislation. A model was bUild based on the
mechanisms identified as important for the working of the rental
housing market: tenant and landlord idiosyncrasy, potential tenure
discounts, and high moving costs.
As a first result, the model indeed predicted positive tenure
discounts. Second, the comparative static analysis of rent and
eviction control showed, that with low moving costs and a large
difference in costs between good and bad tenants rent and eviction
control makes both tenants and landlords worse off. Howevsr, with
high moving costs and only little difference in costs between tenant
types, the intervention increases the utility of all participants 9 of
landlords as well as of tenants. The conclusion of many analyses that
the German tenants' protection legislation will not only reduce the
profits of landlords, but even harm the tenants which should have been
protected by the legislation is at least premature.
This result of an intervention Pareto superior to laissez faire
is due to the externalities between landlord and tenant and an example
of how first best analysis misleads poliCy evaluation in a second best
environment.
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The second conclusion concerns estimating housing demand. As
discussed in the end of Chapter Three f positive tenure discounts bias
the estimated price responses upward. How can we correct for that?
Obviously, the proper solution is to take all units of a given cross
section, but look at their spot market rent rather than their actual
rent. The spot market rent is observed only at the time of moving.
With a panel, we could trace all units back to this period. In
absence of a panel, however, we can use the hedonic estimates of
average discounts quoted in Tables 4-1 through 4-3 and add these
discounts to the actual rent to achieve approXimations of the spot
market rent. Note that this procedure avoids the bias which is
introduced when confining the estimation only to recent movers. We
Will use this procedure in the next chapter, when we compare housing
demand in the United States and in West Germany.
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Footnotes to Chapter 4
(1) Guasch and Marshall (1983) argue that the hedonic regression
suffers from self selection bias, because tenants with low or no
tenure discounts will move out of their expensive units and therefore
have less probability to be in the sample. Our model in Section 4
will have the same implication. However, their empirical findings
about the size of this effect and the remaining "true" discounts are
inconclusive. Correction for the selection bias in three different
samples changes the estimated tenure discounts only little and in
either direction. Their standard errors, though, increase as much as
to render the discounts statistically insignificant at all. It is not
clear whether this result is due to the speci~ic sample they used or
to an inefficient estimation procedure for their relatively small
sample size8
(2) The law was modified in 1983, but not changed in its sUbstance.
(3) Only usury is prohibited by Jfs WiStG.
(4) jfS64b BGB.
(5) )£2 MiethoeheG. This procedure can only be waived if the tenant
agrees to it.
words.
higher
to
from
(6) ThiS might be a frivolous choice of
distinguish discrimination due to objectively
discrimination due to taste or prejudice.
We want
costs
(7) Compare Goodman and Kawai (1982) for a sketch of a similar model.
(8) We assume that the expected costs of a bad tenant staying are
a1ways larger than the expected costs of an unknown new tenant. For
o < a2 < 1, this is basically a statememt about small turnover costs.
See the discussion at the end of this Section.
(9) A suitable equilibrium concept is developed in Section 4.4.3.
(10) Eckart, Schulz~ and Stahl (1983) consider a model of voluntary
and involuntary exchange in a housing market with implicit contracts.
The landlord-tenant relationship in our model resembles an implicit
contract: the tenant takes the discounts in the second period in
account when maximizing his expected utility over the two periods.
(11) We assume each landlord supplies only one housing unit~ This
includes landlords with more than one housing unit, as long as each of
the units is supplied by maximizing its own profit.
(12) We keep a2 constant. In fact, a2 is a function of the tenure
discounts, thus affected by the change of s. However, the linear
specification of costs and moving probability keeps a2 unchanged, as
it wi11 turn out in (4.40).
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CHAPTER FIVE
AN ANALYTIC COMPARISON OF HOUSING DEMAND DECISIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY
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5.1 Introduction: Idea and Scope of an Analytic Comparison
This last chapter of the thesis uses all the analytical tools we
have developed so far to compare housing demand in the United States
and West Germany. In both countries housing surveys exist with
comparable scope of questions asked, sample sizes, and sampling
procedures. This is the Annual Housing Survey in the United States
which we already used in Chapter Three, and the One Percent Sample in
West Germany, named after its sampling ratio.
The eXistence of parallel data sets in the two countries allows
us to use the same analytical model, i. e. , functional speCification
of the demand equations and specification of the explanatory price,
and income, and demographic variables. In this ~ense, we will carry
out an analytical rather than a descriptive comparison
Though the scope of questions asked is roughly the same in both
surveys, due to confidentiality restrictions in West Germany the data
available to us has little information on household composition,
prohibiting the decomposition of households into nuclei as described
in Chapter Three. Th'Js, our campa.rison wil.l be confined to population
strata in which household formation can safely be considered exogenous
to the housing market: married couples.
Second, we do not want to stress the comparison to areas where
the two countries are structure~ very differently. We will exclude
guestworkers in West Germany and non-whites in the United States from
our comparison.
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With similar reasoning, we confine the analysis to
metropolitan areas because the density pattern of rural settlements
are completely different in the two countries. In Germany, we sample
only from counties which are classified as highly densely populated.
The United States are represented by the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas of Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, and
Minneapolis/St.paul from the Annual Housing survey by SMSA.
Though we pool the data across cities in both countries, we will
keep city centers and suburbs apart, and we will further stratify the
households (married couples) according to three age groups (age below
35, age between 35 and 50, and age above 50). This yields six strata
for each country_ In addition, we pool all data to explore a variety
of functional forms -~ decision trees -- and different specifications
of the explanatory variables. These pooled samples contain 8035 white
married couples in West Germany and 8139 in the United States. We
wi.ll refer to these two samples as our e'basic samples".
This chapter begins with a short enumeration of descriptive
statistics to outline the differences in housing consumption in the
two countries. In addition, we will compare summary statistics from
the entire nation with summary statistics from our basic sample to
obtain a sense of how the samples represent the countries. Section
Three briefly sketches the differences in the tax treatment of
owner-occupancy between the countries.
This descriptive part is intended to set the stage for the
analytical comparison:
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how much of the observed differences in
housing consumption can be explained by differences in the exogenous
variables, much has to be attributed to preference
differences. Sections Four through Seven specify the common demand
model, estimate the components -- permanent income and hedonic prices
-- and finally the NMNL-demand equations. Then, we compare the price
and income responsiveness and optimal tree structures. This will give
us insight in the differences between the preferences in West Germany
and the United States. The last section attempts to separate those
from the effects of the tax differences: we forecast each country's
housing consumption first at the other country's preferences and then
at the other country's tax and subsidy system.
lived in
This pattern
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5.2 A Brief Descriptive Comparison
The most striking difference in housing consumption between West
Germany and the United States is the difference in the tenure choice:
of all households in the U. S. 1978, 65.2 percent
owner-occupied housing 1 , only 36.3 percent in Germany2.
is as striking in our basic samples of white married couples in urban
areas: compared to the entire population, this ratio rises to 77.0
percent in the U. S.; but only to 42.2 percent in West Germany.
Table 5-1 gives a more detailed decomposition of housing demand for
the two countries, based on the entire population (Annual Housing
Survey 1977, National Sample, and the West German One Percent Sample
1978, respectively) and our basic samples. We consider eight housing
alternatives, generated by three dimensions: owner-occupied versus
rental housing, single-family homes and duplexes versus multi-family
structures, and one-to-four room dwelling (plus kitchen) versus
dwellings with more than five roomso
The differences in tenure choice are echoed in the differences
between structure types: whereas in Germany single-family structures
(including duplexes) and multi-family structures have almost equal
shares, single-family homes constitute the overdhelming share of
structures in the United States. Note, that our sample differs from
the population in two ways: we consider only married couples with a
higher likelihood of owner-occupancy, and only high density urban
areas with a lower propensity to own. The ownership ratio for married
couples allover Germany is 43.2 percent, whereas the ownership for
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TABLE 5-1: MARKET SHARES OF HOUSING ALTERNATIVES
=============~===================================
WEST GERMANY: ONE PERCENT SAMPLE 1977, NATIONAL SAMPLE
All Households I Rental Housing I owner-Occupied Unit
23,067,000 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms Choice
---------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
1-2 Units I 10.5% I 5.7% I 8.0% I 22.9% I 47.1%
---------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
3+ Units I 38.7\ I 8.8% I 3.2\ I 2.1% I 52.9%
---------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
49.2% I 1404% I 11.2% I 25~O%
Tenure Choice 63.7% 36.3\
Size Choice 60.4% 39.6%
WEST GERMANY: REGIONS WITH HIGH DENSITY
Married, Germani Rental Housing I OWner-Occupied Unit
8,019 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms Choice
------~--------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
1-2 Units I 10.2% I 2.5% I 21.1% I 15.9% I 47.7%
---------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
3+ Units I 41.0% I 4.2% I 4.6% I 006% I 50.3%
---------------+--~--------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
51.2\ I 6.7% I 25.7% I 16.5%
Tenure Choice 57.8% 42.2%
Size Choice 76.9% 23.1%
UNITED STATES: ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY 1977, NATIONAL SAMPLE
All Households I Rental Housing I OWner-Occupied Unit75,280,000 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms Choice
---------~-----+-----------+----------+~----------+----------+--------
1-2 Units I 1.1.5% I 60.0% I 71.5'0
---------------+ 30.2% + 5.0% + 27.7% + 37.1\ +--------
3+ Units I 24.6% I 3.9% I 28.5%
--------~---~--+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
Tenure Choice I 35.2% I 64.8% I
Size Choice 57.9% 42.1%
UNITED STATES: BOSTON, DALLAS, LOS ANGELES, KINNEAPOLIS/ST.PAUL SMSA
White Married I Rental Housing I OWner-Occupied I Unit
8,139 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms 1-4 Rooms I 5+ Rooms Choice
------~--------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------+--------
1-2 Units I 7.2% I 3.2% I 24.5% I 50.6% I 85.5\
---------------+-----------+---------~+-----------+----------+--------
3+ Units I 11.9% I 0.6% I 1.1% I 0.7% I 14.5%
---------------+-----------+----------+-----------+------~---+-------~
19.1% I 309% I 25.6' I 51.4%
Tenure Choice 23.0% 77.0%
Size Choice 44.7% 55.3%
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all households in urban areas in the United States (SMSA's) is 61.0
percent.
The difference between rural and urban areas in the two countries
are most striking in the market shares of small versus large
dwellings. On the national scale, tttey are very close: 57.9 percent
of all dwellings have less than five rooms in the United States, 60.4
percent in West Germany. However in urban areas, this ratio falls in
the United States to 44.7 percent, but rises in Germany to 76.9
percent. This reflects a greater deqree of suburbanization in the
United States with both urba~ sprawl and a concentration of higher
income households in the suburbs as compared to rural areasG
So far, we have compared the endogenous variables of housing
demand. Table 5-2 compares the patterns of exogenous variables and
their reflection in the tenure choice. Germany has a substantially
higher proportion of elderly households (aged over 65) both on
national scale and in our sample of couples in urban areas. In both
countries our sample has a more centered age distribution, here, the
married couple effect and the urban area effect accumulate. The
ownership ratios show the familiar life cycle pattern, but with
considerable differences between the countries. The peak in Germany
1s about ten years earlier than in the United States and the decline
in homeownership among the elderly is much more pronounced.
The second part of Table 5-2 lists the annual gross income in
Dollars at prices of 1977. Median income is about equal in West
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TABLE 5-2: EXOGENOUS VARIABLES: AGE, INCOME, AND PRICES
===============~=======================================
(1) AGE DISTRIBUTION AND TENURE CHOICE:
Age Distribution ownership Ratio
Age United States West Germany United States West Germany
All HH B Sample b All HH 8 Sampleb All HH Sample All HH Sample
------+--------------------------------+------------------------------
< 25 I 6.4% 5.3% 12.6% 3.2% 35.3% 24.6% 10.4% 5.1%
25-29 11.6 11.3 n 8.5 56.6 53.3 n 15.1
30-34 12.4 12.7 18.5 10.1 74.5 74.6 32~6 28.8
35-39 20.0 11.2 " 14.5 82.5 83.5 "40.3
40-44 " 9.5 18.8 12.5 " 86.2 48.4 54.2
45-49 35.5 10.3 n 9.9 86.8 86.6 n 54.1
50-64 n 27.5 23.2 21.3 " 87.7 47.6 52.4
> 65 14.2 12.4 26.7 20.1 83.2 79.2 33.6 43.2
------+--------------------------------+----------------------~-------
a: Nationwide, see Footnote 1, b: White Married Couples in Urban Areas
(2) INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND TENURE CHOICE:
Income Distribution Ownership Ratio
Income United States West Germany United States West Germany
All HH Sample All HH Sample All HH Sample All HH Sample
------+----~----------------~----------+------------------------------
< 4.0 13.1% 2.1% 9.7% 0.4% 44.3% 59.8% 23.9% 42.8%
< 6.0 8u9 3.2 14.9 Oe9 48.5 51.7 25.2 44.7
< 8.0 10.2 4.9 18.4 1.7 52.1 53.5 29~5 39.6
<10.0 6.6 4.9 14.9 9.4 54.1 57.4 34.7 38.2
<12,5 10.7 8,0 16.0 8.2 58.2 60.2 37.7 39.5
<15.0 7.7 7.6 9.7 8.8 66.5 63.3 42.3 38.3
<20.0 ~4.7 18.3 10.3 25.7 72.3 76.0 50.6 40.8
<25.0 28.0 16.4 601 15.1 85.0 82.7 61.6 38.8
>25.0 n 34.6 "29.8 "91.3 "48.2
------+--------------------------------+--~--------~------------------
Income is yearly gross household income in Thousand 1977 Dollars
(3) HOUSING PRICES
r
United States I West Germany
City Center Suburbs City Center Suburbs
-----------------+------------------------+-------------------------
Gross Rent I 2,816 2,981 I 1,627 1,628
Hedonic Rent 2,742 2 u 935 1,980 2,010
-----------------+-------~-------~~-------+-------------------------
Out-Pocket-Cost 4,108 4,300 f 2,741 2,667
Hedonic Rent 3,428 3,546 I 2,738 3,014
Value 49,238 48,443 116,694 103,724
-----------------+---------------~--------+----~-~--~---------------
Yearly rents and values in ~977 Dollars
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Germany ($ 13,361) and the United States ($ 13,444)3. However, the
income distribution is very different. . In both countries income is
approximately evenly distributed across all categories up to median
income, but in Germany only the small flaction of 6.1 percent earns
more than $ 20,000, whereas in the United States this percentage is as
large as 28.0 percent. A similar pattern holds in our sample: mean
income is similar (United States: $ 22,020, West Germany: $ 23,420),
but the income among couples in U.S. cities has somewhat fatter tails
on either side: the low income category (below $ 8,000) accounts for
10.2 percent as compared to 3.0 percent in German cities, and the high
income category (above $ 35,000) 34.6 percent as compared to 29.8
percent. In both countries ownership is strongly correlated with
income where the OWlICLShip ratio reaches 95.8 percent for an income
above $ 45,000 in the U.S. sample, and 58~8 percent in the German
sample. Interestingly, the pattern is reversed for the very low
income groups. A more detailed cross-tabulation reveals that most of
these households are elderly or very young couples. This may reflect
reporting errors in transfer income of the young and extremely low
out-of-pocket cost due to paid-off mortgages among the elderly.
The most striking observation is the difference between the
income of t~e renter households and the homeownerSe In the United
States, median income for homeowners is about twice as high as among
renter households ($ 17,100 versus $ 8,800), but in West Germany it is
only about 30 percent higher ($ 15,750 versus $12,000). The same
discrepancy holds in our sample: the mean income in the U.S. sample
is $ 24,030 for homeowners and $ 15,410 for renters, in West Germany $
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25,260 and $ 22,080, respectively.
Finally, the third part of Table 5-2 lists average housing prices
for our two samples, stratified by city center and suburbs. Again,
there are very pronounced differences: gross rents in GermRny are
substantially lower (about 55 percent) 4, but prices of single-family
houses including the lot are drastically more expensive (more than
twice). Note, that this does not translate into high mean
out-of-pocket-costso This is basically due to a much lower
loan-to-value ratio in Germany where a large downpayment is made from
a building society's sav~ngs contract ("Bausparkassenvertrag"). The
mean hedonic rent for owner-occupied housing is about 40 percent
higher than for rental housing in Germany, only about 25 percent
percent in the United States. Thus, a part of the differential in
house prices can be explained by better quality dwellings. Second, in
1977/78, about 40 percent of the German house prices in high density
areas are paid for the lotS, only about 20 percent in the U.S.
SKSA,s6. This translates into a 4.5 times higher lot price in Germany
than in the United States and only 80 percent higher structure costs.
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5.3 Tax Treatment of Owner Occupancy in the Two Countries
We will argue that a substantial part of the different housing
consumption patterns can be explained by the different tax laws. This
Section gives a brief description of how the out-af-pocket costs of
homeownership are reduced by tax deductions from the personal income
tax in the two countries. Compared with the United States, the tax
provisions for homeowners in Germany are confusing and complicated,
and we present only a simplified version.
Table 5-3 gives a stylized survey of the tax laws. The important
tax tool in the United States is the deduction of mortgage interest,
whereas in West Germany the basic mechanism is the allowance for the
depreciation of the structure. There are three depreciation schedules
i.n Germany: an "accelerated scheduleo, with a cap on time and value, a
qdegressive schedule" applicable only to new structures, and the
omnibus linear depreciation schedule. In the United States, imputed
rental income is not taxed; in Germany, it is taxed except in the
case of an accelerated depreciation schedule. Germany has only a
negligible property tax, whereas in the United States the property tax
is sUbstantia1 even after deduction from personal income tax. The
German tax 1aw has an additional tWist in its special treatment of
two~family homes. In this case, mortgage interest can be deducted in
addition to depreciation allowances as well as all maintenance and a
percentage of modernization expenses, only partially offset by the
taxation of imputed rent. This is insofar relevant to our demand
analysis, as the law did not exclude the rentless "lease" of the
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FIGURE 5-3~ STYLIZED TAX-TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
===================================================
United States 1977 West Germany 1978
Single-Family Two-Family
(1) Property Tax:
varies locally,
about 2% of value
(2) Imputed Rent Taxed as Personal Income:
varies locally,
about 0.1% of value
no yes, if schedule B
no, if schedule A
yes
(3) Deductions from Personal Income Tax:
Property Tax yes no yes
Mortgage Interest yes no yes
Depreciation no schedule A any
or schedule B schedule
Maintenance no no yes
Modernization no no yes, 15%
Notes:
Schedule A ("accelerated"): 8 years 5% of structure costs, capped at
$ 3,000. Thereafter none.
Schedule B ("degressive"): 12 years 3.5% of structure costs, 20 years
2%, finally 10 years 1%. Only applicable
for new buildings.
Schedule C ("linear"): 50 years 2%. No restrictions.
Imputed Rent: Effectively ca. 1% of structure costs.
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second unit to a family member 0 Not too surprisingly, this "fake
two-family housen became very popular (1977: 17.3 percent on national
scale, 13.0 percent in our sample, that is about 40 percent of the one
or two unit owner-occupied houses) until the loop-hQle was closed.
This, too, is the main reason to include two-family homes into the
same category as single-family homes in the definition of the eight
housing alternatives: apart from the required extra kitchen and bath,
the "fake two-family home" is virtually indistinguishable from a
single-family house.
Tax advantages from homeownership are much more favorable in the
United States apart from this odd loop-hole for two~family homes in
Germany. Table 5-4 lists the value of the tax savings from
single-family homeownership in both countries for various income
levels, house values, and equity ratios in the first-few years of a
new home. Note, that the German tax write-offs depend on the value of
the structure only, not on the value of the land, and that they are
independent of the loan-to-value ratio, tilting the symmetry between
borrowing and lending (interest income is taxable in Germany). The
tax savings in Germany do not increase strictly monotonically with
value Que to the cap on the accelerated depreciation schedule long
before the degressive schedule becomes attractive.
A final note concerns the subsidy given to renters in form of
housing allowances ("Wohngelo") • They depend on the rent paid,
income, and family-size similar to the housing gap formula applie~ in
Chapter Three. For a couple with two children paying the median rent
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TABLE 5-4: YEARLY TAXSAVINGS FROM OWNER-OCCUPANCY IN GERMANY VS. USA
======================~=============================== ==============
EQUITY: 50%, STRUCTURE: 80%
Value Yearly Gross Income in 1977 Dollars:
in 8,000 .12,000 1.6,000 25,000
$ 1000 GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA:
---------+--------------------------~--------------------------------
30.0 $ 260 240 $ 260 $ 370 ~ 260 $ 440 $ 470 $ 560
50.0 440 420 440 610 440 71.0 770 920
80.0 540 420 690 930 690 1,080 1,180 1,420
120.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,550 1,180 2,060
160.0 540 420 700 1,150 700 1,930 1,200 2,650
200.0 540 420 880 1,150 880 1,930 1 f 490 3,170
EQUITY: 50\, STRUCTURE: 60%
Value Yearly Gross Income in 1977 Dollars:
in 8,000 12,000 16,000 25,000
$ 1000 GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA: GEl<: USA:
---------+-------------------------------------~---------------------
30~O $ 200 240 $ 200 $ 370 $ 200 $ 440 $ 350 $ 560
50.0 330 420 330 610 330 710 580 920
80.0 530 420 630 930 530 1,080 910 1,420
120.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,550 1,180 2,060
160.0 540 420 690 1,.150 690 1,930 1,180 2,650
200.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,930 1,180 3,170
EQUITY: 20%, STRUCTURE: 80%
Value Yearly Gross Income in 1977 Dollars:
in 8,000 12,000 16,000 25,000
$ 1000 GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA:
---------+-----------------------------------------------------------
30.0 $ 260 360 $ 260 $ 530 $ 260 $ 610 $ 470 $ 790
50.0 440 420 440 840 440 970 770 1,270
80.0 540 420 690 1,150 -690 1,490 1,180 1,970
120.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,930 .1,180 2,790
160.0 540 420 700 1,150 700 1,930 1,200 3,510
200.0 540 420 880 1,150 880 1,930 1,490 4,100
EQUITY: 20%, STRUCTURE: 6090
Value Yearly Gross Income in 1977 Dollars:
in 8,000 12,000 16,000 25,000
$ 1000 GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA: GER: USA:
---------+----------------------------~------------------------------
30.0 $ 200 360 $ 200 $ 530 $ 200 $ 610 $ 350 $ 790
50.0 330 420 330 840 330 970 580 1,270
80.0 540 420 530 1,150 530 1,490 910 1,970
120.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,930 1,180 2,790
150.0 540 420 690 1,150 690 1,930 1,~80 3,510
200.0 540 420 690 1,,150 690 1,930 1,180 4,100
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in an urban area the income cap is at $ 7,000 yearly after-tax
income. At an income of $ 4,000, about 60 percent of the rent will be
reimbursed~ In 1977, 7.4 percent of all households in West Germany
received housing allowances.
Thus, all things considered, the tax and subSidy structure in
Germany is much less favorable to homeownership than in the United
States.
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5.4 Specification of the Demand Equations
In Table 5-1, we already introduceCl the eight housing
alternatives of the dependent v~riable:
o SF 14
·
owner-Occupied, Single or Two-Family Home, 1-4 Rooms
·o SF 5+
·
OWner-Occupied, Single or Two-Family Home 5 5+ Rooms
·o KF 14-
·
Owner-Occupied, Multi-family Structure, 1-4 Rooms
·o MF Si-
·
OWner-Occupied, Multi-family Structure, 5+ Rooms
·R SF 14
·
Rental Housing, Single or Two-Family Home, 1-4 Rooms
·R SF 5+
·
Rental Housing, Single or Two~Family Home, 5+ Rooms
·R MF 14
·
Rental Housing, Multi-family Structure, 1-4 Rooms
·~ MF 5+ : Rental HClusing, Multi-family Structure, 5+ Rooms
They are generated by three dimensions of choice (tenure, structure
type in number of units, dwelling size in number of rooms) and a
Simple binary set of possibilities in each choice. This symmetric
set-up allows us to estimate a variety of functional forms: there are
six ways to order the three dimensions in a three stage hierarchical
choice model. The six trees are depicted in Figure 5-5 and are
denoted by the order of the dimensions (T = tenure choice, U = choice
of number of units, S = size choice). In addition to the six trees,
we will estimate the simple multinomial logit model.
We use a similar set of explanatory variables as we already
introduced in Chapter Three:
(1) YP: Permanent income before t~tes,
(2) HEDDH: Hedonic index as a measure of user cost,
(3) RETURN~ Return from equity minus its opportunity costs,
(4) CROWDS: Squared deviation of optimal from actual dwelling size,
(5) AGE: Age of household head.
Most of the differences to Chapter Three are motivated by making the
cross country comparison as meaningful as possible. Unfortunately,
the German survey only reports net income which is endogenous in this
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FIGURE 5-5: DECISION TREES AND HOUSING ALTERNATIVES
-~~--~~~~--~~-~~~~-~--~-~~----~-~-~--~-------~-~~-~-~----~~~~~~-------~~--~------~~--~--~-~~~~~-~---~--
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-..----------~--~
U-S-T:
==~=== ~-~
/~s /R~S
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- - ~ ~ - - --
~
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===== ~e~ >t~
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housing demand equation because after-tax income depends on the
housing choice an~ its implications on tax deductions. Gross income
is calculated using stepwise polynomial approximations of the tax
scnedule, given imputed tax deductions from homeownership and average
other deductions by age~ household size, social status, and other
demographic variables'. This necessary calculation, though made as
careful as possible, is rough and noisy.
The use of permanent income rather than current income reflects
the common wisdom (Qui91e~ 1979) that housing decisions are long run
decisions and should not be influenced transitory income
fluctuations. Cleaning the explanatory variables from transitory
components is in particular important when comparing two countries
where the transitory components are more likely to be different. In
particular, it may help to minimize the noise introduced by the
calculation of gross income in West Germany. Section 5.6 will discuss
the estimation of permanent income in both countries. Because income
varies by household, but is not alternative specific, it has to
interact with a set of dummies s • Instead of using a full set of seven
alternative specific dummies, we exploit the symmetric tree structure
and let income interact with a dummy for each dimension of choice.
Age of the household head is included in the equation over and
above the stratification of the sample into age categories to take
account of the differences in the life cycle pattern of housing
consumption within each stratum, discovered in Table 5-2. Age enters
the equation linearly and quadratically, and both variables interact
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with the dummies for each dimension of choice in the same as way
income does.
We use two price variables, one measuring the out-of-pocket user
cost, and the other measuring the less tangible return from equity
invested in an owner-occupied home. The latter variable is defined as
(5.1) RETURN = ( APPR - TBILLR * (l-HARGTR) * (l-LOANRA) ) * VALUE
where APPR: rate of appreciation
TBILLR: alternative interest rate
MARGTR: marginal tax rate of household
LOANRA: loan-to-value ratio
Note that the capital gains accrued by appreciation are not taxed,
whereas the alternative investment (in the u.s.: in treasury bills,
in Germany in "festverzinsliche Wertpapiere tl ) is sUbject to personal
income tax. This reflects the tax treatment of home sales in both
countries where the capital gains essentially evade taxation.
To compute user cost, we could in principle proceed as in Chapter
Three. However, the data provided in both surveys is qUite different,
in particular, house values have to be imputed from external
information because they are not reported in th~ German survey.
Therefore, it is likely that user cost of homeownership are not
comparable across the two countries, and we rather use a hedonic
index. Furthermore, this allows us to inclUde condominiums into the
choice set. Condominiums are an important housing alternative in West
Germany (5.5 percent in the sample) and Boston (5.1 percent in the
sample), less so in the other u.s. SMSA's (Dallas 0.6 percent, Los
Angeles 1.6 percent, Minneapolis/St.Paul 0.8 percent). A discussion
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of the hedonic estimation follows in the next section.
As a second demographic variable, we introduce a variable to
measure household size which boils down to the number of children in
our sample of married couples. As most useful a variable turned out
which measures the crowding of a dwelling in terms of the deviation of
an optimal from the actual dwelling size:
(5.2) CROWDS = ( NROPT - NRACT) 2
where NRACT: actual number of rooms
NROPT: optimal number of rooms
NROPT = NADULTS + 1 + (NKIDS-l)/2
NADUIJTS: number of adult~ in household
NADULTS: number of children in household
Finally, the attributes of hypothetical, i. e., not chosen
alt.erllatives are imputed as sample averages evaluated at the
household's housing independent characteristics. The treatment
differs from that in Chapter Three: we keep the chosen number of
rooms constant when the household hypothetically moves to another
tenure or structure category. This way, we can more clearly separate
the choices on each level of the tree.
We did a fair number of experiments with alternative
specifications for the exogenous variables in the chosen and
hypothetical alternatives, the functional form of the decision trees,
and the number of alternatives. Some sensitivity results are reported
in Section 5.7.
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5.5 Hedonic Price Indices
Hedonic rent ~ndexes are estimated from the renter subsample in
each country, then evaluated at each dwelling. This yields an imputed
rent for owner-occupied homes and condominiums, where no value and
out-af-pocket cost data is available in both countries.
Methodological underpinnings of hedonic estimation can be found in
Lancaster (1966), Rosen (1974), Kuellbauer (1974), and Murray (1978).
Mean gross rents and hedonic rents are reported at the bottom of Table
5-2. In both countries, we use a semilogarithmic functional form to
accommodate interaction terms but avoid using nonlinear
specifications.
5.5.~ United States
In the United States, we mimicky the the speCification of
Malpezzi, Ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980), in the following denoted by
KOT. The estimates are readjusted for our sample and the sampling
period (1977-78 instead of 1974-75), and the specification was
sliqhtly changed to be app1icable for bOth renter and owner-occupied
units. We estimated four sets of coefficients, one for each SMSA, to
accommodate regional differences in the housing stock and its
evaluation in each geographical region due to, e. g., climatic
differences, as well as in the general level of rents due to market
conditions.
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The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 5-6. Very
little changes compared to the original MOT results. The number of
rooms has the expected significance as the most important quality
measure. Structure type performs weakly, as it does in the MOT
estimations for 1974-76, and, as we will see, in the German hedonic
regressions. Of the building attributes, the informal ratings are
unreliable. Age enters in a S-shaped nonlinear fashion. The rental
unit depreciates fast in the first years after construction; this
rate slows down after the initial period; but increases again when
the building becomes very old. Interestingly, the pattern is
different in Boston where old buildings even have a positive
contribution to the hedonic value~ Almost all dwelling attributes
have their expected signs or are insignificant.
We measure strong tenure discounts with a concave relationship to
the length of tenure. Ten years after moving in, tenants receive a
discount of 22.1 percent in Boston, 16.1 percent in Dallas~ 24.5
percent in Los Angeles, and 10.7 percent in Minneapolis/St.Paul,
compared to those of MOT quoted in Table 4-20 The presence of the
1andlord in the building imp1ies a significant (at the 90 percent
level) rent reduction in all SMSA's except Minneapolis/ St~Paul, which
supports our reasoning in Section 4.2.2. Tenant characteristics may
proxy neighborhood characteristics not picked up in the coefficients
at the bottom of Table 5-6. Finally, we control for inclusions in the
gross rent and inflation during the lengthy interview period.
The Boston rental market emerges as distinctly different froiD the
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TABLE 5-6 HEDONIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (USA)
================================================
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Yearly Gross Rent
VARIABLE: BOSTON: DALLAS: LOS ANGELES: MINN/ST.P.:
CONSTANT 0.90199 ~ 0.94663 * 1.33857 * 0.83656 *
(1) NUMBER OF ROOMS:
1+1/2 BATHS
TWO BATHS
THREE BATHS
ONE ROOM
TWO ROOMS
FOUR ROOMS
FIVE+ ROOMS
NO BEDROOM
TWO BEDROOMS
THREE BEDROOMS
FOu~R+ BEDROOMS
0.J.3285 *
01:l2J.148 *
0.50431 -=
-0.10873 *
-0.05875 *
0007249 *
0.02473 +
-O.~1798 *
0.11596 *
0.22820 *
0.06679 *
0.1.0007 *
0.1.6076 1c
0.37019 *
-0.16168 *
-0.12015 *
0.05347 -
-0.01625 -
-0.20446 *
0.12006 *
0.26933 *
0.08153 *
0.11486 fir
0.11136 *
0.21600 sa:
-0.14698 *
-0.10482 *
0.20443 *
0.04412 *
-0.27271 *
0.19344 *
0.35732 *
0.10280 *
0.12840 *
0.13190 *
0.11278
-0.14291 *
-0.04869 *
0.04485 -
0.06999 *
-0.21347 *
0.13746 1\:
0.29278 1\:
0.06839 1\:
(2) STRUCTURE TYPE:
ONE FAM.,ATT.
ONE FAM. ,DET.
DUPLEX
FIFTY+ UNITS
-0.00398
0.09331 +
0.03736 -
0.06505 -
0.02405
0.01735
0.05303 -
-0.02114
-0.07958 +
-0.01601
-0.00146
0,,09605 *
0.12123 11:
0.08406 +
0.03988 -
0.05409 +
(3) ATTRIBUTES OF BUILDING:
BUILDING AGE
AGE SQUARED
AGE CUBED
PRIOR 1940
ELEVATOR
BAD HALLWAY
LEAKS , CRACKS. ~ •
0.03099 +
-0.00262 +
.000054 *
0.02558
0.~215~ *
-0.00373
0$00888
-0.02530 *
0.00101 -
-.000012
-0.22387 *
0.37430 *
-0.04854 +
-0.00778
-0.03452 •
0.00170 +
-.000030 +
-0.35393 *
0.10561 +
0.02274 -
0.00075
-0.02873 1\:
0.00135 +
-.000024 -
-O~28725 *
0.10681 *
0.00021
0.00403
(4) ATTRIBUTES OF DWELLING:
ROOM HEATER
STEAM HEAT
ELECTRIC HEAT
ROOM AIRCOND.
CENTRAL AIReD.
NO RADIATORS
POOR PLUMBING
NO PRIVACY
NO OUTLETS
COOK WITH ELEC.
-0.07710 -
0.00216
-0.00169
0.04912 *
0.17119 11:
-0.03860 -
-0015616 *
-0.04803 +
-0.06982 -
0.06503 *
-0.03693
0.02376
-0.03554
0 .. 15800 *
0.09890 *
-0.02579
-0.1.6900 1t
-0.04793 +
-0.17764 *
0.07872 *
-0.04243 +
-0.08911 -
0.01642
0.01314
0.10926 *
-0.05037 *
-O.13SJ73 *
-0.06610 *
-0.06638 -
-0.00012
-0.05421
-0.01782
0.00553
0,03727 +
0.08094 1\:
-0.02954
-0.07503 -
-0.09208 *
0.00217
0.05554 *
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TABLE 5-6 HEDONIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (CONT'D)
===================================================
VARIABLE: BOSTON: DALLAS: LOS ANGELES: MINN/ST.P.:
(5) TENURE DISCOUNTS
LENGTH OF TEN. -0.02841 * -0.02671 * -0.03469 it -0.01335 1\:
L.O.T. SQUARED 0,,00063 * 0.00106 * 0000101 * 0.00027
HOVE PRIOR 1950 -0.24097 * -0.18788 + -0.30103 * -0037291 1\:
LANDLD PRESENT -0.03875 + -0.05625 - -0.04171 + 0.00118
(6) TENANT CHARACTERISTICS:
BLACK -0.02188 -0.15769 * -0.17172 * 0.04533 -
SPANISH -O.09~'36 1: -0.06463 + -0.14289 1c 0.07447
CHINESE Oe-04310 -0.07988 - -0.07150 * -0.03224
PERSONS/ROOM 0.040.12 - 0.05058 + Oe04329 + 0.09127 1c
(7) CONTROLS FOR GROSS RENT:
UTILITIES INCL~ 0.20532 1: 0.06374 11: 0 .. 11750 * 0.18198 *
HEAT INCL. -0.00491 0.34012 + 0.23630 - 0.20027 +
PARKING INCL. 0.10299 - 0.03587 0.03850 Og13858 "=
FURNITURE INCL~ -0.01085 0.00889 -0.00394 -0.03753 -
INTERVIEW DATE -0.00086 -0.00220 -0.00414 + -0.00120
DATE * HEAT INCL 0.00395 -0.01973 0000747 -0.00695
(8) NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
EXCELLENT 0.07622 '* 0003738 - 0.10468 * 0.09294 11:
GOOD 0.04408 * 0.00768 0.04550 11: 0.05350 11:
POOR -0.02213 -0.06031 - 0.00591 -0.02192
ABANDONED STRUC -0.07983 * 0.05323 - -0.06336 + -0.00985
LITTER 0.01417 -OC)02959 - -0001269 -0.01083
110 SHOPS 0.02936 - -0.00515 -0.02996 - -0.01104
CEI'lTER CITY -0.02243 - 0.01051 0.04379 * 0.05219 ..
GROSS RENT/MONTH: $ 225
MEAN DEP. VARIABLE 0.995
STANDARD DEV.: 0.368
STANDARD ERROR: 0.262
OBSERVATIONS: 1 71.4
R-SgUARED: 0.509
* = SIGNIFICANT AT 99%
+ = SIGNIFICANT AT 95%
- = SIGNIFICANT AT 80%
$ 190
0.825
0.397
0.244
1368
0.636
$ 198
0.863
0.412
0.263
1818
0.606
$ 201
0.880
0.328
0.206
1196
0.624
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other three SHSA's: the mean monthly rent is considerably higher;
the explained fraction of rent variation lower; and the age pattern,
discussed above, is reversed. This is consistent ~ith the MOT
findings and parallels the other SMSA's in the North-East considered
in their investigation.
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5.5.2 West Germany
For West Germany, we use the hsdonic regression results by
Behring, Goldrian g et8 ale (1983) reported in Table 5-7. These
indexes vary by city center versus suburbs, but are pooled across West
Germany. To make up for intercity differences, we calculated average
rents by housing alternative for each city and adjusted the level of
the hedonic index accordingly. The variables used are similar to
those in the specification of MalpeZzi, ozanne, and Thibodeau (1980).
The sample for the estimation is huge and produces very large
t-statistics. As in the UoS. estimates, number of rooms has the
strongest impact on hedonic values. For a given number of rooms, the
average size of the rooms contributes positively to the rent. This
variable is measured as the deviation of average room size from the
standard room size of 135 square feet.
The coefficients for structure type are weak, and the negative
value for two-family structures may indicate the German peculiarity of
the "fake two-family homes" where the rent in the second unit is
substantially reduced in some form of gentlemens' agreement as
mentioned in Section 5.3. Note, however f that Behring and Goldrian
excluded a unit from the sample if the tenant did not pay rent at all
or explicitly stated that his rent was reduced due to an agreement
with the landlord.
The age of the building is measured 1inearly and enters
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TABLE 5-7 HEDONIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (GERMANY)
=================~=================~================
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Monthly Rent Net of Utilities
VARIABLE: CITY CENTERS SUBURBS
CONSTANT 5.451 (402.90) 5.451 (248.93)
(~) NUMBER OF ROOMS:
ONE ROOM
THREE ROOMS
FOUR ROOMS
FIVE+ ROOMS
MEAN ROOM SIZE
NO KITCHEN
NO BATH
TWO+ BATHROOMS
-0.289
00215
0.389
0.103
0.0325
-0.261
-0.172
0.114
(47.08)
(51~06)
(69.60)
(79.98)
(79.68)
(40.14)
(29.56)
(20.0.0)
-0.320
0.212
0.367
0.094
0.0317
-0.320
-0.129
O.~84
(24.24)
(27.41)
(38.85)
(44.52)
(43.94)
(27.02)
(13.12)
(20.69)
(2) STRUCTURE TYPE:
ONE FAMILY HOME
TWO FAMILY HOME
5+ F., 4- FLOORS
5+ F., 5+ FLOORS
0.005
-0.082
0.029
0.059
( 0.49)
(10.11)
( 5.58)
(10.29)
0.071
-0.065
0.070
0.150
( 5.45)
( 7.99)
( 8.79)
(~lo68)
(3) ATTRIBUTES OF BUILDING:
BUILDING AGE
PRIOR 1949
GENTRIFIED
1IlP0.0082
--0.330
-0.046
(21.81)
(41.93)
(17.86)
-0.0075
-0.239
-0.039
(12.54)
(19.13)
( 6.22)
(4) ATTRIBUTES OF DWELLING:
CENTRAL HEAT
WARM WATER
BALCONY
DOUBLE WINDOWS
0.216
0.137
0.037
0.007
(54.62)
(17.81)
(24.81) .
( 1.81)
-0.163
-0.045
0.065
0.031
(22.72)
( 3.13)
(14.39)
( 4.64)
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TABLE 5-7 HEDONIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (CONT'D)
---~~~~--~~---~-~~~---~---~--~~---~-~-~~-~--------­~--~~-~---~-~~~---~-----~-----------~~~---~~-~~--~-
VARIABLE: CITY CENTERS SUBURBS
(5) TENURE DISCOUNTS
LENGTH OF TENURE
I.•• O.T. SQUARED
MOVE PRIOR 1955
LANDLD PRESENT
-0.020
0.0007
-0.189
-0.127
( 8 .• 20)
( 3.32)
(30.70)
(31.99)
-0.022
0.0007
-0.249
-0.139
( 5.59)
( 2.06)
(21.44)
(15.85)
(6) TENANT CHARACTERISTICS:
GUESTWORI<ER 0.008 ( 1.14) -0.011 ( 0.98)
(7) CONTROLS FOR GROSS RENT:
COMPANY DWELLING -0.083 (10.20) -00062 ( 4.51)
(8) NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
NOISE
PUBLIC TRANSP.
SHOPPING
PUBLIC PARKS
NET NORMAL RENT:
OBSERVATIONS:
R-SQUARED:
-0.005
0.022
0.003
0~015
$ 100
31207
0.692
( 2.10)
( 5.95)
( 1.28)
( 6.56)
-0.018
0.016)
-0.002
0.009
$ 100
11952
0.665
4.51)
3.76)
0.57)
2.11)
t-statistics in brackets.
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negatively, approaching a discount of a third of the normal rent in
. ~ity centers, and of a quarter in suburbs for pre-1949 structures. An
indicator variable for gentrification obviously measures the cause
rather than the effect because it depresses the rent signifi.cantly.
The tenure discounts are those reported in Table 4-1. In addition,
the land1ora's presence in the building has a significant influence on
the rent, reducing it more than 12 percent. An indicator variable for
questworkers is included to test for discrimination, however, this
variable can not be measured with any precision. Finally, a group of
neighborhood variables is included with the expected sign pattern, but
weak t-statistics.
The interviews in the One Percent Sample were conducted within a
single week, so no adjustment for inflation was necessary. There are
very little differences in the valuation of the hedonic attributes
between city centers and sUburbs. Buildings depreciate faster in
cities, highrises add a substantially higher amount to the hedonic
value in suburbs. Unfortunately, Behring and Goldrian do not report
the means of the dependent variable. However, the explanatory
variables are constructed in a way that the constant measures "normal
rent" of a standard German rental unit. This rent is the monthly rent
net of utilities and ~s approximately $ 100 for suburbs and city
centers, which is considerably higher than the average in non-urban
areas, $ 77 per month. For the demand equation in Section 5.7, we
will add utility bills to this number as reported in Behring aTId
Goldrian (1983). The average of this gross rent in our sample is
reported at the bottom of Table 5-2.
o
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5.5.3 Comparison
Using the same functional specification and similar explanatory
variables, we can make a meaningful comparison between the results of
the hedonic estimations in both countries. Note first the stunning
difference in the rent levels as already pointed out in Table 5-2.
The regression fit is somewhat tighter in the German estimatiQn in
spite of a more parsimonious specification which might be due to a
smaller spread of rents in Germany. In both countries, the hedonic
regressions do not discriminate well among structure types which
indicates some trouble in predicting hedonic rents for owner-occupied
single or two-family homes and comparing hedonic rents across tenure.
For this reason, we will use the hedonic rents in the demand equations
only interacting with a tenure choice dummy.
We already compared tenure discounts in Chapter Four. We also
refer to this chapter for a discussion of measurement problems
pertaining to this variable. The discounts for a private landlord are
sUbstantial in Germany. Many of these landlords live in the building
they rented out. If we compare the discounts with the
landlora-present-discounts measured for the American SlISA's, we may
conclude that the relationship between landlord and tenant is more
idiosyncratic as compared to the United States.
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5.6 Permanent Income Estimates
As we argued in Section 5.3, the decision for a durable commodity
like housing should depend on transitory income components. Thus, we
use the following age specific permanent income
Ycurr = Yperm(age, human and nonhuman wealth) + Ytrans
where the transitory income is defined as the residual of a regression
of current income on the determinants of permanent income, thus
uncorrelated to the latter. In both countries, we face data problems
to measure all the components determining permanent income. The
estimation heavily relies on the puritan proposition that human and
nonhuman wealth are strongly correlated, and missing data in one of
the wealth categories is predicted by the other. However, structural
interpretation of the estimated coefficients should be only made with
care.
5.6.1 United States
The Annual Housing Survey has very little information on human
wealth as measured by professional status, social position, or job
training. The only variable in this direction is the household head's
education given by the highest degree received. The survey, however,
has some information on non-human wealth in form of indicator
variables of asset income, rental income, the number of cars and
trucks r and the possession of a second home. To accommodate
interaction patterns, we stratify the estimation by age groups and use
a semilogarithmic form.
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To cope with inter-city differences, we
estimate each set of regressions for each city separately 0 The
results are presented in Table 5-8.
The regression fits are fairly low, most satisfactory in the
elderly strata. Average gross income varies considerably among
strata, reflecting life cycle earning patterns, and among SMSA's, with
Hinneapolis/StoPaul at the top and Boston at the bottom of the income
scale. Only for the youngest stratum, Los Angeles has the lowest
average income. The cross sectional variation in income is increasing
with age in all strata, lOwest in Minneapolis/St.Paul.
Not surprisingly, the employment status in the week of the
interview has in almost all regressions a large and significant
inf1uence on permanent income. Similarly, the impact of additional
wage and salary incomes in the household is positive, though measured
with less precision. Among the coefficients of nun-human wealth, the
presence of assets and the number of cars play the most important role
to predict permanent income. They are highly significant and of large
magnitude in every regression. The presence of rental income has a
negative impact which may be explained by the lack of other income
sources.
The household characteristics perform very weakly. This is
partially due to the stratification by age which takes care of most of
the age qenerated income variation. In the pooled sample, all age
variab1es are highly significanto The number of dependents is of
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TABLE 5-8: PERMANENT INCOME ESTIMATION (USA)
~-~-~--~--~---~-----~~----~-~~----~--~------~- ~- - ~-~~ -~~~~ -- ~~~ --~ ~-~ ~ -
Dependent Variable: Yearly Gross Income in 1000 Dollars
HARRIED COUPLES, HEAD AGED UNDER 35
VARIABLE: BOSTON: DALLAS: LOS ANGELES: MINNc/ST.P.:
CONSTANT -0.80973 1.599B1 + 0.14282 -0.42008
(1) INCOME SOURCES:
EMPLOYED 0.51998 *
RETIRED -0.03709
HUMBER OF WAGES 0.12955
(2) NONHUMAN WEALTH:
ASSETS PRESENT 0.19084 *
RENTAL INCOME -0.07496
SECOND HOME 0.04524
NUMBER OF CARS 0.20459 *
TRUCKS 0.15078 -
0.17746 -
0.09544
0.05445
0.13198 *
-O~01337
0.00428
0.17218 *
0.13096 *
0.19068 -
0.05716
0.19286 *
0.1~g37 *
-0.30735 +
-0.18293
0.16886 'a
0.1.9457 *
0.25783 *
0.26918 tc
0.05011
0.12817 1:
-0$17260 )\'
0.15247 -
0.15266 *
0.08854 *
(3) HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS:
AGE OF-HEAD
AGE SQUARED
AGE OF SPOUSE
AGE SQUARED
HEAD FEMALE
HEAD SPANISH
DEPENDENTS
0.20867 -
-0.00308 -
-0.05026
0.00094
-0.53898 -
-0.29875 +
-0.07036 +
--0.01180
0.00037
0.03911
-0.00030
~O.27547 +
-0.13915 +
-0.02233 -
0.08496
-0.00125
0.06507 -
-0.00085 -
-0.06889
-0.16636 *
-0.03441 -
0.12986 +
-0.00203 ..-
0.06350 -
-0.00076 -
-0.46801 *
0.12459
-0.05588 *
(4) EDUCATION OF HEAD:
GRADE 0-7 -Ov17824
GRADE 8 0.15895
GRADE 9-11 -0.03026
TWO Y. COLLEGE 0.14623-
FOUR Y. COLL. 0.21300 +
GRAD. SCHOOL 0.25401 *
GROSS INCOME: $ 16 r 729
MEAN DEP. VAR~: 2~790
STANDARD DEV.: 0.653
STANDARD ERROR: 0.551
OBSERV~TIONS: 435
R-SQUARED: 0.323
-0.24808 +
-0.21486 -
-0.18188 "
-0.00325
0.17191 *
0.16361 *
$ 16,413
2.798
0.517
0.425
674
0.347
-0.29891 ~
-0.19937
-0.22314 *
0.01650
0.14929 -
0.26262 *
$ 14,490
2.673
0.622
0.488
493
0.412
-0.04451
-0.14088
-0.19088 +
-0.00028
0.10726 *
0.05295
$ 18,758
2.932
0.439
0.368
782
0.316
* = SIGNIFICANT AT 99', + = SIGNI. AT 95', - = SIGNIFICANT AT 80\
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TABLE 5-8: PERMANENT INCOME ESTIMATION (CONT'D)
================================================
Dependent Variable: Yearly Gross Income in 1000 Dollars
MARRIED COUPLES, HEAD AGED 35 TO 50
VARIABLE: BOSTON: DALLAS: LOS ANGELES: MINN./ST.P.:
CONSTANT 3.36395 - 4.29046 + -0.81824 4.66697 *
(1) INCOME SOURCES:
EMPLOYED 0.59880 *
RETIRED 0.17779 +
NUMBER OF WAGES 0.06008 *
(2) NONHUMAN WEALTH:
ASSETS PRESENT 0.20699 *
RENTAL INCOME -0.06914
SECOND HOME -0.00404
NUMBER OF CARS 0.18490 *
TRUCKS 0.00954
0.14077
-0.01350
0.02934
0.21668 *
-0.14468 -
-0.05242
0.13613 *
0 • .10244 +
0.29925 *
0.05632
0.03601 -
0.15666 1c
-0.16673 -
-0.00915
0.15155 *
0.11271 +
0.45921 Ie
0.05910
0.03577 +
0.11054 *
-0.07303
0.13155 *
0.09574 *
0.07375 +
(3) HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS:
AGE OF HEAD
AGE SQUARED
AGE OF SPOUSE
AGE SQUARED
HEAD FEMALE
HEAD SPANISH
DEPENDENTS
-0.00953
0.00013
-0.05746 -
0.00070 -
-0.05133
-0.08615
-0.00412
-0.04111
0.00049
-0.02400
0.00026
-0.32602 -
-0.11953
-0.02729
0.17083 -
-0.00200 -
-0.00396
0.00009
-0.86750 It
-0.10984 -
-0.00806
-0.13516 +
0.00154 -
0.03509
-0.00041
-0.26408 --
0.04132
-0.01937 -
(4) EDUCATION OF HEAD:
GRADE 0-7' -0.20554 -
GRADE 8 -0.13150
GRADE 9-11 -0.31727 *
TWO Y. COLLEGE 0.05834
FOUR Ye COLL. 0.33085 *
GRAD. SCHOOL 0.45139 *
GROSS INCOME: $ 20,795
MEAN DEP. VAR.: 3.035
STANDARD DEV.: 0.633
STANDARD ERROR: 0.502
OBSERVATIONS: 566
R-SQUARED: 0.396
-0.49628 *
-0.06132
-0.27937 1(
0.00525
0.1.6639 *
0.23079 *
$ 22,727
3.124
0.648
0.571
753
0.245
-0.44321 1(
-0.22485 -
-0.22982 *
0.13788 +
0.19509 *
0.24461 *
$ 21,170
3.053
0.640
0.508
552
O~396
-0.09350
-0.10471
-0.03883
0.10378 +
0 .. 24956 *
0.36131 *
$ 24,210
3.187
0.466
0.409
818
0.251
* = SIGNIFICANT AT 99%, + = SIGN!. AT 95%, - = SIGNIFICANT AT 80%
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TABLE 5-8: PERMANENT INCOME ESTIMATION (CONT'D)
----~~~~--~--~~~~-~~------~------~~~---~---~---~----~----~~~~--------~-~~--~-~~~---~~~~~--~-----
Dependent Variable: Yearly Gross Income in 1000 Dollars
MARRIED COUPLES, HEAD AGED ABOVE 65
VARIABLE: BOSTON: DALLAS: LOS ANGELES: MINN.lsT.P.:
CONSTANT 0.83725 2.89141 + 3.81292 * 4.44491 *
(1) INCOME SOURCES:
EMPLOYED 0.56220 *
RETIRED -0.03779
NUMBER OF WAGES 0_10064 *
(2) NONHUMAN WEALTH:
ASSETS PRESENT 0.17069 *
RENTAL INCOME -0.12446 +
SECOND HOME 0.07390
NUMBER OF CARS 0.14855 *
TRUCKS 0.06069
0.42915 *
-0.16794 *
0.05139 -
0.30942 *
-0.11814 -
0.15351 +
0.15342 ..
0004032
0.52288 *
-0.00646
0.02891
0.22881 :It
-0.25154 11:
0.00349
0.20605 *
0.11191 +
0.46670 *
-0.00477
0.05000 +
0.21248 1C
-0.11196 +
0.07766 -
0.12445 *
-0.00938
(3) HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS:
AGE OF HEAD 0.02659 0.01631 -0.01261 -0.03608
AGE SQUARED -0.00022 -0.00019 0.00006 0.00015
AGE OF SPOUSE 0.01521 -0.02337 -O~02787 - -0.01469
AGE SQUARED -0.00012 0.00019 0.00025 - 0.00013
HEAD FEMALE -0.14404 0.05405 -0.38831 + -0.35599 1(
HEAD SPANISH -0.20846 -0.39402 * -0.05994 -0.03418
DEPENDENTS 0.01323 ....0.03779 -0.03355 -0.03=70
(4) EDUCATION OF HEAD:
GRADE 0-7 -0.13966 - -0.38534 * -0.04878 -0.36015 *
GRADE 8 -0.09756 -0.22214 + -0 .. 14171 - -0.22988 *
GRADE 9-11 0.00421 -0.25738 * -O~11925 - -0.15364 *
TWO Y. COLLEGE 0.1311.3 + 0.09931 - 0.14367 + 0.05274
FOUR Y. COLL. 0.30181 * 0.12521 - 0.16261 - 0.09221 -
GRAD. SCHOOL 0.39379 * 0.21239 * 0.37758 "= 0.13384 +
GROSS INCOME: $ 16,183
MEAN DEP. VAR.: 2.784
STANDARD DEV.: 0.732
STANDARD ERROR: 0.534
OBSERVATIONS: 813
R-SQUARED: 0.481
$ 17,329
20852
0.769
0.559
694
0.487
$ 16,793
2.821-
0.767
0.590
670
0.427
$ 17,489
2.862
0.672
0.468
880
0.526
* = SIGNIFICANT AT 99%, + = SIGNI. AT 95%, - = SIGNIFICANT AT 80%
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importance only in the strata of young couples where it reduces the
expected normal income.
The dummy variables for the highest degree have the expected sign
pattern and are in general measured with satisfactory precision.
Comparing the three strata, we discover an interesting life cycle
pattern: the magnitude of the education coefficients are largest in
the strata of medium age, less so among the couples over fifty, and
smallest in the young couples' stratum. Here, it may reflect the lag
before the educational achievements are translated into money income.
Among the people over fifty years old, it may indicate the
supersession of education by experience and on-the-job-training.
It is very unfortunate that no information about the latter group
of variables is contained in the Annual Housing Survey. We are left
with a less than satisfactory determination of permanent income, but
still prefer the poorly measured correct explanatory variable to
current incomeu Section 5.7.3 discusses the sensitivity of the demand
estimations when we replace permanent income by current income.
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5.6.2 West Germany
With the German One Percent Sample we face the opposite data
problem: the sample contains rich information on human wealth of both
household heaa and spouse, but no information on asset holdings. We
use the regression results by Schneider, Stahl, and Struyk (1983)
which were estimated from a large pooled sample across West Germany.
This sample includes rural areas as well as other demographic strata
apart from married couples, so the mean income is lower than the mean
income in our sample. Summary statistics and coefficients are
reported in Table 5-9. Not presented are the coefficients for marital
status, guestworkers, and rural area dummies which are irrelevant for
our basic sample. Furthermore, the constant and the City center dummy
are adjusted for the base case of a suburban location. Finally, the
original specification of Schneider, Stahl, and Struyk included an
indicator variable for homeownership on the right hand side. The
inclusion of this variable would introduce a simultaneity bias in the
demand equations. The corresponding coefficients were barely
significant and of small magnitude (0.035 for single-family
homeowners, -0.048 for two-family homeowners, with t-statistics of
3.36 and 2.97, respectively, in a sample of 29,017 observations). We
excluded these coefficients.
The dependent variable is net income adjusted for tax advantages
of homeownership as discussed in Section 5.4. We ~ill briefly discuss
the coefficients of the explanatory variables estimated by Schneider,
Stahl, and Struyk. The age variables draw the familiar first
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TABLE 5-9: PERMANENT INCOME ESTIMATION (GERMANY)
=================================================
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Monthly Net Income
VARIABLE:
CONSTANT
HOUSEHOLD:
7.42 *
HEAD: SPOUSE:
(1) DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS:
AGE OF HEAD
AGE SQUARED
HEAD MALE
GUESTWORKER
(2) EDUCATION:
NO SCHOOL DEGREE
MIDDLE SCHOOL (MITTLERE REI FE)
HIGH SCHOOL (ABITUR)
COLLEGE (VORDIPLOM)
UNIVERSITY (DIPLOM)
(4) PROFESSIONAL STATUS:
08016 *
-.0002 *
0.189 1:
0.051 *
0.085 1<
0.194 1t
0.268 *
0.237 1<
0.353 1<
0.002 *
0.048
0.036 *
0.031
0.048
0.128 *
NUMBER OF WAGES
SD. JOB AS FARMER
APPRENTICESHIP
ItIASTER CRAFTSMAN
SELF EMPLOYED
WHITE COLLAR
BLUE COLLAR
UNEMPLOYED
RETIRED
STUDENT
(5) CONTROLS:
COI1PANY HOUSING
HOUSING ALLOWANCES
CITY CENTER
YEARLY NET INCOME:
MEAN DEP. VAR.:
STANDARD ERROR:
OBSERVATIONS~
R-SQUARED:
* = SIGNIFICANT AT 99%
0.303 *
-0.087 *
-0.046 *
0.036 21:
$ 9,322
7.48
0.381
~n "1'"&-::J,U. 1
0.592
-0.404 *
0.109 *
08137 1<
0.237 *
0.141 *
-0.001 1:
-0.177 '*
-0.378 *
-0.234 *
0.050 *
0.035
0.020
0.290 *
0.228 ~
-0.087
0.006
- 199 -
increasing, then decreasing pattern of life cycle earnings. Education
of the head performs as expected, both significant and with increasing
magnitude for the improving educational status. Education of the
spouse is measured with mixed results, mostly insignificante
Furthermore, human capital is indicated by the professional status.
The number of wage and salary earners in the household contributes
significantly to the household income, each additional wage at about
30 percent, whereas the combination of an industrial job at day with a
second job as farmer ("moonlight farmer") has a sharp negative impact.
Self employed or white collar status expectedly enhance; blue collar,
unemployed, retired, or student status decrea~e permanent income.
Again, the professional status of the spouse yields mixed, mostly
unprecise results. Finally, Schneider, Stahl, and Struyk control for
subsidies by receiving housing allowances or company h~using, as well
as location: the income differential between city center and suburbs
is significant at about 3.6 percent.
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5.6.3 Comparison
The regressions in both countries suffer from the lack of data,
and we will only compare the predictions generated by the regressions.
The third column of each block in Table 5-10 lists the distribution of
actual current income versus predicted permanent income for both
countries. Both incomes are measured yearly. before taxes, and in
1977 Dollars. By construction, permanent income has a substantially
lower variance. The distributional differences between West Germany
and the United States, already discussed for current income in Section
5.2, remain the same for permanent income: the fraction of households
with a yearly permanent income $ 8,/000 is 7.4 percent in the United
States and only 3.2 percent in Germany. On the other hand, in the
middle income classes ($ 8,000 to $ 25,000) the distribution is more
even in Germany.
It is interesting to compare the correlation between ownership
and income for both income concepts. In both countries, permanent
income has a stronger impact on tenure choice than current income, as
can be seen in the lower (greater) ownership rat±o of permanent income
at the bottom (top) of the income scale, compared with current income.
This confirms the common wisdom of higher permanent than current
income elasticities and the inclusion of permanent rather than current
income into the demand analysis.
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TABLE 5-10: DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT AND CURRENT INCOME
==:=========~=============~=========================== ===
(1) CURRENT INCOME VERSUS OWNERSHIP:
UNITED STATES SAMPLE WEST GERMAN SAMPLE
Income Income Ownership Income Ownership
Class Distribution Total Ratio Distribution Total Ratio
--~----+--------------------------~-+---------------------~------+
< 3.0 1.04% 52 61.18% 0.07% 4 66.67%
< 4.0 1009 52 58.43 0.27 8 36.36
< 5.0 1.33 55 50.93 0.91 34 46.58
< 6.0 1986 79 52.32 0.04 0 0.00
< 7.0 2.36 101 52.60 1.56 48 38.40
< 8.0 2.51 111 54.41 0.11 5 55.56
< 10.0 4.88 228 57.43 9.42 289 38.18
< 12.5 8.04 394 60.24 8.19 260 39.51
< 15.0 7.63 393 63.29 8.81 271 38.28
< 20.0 18.26 1229 75.98 25.66 841 40G79
< 25.0 16.43 1106 82e72 15.10 470 38.75
< 35.0 19.18 1395 89.37 13.24 445 41Q82
< 45.0 7.81 582 91.51 9.82 390 49.43
< 55.0 7.59 592 95079 2.30 100 54.05
> 55.0 0.00 0 0.00 4.49 221 61.22
-------+-----~----------------------+----------------------------+
(2) PERMANT INCOME VERSUS OWNERSHIP~
UNITED STATES SAMPLE WEST GERMAN SAMPLE
Income Income Ownership Income Ownership
Class Distribution Total Ratio Distribution Total Ratio
-------+----------------------------+----------------------------+
< 3.0 0.00% 0 0.0% 0.00% 0 0.0%
< 4.0 0.07 2 33.3 0.04 0 0.0
< 5.0 0.33 16 59.3 0.42 1 2.9
< 6.0 1.47 58 48.3 0.56 1 2.2
< 7.0 2.20 79 44.1 0.65 7 13.5
< 8.0 3.34 133 48.9 1.54 64 51.6
< 10.0 7.95 349 53.9 17.47 591 42.1
< 12.5 13.05 663 62.4 16.73 500 37.2
< 15.0 15.00 866 70.9 15.88 552 43.3
< 20.0 29.34 2016 84.4 21.18 684 40.2
< 25.0 17.95 1360 93.1 12.01 389 40.3
< 35.0 9.12 713 96.1 9.99 441 54.9
< 45.0 0.17 14 100.0 2.45 84 42.6
< 55.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.77 54 87.1
> 55.0 0.0 0 0.0 De30 18 75.0
-------+----------------------------+----------------------------+
Yearly gross current and permanent income in thousand 1977 Dollars.
The totals are based on a sample size of 8035 married couples in West
German Urban Areas and 8139 white married couples in U.S. SMSA's.
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5.7 Estimation of the Demand Equations
With the preliminary estimations of permanent income and hedonic
indexes completed, we can proceed to estimate the NMNL-demand
e1quations. The extensive preliminary work provided us with the basis
for a common model for the United States and West Germany with
directly comparable variables and units. We estimated four sets of
regressions, two in each country: for the first two sets, we draw a
choice based sample of the pooled population for each country, and
estimated all six trees depicted in Figure 5-5 in addition to the
multinomial logit model$ For the second two sets~ we stratified the
basic sample of each country according to the six strata of age and
location:
(1) Ce,Yo:
(2) CC,ME:
(3) CC,EL:
(4) SU,YO:
(5) SU,ME:
(6) SU,EL:
City center, young married couples, head aged under 35
City center, married couples, head aged between 35 and 50
City center, elderly married couples, head aged over 50
Suburbs, young married couples~ head aged under 35
Suburbs, married couples, head aged between 35 and 50
Suburbs, elderly married couples, head aged over 50
Within each stratum, we selected a smaller choice based subsample for
estimation with the optimal tree discovered in the first regression
sets. This procedure allowed us to use relatively small sample sizes
(about 400 observations) without losing precision on the housing
choices with small market shares. To make up for the endogenous
samp1ing, we weighted the observations inversely to their sampling
ratio and proceeded as if we had an exogenous sample. This estimation
technique (WESML, Manski and Lerman, 1977) and the necessary correction
for standard errors is described in Chapter Two.
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5.7.1 Pooled Sample: Optimal Tree Structure
Table 5-11 reports the estimation results for the pooled sample
of the United States: Table 5-12 for those of West Germany. The
performance of each tree is indicated by the value of the likelihood
function presented in the first row in the tables. This likelihood is
evaluated relative to the null model at the bottom of the table
(IIRHO_SQ'U) as well as the percentage of correct ex post predictions.
Section 2.3.2 discusses the interpretation of these statistics. The
estimated coefficients represent the taste weights in the linear
elasticities according to
function
the dissimilarity
indirect utility (2.2)
(2.10).
and can
Finally,
be transformed into
coefficients translate into the inter-alternative sUbstitution effects
as discussed in Section 202.3.
Three observations strike the eye: in both countries, the same
hierarchical decision tree dominates: in Germany, the transition from
simple multinomial logit analysis to this optimal nested model is more
rewarding;
sample.
however, all results are more precise in the American
Figure 5-13 shows the pattern of performance and significance
graphically. All trees can be distinguished statistically from the
MNL-model by a likelihood test which is distributed chi-squared with
six degrees of freedom, the number of dissimilarity parameters. In
turn, all trees can be interpreted as restrictions of a common
generalized extreme value model (GEV, McFadden, 19B1) of the form (2.8)
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TABLE 5-11: POOLED CHOICE BASED SAMPLE, WESML-ESTIMATES (USA)
==============~======================================= =======
TREE: KNL T-U-S T-S-U S-T-U S-U-T U-T-S U-S-T
LIK: -280.61 -269.63 -269.88 -273.83 -272.82 -274.75 -272.57
(1) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
HEDONO -1.3764 -2.0677 -1.9741 -1.3271 -1.3922 -1.5606 -1.6066
(-5D25) (-4.26) (-4.55) (-3.96) (-3.96) (-4.65) (-5.22)
HEDONR -2.5573 -4.8441 -4.5636 -2.9145 -3.0677 -3.0102 -3.4092
(-8.11) (-5.22) (-5.16) (-4.41) (-4.87) (-4.98) (-4.81)
RETURN 0.0535 -0.0312 -0.0097 0.0382 0.0621 0.0369 0.0589
( 0.82) (-0.27) (-0.09) (0. 52) (0 0 80) (0.49) (0. 75)
CROWDS -0.1886 -0.3790 -0.3432 -0.1734 -0.1745 -0.2334 -0.1972
(-3.44) (-3037) (-3.10) (-2.01) (-2.28) (-4.51) (~3.43)
(2) HOUSEHOLD SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
INC OWN 0.1759 0.0507 0.0997 0.1020 0.1766 0.1368 O.172~
(3.14) (0.60) (1.18) (0.83) (1.60) (1.72) (1.69)
INC SFM 0.0671 0.2316 0.1553 0.0848 0.0596 0.1058 0.0745
(1.01) (1.88) (1.32) (1.30) (0.81) (1.42) (0.98)
INC 14R -0.1815 -0.3117 -0.2993 -0.1647 -0.1627 -0.2073 -0.1816
(-2.29) (-1.82) (-1.80) (-2.11) (-2.07) (-~.85) (-1.80)
AGE OWN -0.5434 -0.1771 -0.3322 -0.0855 -1.1320 -008134 -1.2329
*10 (-0.90) (~O.23) (-0.42) (-0.17) (-1.44) (-1.17) (-1.49)
AGE SFM 1.3477 1.1049 1.4628 1.0142 1.6491 1.4462 1.7425
(2.16) (1..47) (1.59) (2.09) (2.30) (2.00) (2.20)
AGE 14R 0.0589 -0.3321 -0.0608 -0.1359 -0.2663 -0.1777 -0.3572
(0.06) (-0.18) (-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-0.14) (-0.26)
AG2 OWN 1.2423 0.9336 1.0823 0.5839 1.8189 1.5042 2.0017
*1000 (1~91) (1.10) (1.29) (0.92) (1.88) (1.91) (2.08)
AG2 SFM -1.6818 -1.3697 -1.7155 -1.1665 -1.9571 -1.7429 -2.0991
(-2.73) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-2.31) (-2.56) (-2~40) (-2.63)
AG2 14R 0.0800 0.6597 0.3716 0.2961 0.4183 0.3348 0.5134
(0.08) (0$36) (0.21) (0.24) (0.38) (0.25) (0.37)
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TABLE 5-11: POOLED CHOICE BASED SAMPLE, WESML-ESTIMATES (USA)
===========~========================================== =======
(3) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES:
o SF 14 -7.5473 -13.0095 -9.6823 -4.6048 -8.4654 -7.7687 -8.5669
(-1.93) (-2.27) (-1.47) (-0.69) (-1.64) (-1.74) (-1.84)
o SF 5+ -501823 -9.7826 -6.1457 -2.6792 -6.6825 -5.4892 -6.5924
(-2.72) (-3.45) (-1.67) (-0.75) (-2.42) (-2,.32) (-2.57)
o MF 14 -7.2345 -11.0102 -7.8277 -3.1124 -8.1853 -6.9033 -8.0642
(-2.22) (-2.07) (-1.30) (-0.47) (-1.52) (-1.72) (-1.94)
o MF 5+ -6.0281 -9.0941 -6.2969 -2.9078 -6.2275 -5.7448 -6.5197
(-4.15) (-3.69) (~2.06) (-0.89) (-2.40) (-2.59) (-2.50)
R SF 14 -2.6049 -4.2363 -0.9959 1.3766 -3.2005 -2.7521 -3.0756(-o.eo) (-0.88) (-0.18) ( 0.28) (-0.86) (-0.70) (-0.74)
R SF 5+ -1.0764 -2.7777 0.0476 1.1024 -4.2145 -2.1269 -4.3937
(-0. P/6) (-1.13) ( 0.02) ( 0.61) (-2.28) (-1.17) (-2.05)
R MF 14 1.9062 205031 5.4261 5.5839 1.7697 2.4580 2.4728
( 0.77) ( 0.56) ( 1.13) ( 1.29) ( 0.61) ( 0.73) ( 0.69)
(4) DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS (T-STATISTICS AROUND 1.0):
TH o~o~ 1.0000 2.0533 0.9181 0.4866 0.6603 1.3184 0.7170
( 0.00) ( 1.42) (-0.15) (-2.27) (-1.90) ( 0.68) (-1.10)
TH 0102 1.0000 2.2287 1.1359 1.0598 104883 2.1746 2.3410
( 0.00) ( 1.53) ( 0.40) ( 0.19) ( 0.86) ( 1.67) ( 1.64)
TH 0201 1.0000 3.6476 1.7588 0.7479 2.1029 1.3742 1.6029
~ 0.00) ( 2.28) ( 1.39) (-1.23) ( 1.94) ( 0.73) ( 1048)
TH_0202 1.0000 1.6663 5.5940 3.6865 1~1668 1.0697 1.2285
( 0.00) ( 1..43) ( 2.07) ( 1.41) ( 0.44) ( 0.23) ( 0.56)
TAU 01 1.0000 0.9259 1.8699 0.6832 0.9618 0.8115 1.2074
( 0.00) (-0.27) ( 1.33) (-1.03) (-001.1) (-0.72) ( 0.59)
TAU 02 1.0000 2.2673 2.5172 1.4645 0.7482 1.1697 0.9229
( 0.00) ( 2.20) ( 2.32) ( 0.94) (--1.35) ( 0.57) (-0026)
------~~----~-----~~~~-~---~~~~~-~~----~-~-~-~-~----~~~-~-----~--~~---
NOBS: 377 377 377 377 377 377 377
RHO_SQ: 0.642 0.656 0.656 0.651 0.652 0.650 0.652
CORRECT: 76.89% 78.40'0 78.40% 76e56% 76.48% 77.14% 75.80%
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TABLE 5-12: POOLED CHOICE BASED SAMPLE, WESML-ESTIMATES (GERMANY)
====~===========================~=~=================== ===========
TREE: MNL T-U-S T-S-U S-T-U S-U-T U-T-S U-S-T
LIK: -490.99 -418.39 -423.88 -447.32 -478.24 -447.34 -479.40
(.1.) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
HEDONO -2.0699 -11.1418 -9.3458 -2.5215 -2.5256 -2.8547 -2.3419
(-7.87) (-5.53) (-4.19) (-5.91) (-5.50) (-11.1) (-8.67)
HEDONR -2.4206 -13.2527 -10.5991 -2.8063 -3.2451 -3.3627 -2.9411
(~6.46) (-4.00) (-3.23) (-5.60) (-5.82) (-8.26) (-6.30)
RETURN -0.0546 0.0594 0.0540 -0.0085 -0.0693 -0.0057 -0.0532
(-2.53) (0.94) (0.92) (-0.43) (-2.21) (-0.40) (-2.19)
CROWDS -0.0977 0.0242 -0.4716 -0.1888 -0.1877 0.0259 -0.1496
(-0.94) (0.06) (-1.35) (-2.74) (-2.47) (1.3~) (-1.79)
(2) HOUSEHOLD SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
INC OWN 0.0407 -0.1685 0.0076 0.0416 0.0582 -0.0363 0.0478
(1.71) (-1.06) (0005) (1.12) (1.23) (-1.30) (1.22)
INC SFM -0.0587 -0.0859 -0.2165 -0.1130 -0.0841 -0.0595 -0.0733
(-1.89) (~O.39) (-1.12) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-1.50) (-1.85)
INC 14R -0.0632 -0.7135 -0.2352 -0.0634 -0.0658 -0.1545 -0.0826
(-1.90) (-1.28) (-1.01) (-1.60) (-1.75) (-2.48) (-1.45)
AGE OWN 0.9027 1.1970 0.1233 0.2656 0.7224 0.4444 0.5317
*.10 (2.24) (0.72) (0.10) (0.56) (1.13) (1.11) (0.96)
AGE SFM 0.0807 -0.2824 0.4862 0.5011 0.3907 0.2891 0.2807
( 0.15) (-0.09) (0.17) (0. 76) (0.56) (0.46) (0.46)
AGE 14R -O~8051 2.2728 -2.6354 -0.9136 -0.7072 -0.1082 ~0.7904
(-1.55) (0_29) (-1.13) (-1.61) (-1.18) (-0.11) (-1.20)
AG2 OWN -0.6556 -0.5486 0.2077 -0.1643 -0.4207 -0.1810 -0.2789
*1000 (-1.64) (-0.36) (0.17) (-0.36) (-0.68) (-0.47) (-0.51)
AG2 SFM 0.0012 1.0275 0.0771 -0.3487 -0.2657 -0.1105 -0.1873
(0.00) (0.32) (0.03) (-0.55) (-0.40) (-0.18) (-0.32)
AG2 14R 0.8679 -0.3025 3.0544 Q.9197 0.7751 0.4782 0.8530
(1.66) (-0.04) (1.30) (1.65) (1.32) (0.50) (1.31)
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TABLE 5-12: POOLED CHOICE BASED SAMPLE, WESML-ESTIMATES (GERMANY)
=================================================================
(3) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES:
o SF 14 -1.0219 4.5272 2.5825 0.4180 -2.4752 1.8103 -0.4063
(-0.43) ( 0.30) ( 0.27) ( 0.18) (-0.82) ( 0.50) (-0.12)
O_SF_5+ -0.9606 12.5258 4.5345 0.4808 -1.)4490 2.2662 -0.3293
(-0.51) ( 0.68) ( 0.54) ( 0.25) (-0.62) ( 0.92) (-09'13)
o MF 14 -0.6503 12.2380 5.5270 1.4559 -2.1118 4.3126 -0.1059
(-0.34) ( 0.82) ( 0.58) ( 0.66) (-0.78) ( 1.50) (-0.03)
o MF 5+ -3.0975 8.2310 2.5823 -1.7037 -4.2900 0.5331 -4.0728
(-2.37) ( 0.51) ( 0.36) (-1.25) (-2.13) ( 0.31) (-1.91)
R SF 14 1.6966 13.0461 4.7581 1.1652 0.6535 4.2933 2.0388
( 0.88) ( 0.86) ( 0.48) ( 0.57) ( 0.29) ( 1.45) ( 0.66)
R SF 5+ 0.3387 10.0395 0.6173 -0.1822 -1.1810 2.0400 -0.3158
( 0.27) ( 0.53) ( 0.10) (-0.10) (-0.62) ( 1.00) (-0.17)
R MF 14 2.6783 16.2191 8.4049 2.7091 2.2445 5~5084 3.2308
( 1.79) ( 1.10) ( 1.02) ( 1.77) ( 1.36) ( 2.20) ( 1.21)
(4) DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS (T-STATISTICS AROUND 1.0):
TH 0101 1.0000 11.9006 7.1650 1.7605 0.9247 2.8748 0.8075
( 0.00) ( 1.96) ( 3.42) ( 2.26) (-0.30) ( 2.57) (-1.16)
TH 0102 1.0000 6.3372 7.332.1 1.5579 1.5054 2.3697 2.1988
( 0.00) ( 0.63) ( 3.74) ( 1.13) ( 1.23) ( 3.96) ( 2.68)
TH 0201~ 1.0000 8.4397 5.1846 2.6473 2.6438 2.2335 1.3246
( 0.00) ( 2.84) ( 3.39) ( 2.22) ( 1.88) ( 1.87) ( 1.04)
TH 0202 1:0000 12.5118 7.8569 2.5257 2.3853 2.9437 2.1199
( 0.00) ( 1.2'1) ( 3.20) ( 2.10) ( 1.89) ( 3.05) ( 1.97)
TAU 01 1.0000 8.1912 5.2373 0.4488 1.2882 O~2715 1.1079
( 0.00) ( 2c85) ( 2.09) (-4.38) ( 1.02) (-9.17) ( 0.44)
TAU 02 lClOOOO 4.4291 307735 O~7231 1.4458 1.2329 1.4341
( 0000) ( 3.13) ( 1.09) (-1.24) ( 1.07) ( 0.79) ( 0.55)
--~~--~--~~~-~~-~----~-~-~--~~------~~--~----------~--~---~~~~~~-~--~~
NOBS: 442 442 442 442 442 442 442
RHO_SQ: 0.466 0.545 0.539 0.513 0.480 0.513 0.478
CORRECT: 67.5751; 65.36% 67.32% 68.13% 68.48% 64.8851; 68.03"
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FIGURE 5-13: CHI~SQUARED DISTANCES OF TREES
===========================================
UNITED STATES:
tenure choice at top tenure choice at bottom tenure choice in middle
21.96 21.46 16.08 15.58 13.56 11.72
*** *
WEST GERMANY:
23.1825.5087.3087.34134.22145.20
tenure choice at top tenure choice in middle tenure choice at bottom
"
***
Note:
*** = significant at the 99.5% level
** = significant at the 95.0% level
* = significant at the 92.5' level
6 degrees of freedom
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where G in (2.19) is replaced by a less restrictive function.
All differences between MNL and the various NMNL-models are
significant at the 99u5 percent level in West Germany, whereas in the
United States only the trees with tenure choice at the uppermost level
meet this criterion. However, of the remaining trees, all except one
are significant at the 95 percent level, none has a Chi-squared
distance to the MNL-model below 92-5 percent. The trees can be
divided into three groups according to the position of tenure choice.
In the West Germany, the pattern is clear and simple: the further
down the tenure choice, the worse the trees perform. In the American
sample, the differences between positions of tenure choice are less
pronounced and the clear order characterizing the German hierarchies
is broken up. Once tenure choice is positioned, the trees can not be
distinguished statistically in terms of dominance of size or structure
choice.
We draw two conclusions: unambiguously in both countries, the
tenure-structure-size choice sequence produces the most plausible
hierarchical decision structure, and we will use this tree for our
stratified estimati'ons in the following Section 0 Secl~nd, however, the
general dominance of tenure choice is less clear in G~rmany. On one
s~de, once tenure choice is not at the top of the hierarchy, the
dominance of tenure choice continues in Germany, but not in the United
States. However, a closer look at the parameters in Table 5-12
reveals that the dissimilarity coefficients in West Germany are not
contained in the unit interval, indicating a more complicated
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microeconomic interpretation than the theory outlined in the beginning
of Section 2.2~ In particular, the estimated relation can be
interpreted as a mixture of different underlying trees, some with
tenure choice at the top, other lower in the hierarchy. Because of
the extent of this task, we were not able to identify a stratification
of the sample which produces well behaved unique but different trees
in each stratum~ The large standard errors associated with the
dissimilarity coefficients indicate such a mixcure of models rather
than a failure of the utility maximization hypothesis per see
In both countries and in all speCifications, we observe
significant coefficients for the hedonic prices, consistently larger
for renters than for owners. We introduced the interaction of hedonic
rents with tenure choice for two reasons: as mentioned in Section
5.5, the hedonic regressions (on the renter subsamples) di.d not pick
up well the differences in structure type, that is the attractiveness
of single-family homes. Second, even if there were no measurement
differences, out-af-pocket cost may be perceived differently by owners
and renters. The general attractiveness of owning versus renting an
object, e. g., the freedom of disposition, may interact with the price
of the object.
The return variable is insignificant, pointing to offsetting
effects of opportunity costs and appreciation, or poor specification.
Unfortunatly, the global appreciation rates used here lack a
differentiation by location within a city which is not reported in the
two samples.
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Surprisingly, the household size variable is significant in the
United States but not in Germany.
earlier studies, see Section 5.7.4.
This result is in contrast to
The income and age pattern can be calculated by addition of
combinations of choice dimension dummies for each
alternative. This yields the following preference ordering for tree
T-U-S:
Germany: (1) R MF 5+ United States: (1) a SF 5+
(2) R SF 5+ (2) R SF 5+
(3) o MF 5+ (3) o MF 5+
(4) o SF 5+ (4) R MF 5+
(5) R MF 14 (5) o SF 14
(6) R SF 14 (6) R SF 14
(7) o MF 14 (7) o MF 14
(8) o SF 14 (8) R MF 14
Clearly II in both countries an additional Dollar of permanent income is
spent first on more size. But again, tenure choice is differently
perceived in Germany than in the United States where more income
always implies a higher tendency to own.
This Section was primarily intended to highlight the differences
in the valuation of tenure choice between the two countries. We will
discuss the numerical values of the coefficients translated into
elasticities in the next Section where we stratify the samples as
discussed above.
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5.7.2 Stratified Sample: Age and Location
Having discovered the tenure-structure-size choice hierarchy as
the optimal functional description of housing demand within our
NMNL-framework, we now stratify the sample according to location
within the SMSA (city center versus suburb) and into three age
categories (below 35, between 35 and 50, and over 50). The latter
stratification takes account of a possible interaction between age and
all other variables, that is a shift in preferences through the life
cycle (de Leeuw 1971), whereas the separation of the sample by
location stratifies by social status and income class as well as
supply factorse Results are reported in Tables 5-14 for the United
States and 5-15 for West Germany; compare the out-set of this Section
for an explanation for the symbols used to denote the strata.
Stratification considerably improves the fit measured by the
likelihood ratio ("RHO-SQ") or the percenta~e of correctly predicted
choices in the strata of the City center and the couples over 50. For
the young and middle aged couples in the suburbs
poor results. This holds for both countries.
strata, the German model now performs as well as
we have relatively
Except for those two
the American model
and has an even tighter fit for the oldest strata.
The results of the previous Section pertaining to the tree
structure carryover to all separate strata. The bottom rows of
Tables 5-14 and 5-15 show the performing of the corresponding
MNL-moaels. The differences are all highly significant (at the 99.5
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TABLE 5-14: SAMPLE STRATIFIED ACCORDING TO AGE AND LOCATION (USA)
=================================================================
STRATUM: POOL ee, YO CC,ME CC,EL SU,YO SU,ME SU,EL
LIK: -269.63 -230.75 -232.65 -232.22 -359.53 -276.25 -297.05
(1) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
HEDONO -2.0677 -2.2485 -1.9020 -3.3301 -1.0870 -0.8438 ~O.9044
(-4.26) (-4.02) (-3.61) (-6.31) (-8.67) (-1.52) (-3.99)
HEDONR -4.8441 -4.2474 -2.9094 -4.0330 -3.3064 -2.1411 -1.7023
(-5.22) (-7.22) (-3.46) (-5.73) (-4.84) (-2.56) (-3.44)
RETURN -0.0312 -0.2246 0.0033 0.2337 -0.1951 -0.1798 -0.0303
(-0.27) (-3.31) (0.05) (4.05) (-3.94) (-2.63) (-O.8~)
CROWDS -0.3790 -0.2374 -0.1099 -0.2934 -0.1997 -0.0001 -0.1412
(-3.37) (-3.24) (-2.88) (-3.63) (-4.07) (-0.00) (-2.74)
(2) HOUSEHOLD SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
INC OWN 0.0507 0.0679 0.1838 0.1456 0.2575 0.1738 0.2210
(0.60) (0.70) (2.71) (2.68) (2.82) (1..10) (2.89)
INC SFH 0.2316 0.1479 0.1210 0.2192 -0.0196 -0.0552 -0.0882
(1.88) (1.27) (1.04) (2.38) (-0.17) (-0.67) (-0.80)
INC 14R -0.3117 -0.2308 -0.2321 -0.1224 -0.1672 -0.3457 -0.1563
(-1.82) (-1.89) (-2.44) (-1.33) (-5.51) (-1.47) (-3.26)
AGE OWN -0.1771 -9.3476 -0.2771 -0.3844 -5.6479 -15$4512 0.8244
(-0.23) (-2.64) (-0.04) (-0.63) (-3.36) (-8.34) (1.50)
AGE SFM 1..1049 6.4182 -5.8375 -4.6315 -3.1839 29.7665 2.5541
(1.47) (0.72) (-0.27) (-1.53) (-0.11) (17.09) (1.95)
AGE 14R -0.3321 -2.4372 0.1134 -3.1698 -4.9824 3.9929 1.9218
(-0.18) (-0.13) (0.00) (-0. 72) (-8.60) (1. 72) (0.53)
AG2 OWN 0.9336 17$3716 0.5852 0.5070 11.2519 17.9575 -0.0804
(1.10) (2.61) (0.08) (1.01.) (3.36) (11.77) (-0.17)
AG2 SFM -1.3697 -13.0038 6.9317 3.4476 7.7779 -35.3570 -2.4791
(-1.82) (-o.eo) (0.27) (1.53) (0.15) (-26.6) (-2.57)
AG2 14R O~6597 3.8766 0.3978 2.8129 9.1134 -4.6284 -1.5555
(0.36) (0.12) (0.01) (0.81.) (23.70) (-1.~67) (-0.57)
- 214 -
(3) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES:
o SF 14 -13.0095 1.4334 5.7648 17.4194 9.7461 -20.1911 -13.6451
(-2.27) ( 0.04) ( 0.06) ( 0.84) ( 0.25) (-4.48) (-0.77)
o SF 5+ -9.7826 1.0910 9.3856 16.3250 5.1413 -13.4647 -6.4494
(-3.45) ( 0.08) ( 0.27) ( 1.48) ( 0.13) (-3.05) (-1.03)
o KF 14 -11.0102 6.4831 -8.7359 2.2890 2_.7310 1205749 -13.5431
(-2.07) ( 0.23) (-0.06) ( 0.17) (13.72) ( 0.02) (-0.98)
a MF 5+ -9.0941 3.9687 -9.0644 -2.4649 -3.3324 20.0976 -8.1960
(-3.69) ( 0.88) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-38.0) ( 0.03) (-2.22)
R SF 14 -4.2363 -4.7114 10.5676 20.3636 10116962 -50.6275 -6.6906
(-0.88) (-0014) ( 0.13) ( 0.99) ( 0.28) (-4.61) (-0.41)
R_SF_5+ -2.7777 -13.2731 4.0935 9.1275 6.4102 -50.8433 -0.1667
(-1.13) (-1.06) ( 0.08) ( 0.86) ( 0.17) (-3.34) (-0.03)
R MF .14 2.5031 7.6133 1.4742 9.1840 9.4563 12.7632 -0.4020
( 0.56) ( 0.30) ( 0.01) ( 0.67) ( 5.74) ( 1.87) (-0.03)
(4) DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS (T-STATISTICS AROUND 1.0):
TH 0101 2.0533 0.9267 1.0671 1.4208 0.8422 1.0073 0.9197
( 1.42) (~O.26) ( 0.20) ( 1..34) (-J.. 00) ( 0.01) (-0.39)
TH 0102 2.2287 1.5557 1.1187 2.0356 0.0010 4.0122 0.7073
( 1.53) ( 0.81) ( 0.27) ( 2.12) ( 0.00) ( 0(>04) (-1.10)
TH 0201 3.6476 3.8981 5.6619 3.3670 2.2662 7.6243 1.3270
( 2.28) ( 2.31) ( 1.36) ( 1.96) ( 0.37) ( 1.87) ( 0.31)
TH 0202 1.6663 1.5150 0.5811 0.8088 1.2399 5.8375 2.1675
( 1.43) ( 1.49) (-1.94) (-0.72) ( 0.44) ( 3.21) ( 1.72)
TAU 01 009259 1.7742 1.9535 1.5887 1.3979 5.7624 1.6498
(-0.27) ( 1.35) ( 2.26) ( 1.16) ( 1.64) ( 0.03) ( 1.58)
TAU 02 2.2673 1.2685 0.7581 1.2421 1 .. 2495 1..0075 1.4213
( 2.20) ( 1.01) (-0.61) ( O~76) ( 0.83) ( 0.02) ( 1.02)
-~--~~--~--~--~~----~~-------~-~-~-~.~~-------~--~-------~~------------
TREE: T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S
NOBS: 377 343 346 398 434 381 422
RHO_SQ: 0.656 0.676 0.677 0.719 0.602 0.651 0.661
CORRECT: 78.40% 79.59% 80.35% 82.59% 74.38% 77.52\ 79.14%
MNL-PERFORMANCE FOR COMPARISON:
LIK: -280.61 -243.70 -253.30 -242.10 -365.20 -286.80 -299.80
RHO_SQ: 0.642 0.658 0.648 0.707 0.595 0.638 0.658
CORRECT: 76.89% 79.27% 78093% 82.50% 74.43% 76.23% 78.37%
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TABLE 5-15: SAMPLE STRATIFIED ACCORDING TO AGE AND LOCATION (GERMANY)
=====================================================================
STRATUM: POOL cc: YO CC,ME CC,EL SU,YO SUuME SU,EL
LIK: -418.39 -230.08 -405.44 -217.55 -414.63 -409.63 -291.59
(~) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
HEDONO -11.1418 -7.1768 -7.1136 -8.3649 -10.8740 -6.0120 ~5.4039
(-5.53) (-6.25) (-6.84) (-Se61) (-4.11) (-5.86) (-4.79)
HEDONR -13.2527 -6.6116 -9.2795 -11.5718 -13.1639 -7.5246 -8.1463
(-4.00) (-4.93) (-5.40) (-5.35) (-3.31) (-4.42) (-5.93)
RETURN
CROWDS
0.0594 -0.0653 -0.0615 -0.1301 -0.1125 -0.0946 -0.1482
(0.94) (-1.13) (-le62) (-2.41) (-~.68) (-1.91) (-2.41)
0.0242 0.0684 -0.6622 -0.1659 -1.2894 -1.2236 -0.3242
{0.06) (0.18) (-5.21) (-0.61) (-3.96) (-5.26) (-2.43)
(2) HOUSEHOLD SPECIFIC VARIABLES:
INC OWN -0.1685 0.2095 -0.0685 0.0424 -0.0257 0.0814 0.0238
(-1.06) (2.25) (-1.11) (0.49) (-0.23) (0.95) (0.21)
INC SFM -0.0859 -0.3019 0.1372 -0.1078 -0.1066 -0.1516 -0.2231
(-0.39) (-2.49) (1.33) (-Om83) (-0.29) (-1.16) (-2.44)
INC 14R -0.7135 -0.3249 -0.2581 -0.3104 -0.2982 -0.3624 -0.4449
(-1.28) (-1.19) (-3.25) (-2.35) (-1.94) (-2.65) (-3.16)
AGE OWN 1.1970 -17.4918 14.7392 -O~7486 26.1760 3.2150 2.6209
(0.72) (-4.69) (24.29) (-0.46) (28.75) (0.81) (0.78)
AGE SFM -0.2824 35.1461 -12.2237 -5.0913 18.7470 8.6190 -4.5715
(-0.09) (9.32) (-.1.76) (-0.64) (2.17) (2.07) (-0.46)
AGE 14R 2.2728 -40.0533 -17.9722 1.5316 -22.0170 6.9028 -3.9208
(0.29) (-2.25) (-9.57) (0.52) (-2.95) (1.26) (-0.35)
AG2 OWN -0.5486 32.2272 -17.2238 1.0017 -40.0000 -2.5016 -2,0388
(-0.36) (4.65) (-16.1) (0.82) (-18.8) (-0.52) (-0.82)
AG2 SFM 1.0275 -64.0541 13.1820 4.1835 -25.1000 -8.1032 286955
(0.32) (-10.1) (1.57) (0.72) (-1.49) (-1.56) (0.37)
AG2 14R -0.3025 57.8748 21.6473 -1.4120 36.6000 -6.6932 2.9590
(-Oe04) (1.50) (7.44) (-0.60) (2.48) (-0.94) (0.34)
- 216 -
(3) ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES:
o SF 14 4.5272 45.0187 25.2199 9.6873 -43.6420 -48.3300 27.6633
( 0.30) ( 4.30) ( 2.10) ( 0.50) (-4.60) (-4.43) ( 2.78)
o SF 5+ 12.5258 -32.5944 -5.5253 18.8074 -65.9939 -24.3661 16.4734 \( 0.68) (-2.15) (-0.40) ( 0.79) (-9.39) (-6.22) ( 0.38) \
\
o MF 14 12.2380 97.4145 4.0762 -1.4141 -2.7157 -29.3015 8 .. 0982
( 0.82) ( 5.4e) ( 0.95) (-a.ll) (-0.28) (-l.7a) ( 0.29)
o HF 5+ 8.2310 6.8571 -33.3569 0.9284 -30.5816 -12.2768 -8.8480
( 0.51) ( 0.20) (-11.9) ( 0.15) (-5.21) (-1.25) (-0.72)
R SF 14 13.0461 25.5750 55(1)6639 10.3353 O~3641 -39.1544 38.1278
( 0.86) ( 2.48) ( 4.50) ( 0.43) ( 0.02) (-3.84) ( 4.50)
R SF 5+ 10.0395 -49.8680 21.6928 15.5875 -26.3631 -19.4744 19.3552
( 0053) (-6.20) ( 1.51) ( 0.56) (-2.85) (-2.06) ( 0.59)
R MF 14 16.2191 74.8717 35.6858 -1.3449 36.2376 -17.7430 17.7709
( 1.10) ( 5.58) ( 9.74) (-0.16) ( 3.39) (-1.62) ( 0.48)
(4) DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS (T-STATISTICS AROUND 1.0):
TH 0101 11.9006 17.4521 3 .. 8013 3.5932 10.5537 4.5294 2.6661
( 1.96) ( 1.08) ( 3.07) ( 2.31) ( 2.05) ( 3.21) ( 2.76)
TH 0102 6.3372 11.4852 2.4881 2~1644 2.7304 2.1706 185683
( 0063) ( 0.56) ( 2.02) ( 1.74) ( 1.89) ( 1.58) ( .1..00)
TH 0201 8.4397 5.0174 6.1321 3.5413 4.2833 6.0452 4.0094
( 2.84) ( 1.33) ( 3.48) ( 2 • .16) ( 1.23) ( 3.91) ( 2.45)
TH 0202 12(»5118 3.9098 4.5335 5.0244 5.7484 5.2970 3.9442
( 1.27) ( 1..39) ( 3.85) ( 2.91) ( 1.93) ( 2.82) ( 2.64)
TAU 01 8.1912 4.7120 5.4953 3.5688 8.2979 5 • .1430 2.5888
( 2.85) ( 2.81) ( 3.89) ( 3.42) ( 2.75) ( 2.66) ( 3.29)
TAU 02 4.4291 3.1176 4.0467 3.5663 11.4965 4.5360 1.6553
( 3.13) ( 2.34) ( 4.61) ( 4.13) ( 2.30) ( 3.61) ( 1.85)
~--~~~--~~--~~~~-~---~~~~-----~----------~--~------~--~-~-~~~~-~-~~---
TREE: T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T·-U-S T-U-S T-U-S T-U-S
NOBS: 442 302 443 361 396 403 389
RHO_SQ: 0.545 0.634 0.560 0.710 0.497 0.511 0.640
CORRECT: 65.36% 74.29% 69.22% 81.52% 57.11% 64.39% 79.19%
KNL-PERFORMANCE FOR COMPARISON:
LIK: -490.99 .-»248.20 -445.10 -242.40 -482.30 -455.03 -314.80
RHO_SQ: 0~466 0.605 0.517 0$677 0.414 0.457 Oe611
CORRECT: 67.57% 72.42% 68.69% 82.80% 55.55% 65.86% 7B.9B%
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percent level) with the exception of the young couples in American
suburbs where this difference only passes the 90 percent mark. Most
of the individual dissimilarity parameters exceed one 6 but are
measured with little precision, telling us that we have not discovered
the correct specification to avoid estimating mixtures of hierarchies.
The taste coefficients for price and income can most easily be
compared using the elasticity tabulations of Table 5-16. The
elasticities refer to the percentage change of the probability to
choose a housing alternative, when the price of this alternative or
the household income is changed by one percent. The formula for the
elasticities is given in (2.10). For each variable, the model
produces an entire matrix of elasticities which describes the change
in each choice probability i in response to a change of this variable
in alternative j. For the pooled sample, the elasticity matrix for
the hedonic rent and permanent income is presented in Table 5-17. All
elasticities are evaluated at sample means and weighted according to
the population shares to offset the effects of choice based sampling.
We Will first study the complete matrices in Table 5-17 for the
pooled samples. The hierarchy of the tree is reflected in the block
structure of equal and unequal elasticities. The corresponding MNL
model would have equal cross elasticities entirely within each row.
The nested model does away with this pattern: if the price of any
renter alternative goes up, all other renter alternatives are also
less likely to be chosen. Of course, the own effect dominates the
cross effects. This pattern holOs in both countrieS8 It can be
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TABLE 5-16: OWN PRICE AND SUM OF INCOME ELASTICITIES OF MARKET SHARES
~~====~=============================================== ===============
(~) GERMANY:
Market Share: I MS(l) MS(2) MS(3) MS(4) MS(5) MS(6) MS(7) MS(8)
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------Stratum I OWn Price Elasticities:
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
POOLED -6.80 -8.90 -SQ92 -6.93 -5.83 -5.52 -Se05 -3.51
CC YO -6~52 -7.42 -8.89 -4.26 -3.64 -4.66 -1.73 -4.46
CC KE -6.16 -9.10 -6.98 -10.97 -4.17 -5.48 -4.86 -5.93
CC EL -8.45 -11.22 -8.58 -14.82 -6.25 -10.85 -5.63 -6.60
SU YO -7.52 -11.11 -7.42 -15.04 ~3.81 -7.08 -4.76 -5.03
SU_ME -2.55 -4.44 -4.26 -9a64 -4.33 -4.06 -5.80 -3.88
SU EL -2.84 -5.21 -6012 -12.55 -S.07 ~5.64 -8.49 -4.92
---------~--~+--------------------------------------------------------
Stratum I Comprehensive Income Elasticities:
-------------+--~------------------------------------------~----------
POOLED -0.50 0.24 -0.55 0084 -0.08 0.96 0.09 0.80
CC YO 1.07 1.31 1w70 2.06 -1031 -0.51 -0.14 0.89
CC ME 0.40 1.38 0.07 1.57 0.05 0.66 -0.52 0.30
CC EL -0.09 0.86 0.18 1.76 -0.49 0048 -0.14 0.55
SU YO -Oe06 0.28 0.01 1.29 -0.23 0.59 -0.06 0.55
SU ME -0.02 1.02 0.25 2.43 -1.33 -0.55 -0095 -0.06
SU EL -0.57 1.14 0.21 3.13 -0.98 0.16 0.36 1.52
-------------+~-----------~-------------------------------------------
(2) USA:
Market Share: I HS(l) MS(2) MS(3) HS(4) MS(5) MS(6) MS(7) MS(8)
-------------+------------------------------------------------------~-Stratum I Own Price Elasticities:
-------------+--------------------------------~-----------------------
POOLED -2.36 -3.25 -6.44 -7.19 -7.59 -9.11 -10.70 -12.56
CC YO -5.10 -8.50 -3.93 -6.23 -7.36 -6.50 -7.53 -12.34
CC-XE -4e14 -3.28 -3.91 -6.33 -6.59 -7.51 -11.63 -21.00
CC EL -5.50 -6.89 -6.55 -9.63 -8.44 -8.22 -11.94 -21.33
SU-YO -2.26 -3.20 n.i. n.i. -6.52 -8.65 -8.29 -11.25
SU-XE -1.71 -1.22 -0.64 -0.80 -4.13 -4067 -6.70 -2.08
SU-EL -1.88 -2.21 -3.12 -5.53 -4824 -6.59 -4.68 -3.33
----~--------+-------~------------------------------------------------
Stratum I Sum of Income Elasticities:
-------------+-~--------------------~---~-----------------------------
POOLED -0.22 1.54 -3.65 -2.03 -2.36 -1.37 -3.75 -1.59
CC YO 0.21 2.49 0.03 1.38 -0.17 0.37 -1.49 -0.09
CC ME -1.14 1.81 -1.41 1.40 -2.11 -1.55 -6.01 -0.60
CC EL 0.29 1.27 -1.10 -0.43 -1.59 -1.18 -3.85 -2.15
SU YO -0.06 1.94 n.i. n.!. -2.24 -1~50 -2.24 -0.88
SU ME -3.25 1.73 -0.19 1.06 -4.10 -3.44 -4.65 -3.79
SU EL -0.96 1.09 -0.25 2.42 -3.28 ~1.86 -2.47 -1.60_____________+ u _
Indices of Alternatives:
1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6: 7: 8:
0_5F_14 O_SF_5+ 0 MF 14 0 KF 5+ R SF 14 R SF 5+ R MF 14 R_MF_5+
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TABLE 5-17: MATRIX OF PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES OF MARKET SHARES
---~~-~---~~-----~~--~-~--~-~~-~~---~~~--~-~~~-----~---~--~~-~~-~~--~~ -~ ~~ --~ - ~- ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ ~ -~-- - ~
(1) POOLED SAMPLE GERMANY:
Variable Alt. I MS(l) MS(2) MS(3) MS(4) MS(5) MS(6) MS(7) MS(8)
-------------+------------~---------------~---------------------------
HEDONO 1 -6.794 -5.083 ~4.641 -4.641 4.293 4.293 4.293 4.293
HEDONO 2 -6.151 -80896 -5.617 -5.617 5.195 5.195 5.195 5.195
HEDONO 3 -1.679 -1.679 -5.922 -0.612 1.553 1.553 1.553 1.553
HEDONO 4 -0.274 -0.274 -OelCO -6.937 08253 0.253 0.253 0.253
HEDONR 5 2.480 2.480 2.480 2.480 -5.834 -2.942 -0.841 -0.841
HEDONR 6 0.932 0.932 0.932 0.932 ~1.106 -5.523 -0.316 -0.316
HEDONR 7 9.392 9.392 9.392 9.392 -3.185 -3.185 -8.051 -6~218
HEDONR 8 1.369 1.3E9 1.369 1.369 -0.464 -0.464 -0.906 -3.509
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
INC OWN 1 -1.199 -1.199 -1.199 -1.199 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875
INC SFM 2 -0.418 -0.418 -0.289 -00289 0.107 0.107 0.346 0.346
INC 14R 3 1.121 1.859 0.942 2e327 -1.063 -0.022 -1.129 -0.427
SUM INCOME -0.496 0.242 -0.546 0.840 -0.081 0.960 0.091 0.793
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
(2) POOLED SAMPLE USA:
Variable Alt. I MS(l) HS(2) MS(3) MS(4) HS(5) MS(6) MS(7) KS(8)
-------------+------------------------~--~---------~------------------
HEDONO 1 -2.363 0.446 1.562 1.562 1.415 1.415 1.415 1.415
HEDONO 2 1.581 -3.247 5.542 5.542 5.020 5.020 5.020 5.020
HEDONO 3 0.097 0.097 -6.445 -2.905 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
HEDONO 4 0.085 0.085 -2.523 -7.189 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
HEDONR 5 1.109 1.109 1.109 1.109 -7~588 -3.367 -1.589 -1.589
HEDONR 6 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 -2.387 -9.107 -1.126 -1.126
HEDONR 7 2.059 2.059 2.059 2.059 -2.950 -2.950-10.701 -0.344
HEDONR 8 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.133 -0.191 -0.191 -O.022-12cS64
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
INC OWN 1 0.135 0.135 0.135 0.135 -0.452 -0.452 -0.452 -0&452
INC SFM 2 0.392 0.392 -2.506 -2.506 -0.433 -0.433 -1.617 -1.617
INC 14R 3 -0.744 1.015 -1.281 0.339 -1.470 -0.480 -1.685 0.482
SUM INCOME -O~217 1.542 -3.652 -2.031 -2.356 -1.366 -3.754 -1.587
-------------+--------------------~-----------------------------------
Elasticities at Sample Means and Frequencies, WESML-Weighted.
Parameters from Nested Model T-U-S.
XS(i) denotes the market share of housing alternative i.
Indices of Alternatives:
1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6: 7: 8:
o SF 14 0 SF 5+ 0 MF 14 0 MF 5+ R SF 14 R_SF_5+ R MF 14 R MF 5+
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interpreted in the following way: if rental housing prices of one
category go up, substitution goes more likely into owner-occupancy
than into other rental housing. In owner-occupied housing, we observe
different patterns: As contrasted to the United States, cross
substitution within the owner market occurs in Germany. The
magnitudes of the elasticities are similar, the Germans are more price
responsive as homeowners, the Americans as renters, reflecting the
higher propensity of Americans to choose an owner-occupied home even
at a slightly higher price.
The income elasticities are composed of the elasticities With
respect to each of the three income/choice-dimension interactions.
They are tabulated at the bottom of each block in Table 5-17. The
income elasticities reiterate the "American Dream" interpretation just
given for the price elasticities and they, of course, reflect the
preference pattern for an additional dollar income discovered above.
A rise in permanent income in Germany will increase the consumption of
large units independent of tenure and structure type, whereas in the
United States the proportion of renters will decreasa unambiguously
and the income will be spent on large single-family homes. Income is
measured against all other goods. Thus, the sum of all income
elasticities reveals that housing as a composite commodity is a normal
good in Germany, but an inferior good in the United States.
We now compare the basic price and income responses across
strata, using the elasticities tabulated in Table 5-16. The
differences between the two countries which we detected in the pooled
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sample hold also in each of the strata, giving confidence in our
results. In general, the suburban households are less price
responsive than those living in the city centers, but more income
elastic. The differential in price responsiveness is very strong in
both countries, the difference in income sensitivity only in the
United States. All estimates show a life cycle dependence with again
reversed roles of price and income. The young and elderly strata are
the most price responsive, but the least income sensitive age group.
These age and location patterns are remarkably similar for both
countries.
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5.7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented in this section rest on a fairly extensive
set of intermediate calculations with numerous assumptions. Except
for age p none of the variables used in the final demand equation are
taken directly from the raw data. Thus, it is appropriate to briefly
report some results from alternative specifications
disp1ayed in Table 5-18.
which are
The use of current instead of permanent income slightly improves
the fit in Germany, slightly worsens the fit in the United States.
The pri.ce and crowding variables are virtually unaffected. Income
coefficients sharply decrease in the United States. This is the
expected direction, but the magnitude is unreasonably large. In
Germany, there is little change. No change occurs in the order of
preferences_ All things considered, the use of current versus
permanent income does not change our results qualitatively, and the
quantities of the hedonic rent variables are robust to this change.
We performed another series of experiments to test the models'
sensitivity with respect to the technique of imputing the attributes
of hypothetical alternatives. Instead of constructing a not chosen
alternative with the same number of rooms as the chosen one, we simply
assigned it the mean attributes of this choice, including the mean
number of rooms. This improves the fit and increases the magnitudes
of most price and income coefficients, see Table 5-18. These changes
are small. However, there is a danger of creatinq spurious
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TABLE 5-18: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
-~-~-~---~-~---~-----~-~~-~~~~~~~-~---~--~--~--~-------~--~-------
MNL-Estimates, Pooled Samples.
(1) CURRENT VERSUS PERMANENT INCOME:
GERMANY: USA:
Variable: YPERM YCURR YPERM YCURR
-----------+-----------------_._------+-----------~------------+
HEDONO -2.07 -2.12 -1.38 -1.18 I
HEDONR -2.42 -2.49 -2~56 -2.57
RETURN -0.055 -0.053 0.054 -0.012 I
CROWDS -0.098 -0.095 -0.19 -0.18
-----------+-------------------------+--------~---------------+
INC_OWN -0.0045 0.041 0.176 0.025
I NC_SFM -0.032 -0.059 0.067 0.0048
I NC_14R -0.089 -0.063 -0.182 -0.053
-----------+-------------------------+------------------------+:~~~CT I ~;:~~% ~8:~~% I ~~~:~% ~;~;~% I
(2) CONSTANT ROOM VERSUS AVERAGE NUMBER OF ROOMS:
GERMANY: USA:
Variable: CONSTANT AVERAGE CONSTANT AVERAGE
----~------+------------------~------+-------------------------+
HEDONO -2.07 -2.22 -1.38 -1.02
HEDONR -2.42 -2.51 -2.56 -2.31
RETURN -0.055 -0.060 0.054 0.015
CROWDS -0.098 0.015 -0.19 -0.11
-----------+-----------------------~-+-------------------------+
INC OWN -0.0045 0.029 0.176 0.035
INC SFM -0.032 -0.044 0.067 -0.010
I NC_14R -0.089 -00069 -0.182 -0.052
-----------+~----------------~-------+--------------~----------+
RHO_SQ I 0.466 0.482 I 0.642 0.577 I
'CORRECT 67.57% 70.52% 76.89% 68.90%
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elasticities when we specify hypothetical alternatives unlikely to be
relevant for the given household. In particular, the average number
of rooms may be too large for a small, and too large for a small
household.
This relates to the issue of what the correct discrete categories
are. There are obviously more than eight different housing choices,
and picking a relatively small number of alternatives means an
implicit aggregation procedure of the uno2rlying elemental
alternatives. In a re~ated study by Behring, Goldrian, et. al.
(1983), we started from a large set of elementary alternatives and
used different sets of aggregated alternatives and different
aggregation weights. The results turned out to be very sensitive to
the pooling of unrelated alternatives, in particular, spurious
particular sensitive to the
elasticities
alternatives.
can be created
The variable
by posing
CROWDS is
irrelevant hypothetical
bundling of alternatives which is obvious given its definition
depending on the number of rooms. In theory, there is a unique
correct aggregation. This is the ext~n£ion of the tree down to all
elemental alternatives, and the corresponding estimation of the
dissimilarity parameters bundling the elemental alternatives provides
the correct weights for aggregation. In practice, the number of
elemental alternatives is much too large to make this approach
feasible. Given clear cut aggregates, however, the results were
fairly robust to the choice of aggregation weights.
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5.8 Simulations with Tax Laws and Preferences
The discussion of descriptive statistics in Section 5~2 revealed
substantial differences in the market shares of housing alternatives
between the United States and West Germany, markedly in the tenure
choice. Bow can they be explained? The endogenous variables
predicted market shares for each tenure-structure-size combination
are generated by the estimated parameters and the set of explanatory
variables. We discusse~ the differences in the exogenous variables
between the two countries in Section 5.2: the income and age
distribution differ; a most stunning discrepancy occurs in the prices
due to a greater land scarcity in Germany; and, a very advantageous
tax treatment of homeownership in the United States. Given these
differences in the exp1anatory variables, we still discovered a
variety of differences in the estimates of the taste parameters, that
is in the preferences of the German and the American households for
different housing choices.
The normalization of all data to a common standard allows us to
predict each country at the other countries tax laws or preferences.
Thus, we can distinguish the consequences of differences in
preferences from those in taxes or other exogenous variables as age
and incomeo Table 5-19 presents the results. The first column
denotes the baseline market shares of each of our eight housing
alternative. These shares coincide with th~ actual shares in the
saturation of the demand model allows us topopulation, because the
produce a perfect fit of the market sharesg This procedure is
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TABLE 5-19: PREDICTIONS: PREFERENCES AND TAX LAWS
=================================================
(.1) GERMAN DATA
I
German US- US- US-
Alternative: Baseline: Preferences: Tax Laws: Tax Laws/Equity:
----~-------+---~--------------------------------~-------~-----------
0_8F_14 0.2108 0.0680 0.3685 0.3352
o SF 5+ 0.1591 0.3298 0.3901 0.3540
o KF 14 0.0462 O~0005 0.0969 0.0925
o MF 5+ 0.0058 0.0005 0.0236 0.0221
OWN: 0.4219 0.3988 0.8791 0.8038
R SF 14 0.1016 0.11"'7 0.0124 0.0245
R SF 5+ 0.0250 0.0731 0.0015 0.0036
R ifF 14 0.4096 0.3858 001018 0.1592
R MF 5+ 0.0420 0.0247 0.0053 0.0090
RENT: Q.S782 0.6012 0.1209 0.1962
------------+-------~------------------~-----------------------------
(1) US-AMERICAN DATA:
GermanGermanGermanI Us-Alternative: Baseline: Preferences: Tax Laws: Tax Laws/Equity:
------------+----------------------------~---------------------------
o SF 14 0.2453 0.3380 0.2388 0.2387
o SF 5+ 0.5063 0.1352 0.4462 0.4460
o MF 14 0.0112 0.2990 0.0102 0.0102
o MF 5+ 0.0073 0.0223 0.0100 0.0099
OWN: 0.7701 0.7945 0.7052 0.7048
R SF 14 0.0720 0.0760 0.0964 0.0964
R SF 5+ 0.0321 0.0225 0.0416 0.0416
R MF 14 0.1193 0.0999 0.1436 0.1437
R_HF_5+ 0.0063 0.0071 0.0132 0.0132
RENT: 0.2299 002055 0.2948 0.2952
------------+-------------------------------------------~------------
All predictions With NMNL-model T-U-S, adjusted to fit aggregate
shares exactly. Shares may not add up because of rounding.
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discussed in Section 2.3.
We performed three experiments: first, we predicted the German
4ata with American preferences; second with the U.S. tax code;
finally with the U~Se tax cOOe in combination with the Loan-to-value
ratios observed in the United States. Then, we performed the
analogous experiments on the American data base. These experiments
represent a drastic interference with the steady state given by the
cross sectional data. Therefore, they provide only qualitative
quidelines and the quantities should not be taken literally.
Predicting either country with the other country's preferences
does not change the tenure choice very much, nor are the proportions
within tIle renter alternatives affected. However, there is a strong
shift within the owner categories: large single-family homes dominate
the American taste, whereas German preferences give a large share to
condominiums and small one or two-family units. We may interpret this
finding as a confirmation that the "American Dream" in fact is an
important element of housing preferences in the United States.
The next experiments predict each countries housing consumption
at its own preferences, but the other country's tax code. This
produces a drastic shift into ownership in GermanYI and only a much
smaller corresponding shift towards rental housing in the United
States. This can be explained by the peculiarities of the tax laws
and by the discrepancy in the price of land. Germany has very high
1and prices in addition to higher structure costs. With the U.S. tax
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code, Ge~mans can deduct a much higher proportion of their income than
Americans do. In turn, the German tax code is most unfavorable to
high house values relative to the American tax code, but the tax
a~vantages are comparable to the United States for low priced
structures and lots which are dominant in the United States. Thus,
the change here is much smaller than the corresponding change in
Germany.
Finally, we may argue that the loan-to-value ratios are
endogenous and respond to the tax changes introduced in the previous
paragraph. Predicting each country at the other country's tax code
and equity pattern produces the last column of Table 5-19. The German
tax advantages from homeownership are independent of the loan-to-value
ratio, so for the Americans living under German tax law little
changes. The only changes come through the change in opportunity
costs of equity. However, as estimated for the Americans, the RETURN
coefficient is small and insignificant. In Germany, we observe two
effectsa Raising the loan-to-value ratio makes the American tax
deductions even more valuable. However, the same time we decrease the
return from homeownership by increasing the opportunity costs. Doth
effects depend on the marginal tax rate. If this is zero, the
additional deductions have no value, but the opportunity costs are
counted fully, leading to a.strong effect away from homeownership. If
on the other extreme the marginal tax rate is one, all additional
interest can be deducted, but the return from an alternative
investment would be taxed away, making investment into housing very
attractive. We estimated a positive coefficient of RETURN in the
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German sample. With the high proportion of elderly homeowners with a
low marginal tax rate in Germany the first mechanism outweighs the
second, and we observe a decline in homeownership as compared to U.S.
tax laws combined with German equity patterns.
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509 Conclusions
The main conclusion from both estimation and simulation is the
confirmation of the often quoted "American Dream;': Americans have a
strong preference for large single-family homes, independent from the
advantages granted by the U.S. tax code. Germans do not share this
dream in this extent: they prefer owning to renting, but they
consider large rental units attractive as wellft
Second, Americans are highly responsive to price changes in
rental housing, less so in owner-occupied housing. Germans have the
reverse pattern: their elasticity of choosing owner-occupied housing
with respect to prices exceeds the corresponding elasticity to rent
housing units.
Third, the market shares of housing alternatives can neither be
explained by the preferences nor by the tax laws alone.
Fourth, an American-style tax law would have drastic effects in
Germany because such a tax code has especially favorable consequences
for the after tax costs of owner-occupancy, given the high land prices
and structure costs in Germany.
Finally, we observe remarkable similarities as well: the pattern
of price and income responsiveness by location and age neatly
coincides in the two countries. The strata of the sUburbs and of the
middle aged couples are more income responsive but less price
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sensitive than households in the City centers or of younger and older
age who react more on price changes relative to income changes. In
both countries, the same hierarchical choice pattern describes the
actual behavior bests Tenure ohoice is the primary dimension to
categorize housing choice. The choice of structure type and dwelling
size follow with no clear order in both countries.
On a more technical level, we conclude that in both countries the
nesting of choices and the stratification of the sample is a rewarding
method to achieve good estimation results. We succeeded in similar
satisfactory ex post prediction accuracies and high likelihood ratio
statistics in the United States and West Germany.
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5.10 Footnotes
(1) These and all following summary statistics for nationwide U.S.
housinq consumption are quoted from Annual Housing Survey 1977, Part
A: General Housing Characteristics, United States and Regions, U.S.
Departments of Commerce and of Housing an~ Urban Development$
(2) These and all following summary statistics on housing choice,
income, and age distribution are quoted from l'-Wohnungsstichprobe
1978, Heft 5: Wohnungsversorqung der Haushalte und Familien,
Statist1sches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden.
(3) We first deflate 1978 DM into 1977 DM, then apply the exchange
rate between DM and Dollars of 19'77 as reported in the Statistical
Abstract of the United States, lOlst. Edition (1980), pages 488 and
927.
(4) These and all following summary statistics on rent levels are
quoted from l%-Wohnungsstichprobe 1978, Heft 5: Wohnungsversorgung
der Haushalte und Familien, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden.
(5) OWn tabulations from the One Percent Sample.
(6) The Urban Land Institute, Land Use Digest, Volume 14, No. 12,
December 1981 (Single Family Improved Lot Price Median), and
unpublished data, provided by the National Association of Home
BUilders.
(7) Unpublished disaggregate tabulations for 1978, prOVided by the
West German Bundesministeriurn fuer Finanzen.
(8) See equation (2.2) in Chapter Two.
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APPENDIX
FORTRAN Program for Nested Multinomial Logit Mo~els
******
********
********
**********
************
**tlttt********
-***** ******
****** -*****
****** *.***fC
****** ******
******************
******************
********************
****** ******
****** *****~
******* *******
--**** ******
*********a** *******~****
*****-****** ************
****••••***- *******_.***
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p(TIB,L) = EXP( X(T,B,L)*BETA/THETA(B,L) ) / EXP( INC(B,L)
p(BIL) = EXP{ INC(B,L)*THETA(B,L)/TAU(L) ) / EXP( INC(L) )
THIS PROGRAM ANALYSES A NESTED MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL OR
HIERARCHICAL DECISION TREE UP TO THREE LEVELS.
WITH: INC(B,L) = LOG SUM EXP( X(T' ,B,L) *BETA/THETA (B,L)
TIC B
(STEM)
(TWIGS)
(BRANCHES)
(LIMBS)
LEVEL 3
LEVEL 2
LEVEL 0
LEVEL 1
VERSION MARCH 1984
I
+---~-+-----+
I I
+~+ +----+----+
I I I
+-+ +-+-+-+ +-+-+
I I I I I I I I I
WITH: INC(S) = LOG SUM EXP{ INC(L')*TAU(L')
L'C S
WITH: IHC(L) = LOG SUM EXP( INC(B',L)*THETA(B',L)/TAU(L)
B'C L
AS AN EXAMPLE, CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING "TREE" :
IN PARTICULAR, THE PROGRAM
L = LOG( p(TIB,L) * p(BIL) * P(L) )
~===============================
WHERE:
CHARACTERIZED BY THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
T=CHOSEN TWIG, B=CHOSEN BRANCH, L=CHOSEN LIMB
P(L) = EXP( INC(L)*TAU(L) ) / EXP{ INC(S) )
- DEFINES THE TREE STRUCTURE
-- READS THE DATA, CALCULATES SAMPLE MEANS, AND GENERATES DUKMIES
- WEIGHTS OBSERVATIONS IF CHOICE BASED SAMPLED (WESML)
- MAXIMIZES THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION (*)
- PREDICTS SHARES AND COMPUTES PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE
GRADX+DFP FOR THREE LEVEL TREE
(£)
AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN
C-----GQTREE------------------------------------------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
C
C-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
c--------------~-------------------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
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THE PROGRAM-STRUCTURE WITH ITS LEVELS IS AS FOLLOWS:
FOR (*) THE PROGRAM USES THE GOLDFELD/QUANDT GQOPT-PACKAGE
- CALCULATES THE COVARIANCE MATRIX, CORRECTS FOR WESML ESTIMATION
- ADJUSTS ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES TO FIT AGGREGATE SHARES (*)
- PLOTS 2-DIM. PARAMETER SPACES (*)
- CALCULATES ELASTICITIES
- TRANSFORMS PARAMETERS INTO MNL-FORHAT
- CHECKS DERIVATIVES
- CALCULATES LM-STATISTICS OF THE TREE PARAMETERS
- CHECKS COMPATIBILITY WITH RANDOM UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
MAIN: DEFINES DIMENSIONALITY
CALLING PROGRAH FOR TASKS OF GQTREE
UPDATES PARMS IN COMMON: THETA, TAU, PMASK
READS DATA IN AND CALCULATES SAMPLE STATISTICS
OTHER GQOPT-ROUTINES
LEAST-SQUARES FIT OF AGGR. PROB. SHARES
EVALUATION OF PROB. SHARES, THEIR GRADIENTS
CONTRIBUTION OF THE N-TH OBS TO PROB. SHARES
OPTIMIZER BY GOLDFELD/gUANDT
EVALUATION OF LIKELIHOOD, GRADIENT, HESSIAN
CONTRIBUTION OF THE N-TH OBS TO LIKELIHOOD
PARAMETERTRANSFORMATION, AIRUM-CHECK,
LM-STATISTIC, ELASTICITIES,
WESML-COVARIANCE CALCULATION
FIRST AND SECOND FINITE DIFFERENCES
MATRIX-INVERSION
GQTREE
TASKS
UPDATE
INDATA
PUNCH,CNTR,
OPTMOV,MATEV2
TRAFO,AIRUM,
LMSTAT,ELAST,
WESML
FDIFF,SDIFF
INV
2
3
2
o
1
1,3
2
2
2 OPT
3,2 FUNC,FP,SP
4,2 CONT
4,3 LSFIT
5,4 SSQDEV,FPSSQD
6,5 CONTPS
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
C---~--------------------------------------~----------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
c------------~------~-------------------~-------------------------------
C
C THERE ARE TWO INPUT FILES:
C
C "STRATUM":
C Fl 7 DATA (DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES BY ALTERNATIVE)
C
INPUT FILE 7:
"INPARMsn:
FI 20 DIMENSIONS, TREE STRUCTURE, PARAMETER-LABELS,
INITIALVALUES
READING AND FORMATTING IS DONE IN SUBROUTINE INDATA.
(THE TERMINAL WILL PROMPT YOU FOR THE ACTUAL FILE-NAMES)
c
c
c
c
c
c
C~----------------------------------------------------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
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NOTE: THE PACKAGE USES THE IDALT/IDCASE-STRUCTURE OF QUAIL.
NALT REFERS TO QUAIL IDALT, NOBS REFERS TO QUAIL IDCASE.
THIS FILE CONTAINS THE FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE DECISION-TREE,
I. E., THE NUMBER AND ARRANGEMENT OF TEl ALTERNATIVES IN THE TREE,
THE NUMBER OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES, AND THE INITIALVALUES FOR THE
PARAMETERS.
WHERE NALT =NUMBER OF ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVES
NALTFR=NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES IN A LARGER FRAME, FROM
WH!CH HALT ALTERNATIVES WERE CONSOLIDATED.
IF IRRELEVANT, SET TO ZERO.
RELSIZ=RATIO OF MAIN SAMPLE SIZE OVER AUXILIARY SAMPL
DATAl CONTAINES THE ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC VARIABLES, WHICH VARY BY
HOUSEHOLD AND BY ALTERNATIVE,
DATA2 CONTAINES THE AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES, WHICH VARY ONLY BY
HOUSEHOLD. THEY HAVE TO INTERACT WITH A SET OF ALTERNATIVE
SPECIFIC DUMMIES.
a
o
o
Yl.
o
o
o
o
Y2
o
o
o
Y1
o
o
o
o
Y2
o
a
o
Y1
o
o
o
o
Y2
o
o
o
BE USED AS :
Pl1 Rll Yl
P12 R12 0
P13 R13 0
P14 R14 0
P15 R15 0
P21 R21 Y2
P22 R22 0
P23 R23 0
P24 R24 0
P25 R25 0
WILL
ell
C12
C13
C14
C15
C21
C22
C23
C24
C25
SIZE. SET TO ZERO FOR EXOGENOUS SAMPLING. SET
A1) NALT, NALTFR, RELSIZ
NOTE: THE EXCLUDED DUMMY IS ALWAYS THE LAST ALTERNATIVE
A) ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVES:
INPUT FILE 20:
FOR IOBS=2 AND NALT=5:
----DATA1---- DATA2
ell Pl1 Rll YI
C12 P.t2 R12
Cl3 P13 R13
C14 P14 R14
C15 P15 R15
C21 P21 R21 Y2
C22 P22 R22
C23 P23 R23
C24 P24 R24
C25 P25 R25
EXAMPLE WITH STANDARD SET OF DUMMIES:
1) THE LEFT-HAND-SIDE VARIABLE C, WHICH TAKES ONLY THE VALUES 1
FOR CHOSEN, 0 OTHERWISE.
2) TWO ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC EXPL. VARIABLES P AND R.
3) ONE AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLE Y, WHICH WILL INTERACT WITH FOUR
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES.
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c---------------------------------------------------------------------~-
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
C
E
C
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C TO ONE IF AUXILIARY INFORMATION IS EXACT.
C
C A2) ONLY FOR NALTFR>NALT:
C (IAKTIV(I),I=l,NALTFR)
C (PROBFR(I),I=l,NALTFR)
C (JAKTIV(J),J=l,NALT)
C
C WHERE IAKTIV~INDEX OF HALT ALTERNATIVES IN NALTFR
C PROBFR=RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF ALTERNATIVES
C JAKTIV=INVERS OF IAKTIV
C
C A3) ONLY FOR RELSIZ > 0.0
C (WEIGHT(J),J=l,NALT)
c
C WHERE WEIGHT=RATIO OF AUXILIARY SAMPLE SHARE OVER MAIN
C SAMPLE SHARE OF RESP. ALTERNATIVE
C
C
C B) EXPLANATORY VARIABLES:
C
C Bl) NX,NXD,NXM,NXA
c
C WHERE NX = # OF ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC VARIABLES AT LEVEL 3
C (MIMICRY LEVEL 1 AND 2 VARIABLES AT LEVEL 3)
C NXD= # OF AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES
C NXM= SET OF DUMMIES FOR THE AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES
C NXA= SET OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS
C
C THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES TO DUMMY AGENT-SPECIFIC
C VARIABLES AND TO SET PURE ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C
C (1) "STANDARD-DUMMIES"
C NALT-l DUMMIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO EACH ELEMENTAL ALTER-
e NATIVE EXCEPT THE LAST. SEE EXAMPLE ABOVE.
C
C (2) "TREE-DUMMIES"
C FOR EACH LEVEL OF THE TREE, NL1-l, NL2-1, NL3-1 DUMMIES
C WILL BE ASSIGNED. NOTE: THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE FOR A SYM-
C METRIC UNDERLYING TREE (I.E., NL2=CONSTANT, NL3=CONSTANT,
C SEE BELOW). THIS IMPLIES AN ASSIGNMENT OF LESS THAN NALT-l
C DUHMIES TO THE ALTERNATIVES, WHERE IN TURN EACH ALTERNATIVE
C CAN BE ASSIGNED UP TO THREE DUMMIES. THIS IS CONTROLLED BY
C THE MAP IN B20
C
C EIGHT COMBINATIONS ARE POSSIBLE:
C
C (1) AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES INTERACT WITH STANDARD-DUMMIES,
C NO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD > 0, NXM = 0, NXA = 0
C
C (2) AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES INTERACT WITH STANDARD-DUMMIES,
C FULL SET OF NALT-l ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD > 0, NXM = 0, NXA = 1
C
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C (3) AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES INTERACT WITH TREE-DUMMIES,
C NO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD > 0, NXM = # OF DUMMIES, NXA = 0
C
C (4) AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES INTERACT WITH TREE-DUMMIES,
C FULL SET OF NALT-l ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD > 0, NXH = # OF DUMMIES, NXA = 1
C
C (5) AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES INTERACT WITH TREE-DUMMIES,
C SET OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS AS TREE-DUMMIES:
C SET NXD > 0, NXH = # OF DUMMIES, NXA = 2
C
C (6) HO AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES,
C NO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD = 0, NXM = 0, NXA = 0
C
C (7) NO AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES,
C FULL SET OF NALT-l ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS:
C SET NXD = 0, NXM = 0, NXA = 1
C
C (8) NO AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES,
C SET OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC CONSTANTS AS TREE-DUMMIES:
C SET NXD = 0, NXM = # OF DUMMIES, NXA = 2
C
C IF NXA IS SET TO -1 RATHER THAN TO 1, STANDARD-DUMMIES ARE NOT
C ESTIHATED FREELY TO MAXIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD-FUNCTION, BUT ARE
C SET AFTER EACH ITERATION TO MATCH THE AGGREGATE SAMPLE SHARES.
C THE PROCEDURE f AS IMPLEMENTED, IS NOT GUARANTEED TO DE
C NUMERICALLY STABLE AND IS NOT NECESSARILY CONVERGENT.
C HOWEVER, IF THE PROCEDURE DOES CONVERGE, THE ESTIMATES ARE
C CONSISTENT AND EFFICIENT, BEING EQUIVALENT TO COSLETT'S
C CONCENTRATED ESTIMATOR. THE SAMPLE SHARES CAN BE MATCHED BY A
C NONLINEAR LEAST SQUARES PROCEDURE AFTER SUCC}SSFUL LIKELIHOOD
C MAXIMIZATION; FOR THIS, SET NXA = 1 AND SELECT THE ADJUST TASK.
C
C THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES AND A SET OF
C TREE-DUMMIES IS DEFINED BY THE FOLLOWING MAP:
C
C B2) ONLY FOR NXM > 0:
C (MAP ( 1 ,J),J=1,3)
C
C (MAP(NALT,J),J=1,3)
c
C WHERE MAP(I,J)=M IMPLIES THAT TREE DUMMY M IS PRESENT IN
C ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVE I. UP TO J=3 DUMMIES
C CAN BE PRESENT. IF LESS THAN 3 DUMMIES ARE
C ASSIGNED, FILL THE REMAINING MAP(I,J) WITH
C ZEROES.
C
C C) TREE STRUCTURE
C
C el) NLl
C NL2(I),I=1,NLl
C NL3( 1 ,J),J=1,NL2( 1 )
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NL3(NL1,J),J=1,NL2(NL1)
C3) NTH g NTH1 , (LOCLIM(I), LOCBRA(I), I=1,NTH+NTH1)
NOTE: ALL INPUTS IN A) THROUGH C) ARE IN *-FORMAT
C2) NTAU, NTAU1, (LOCTAU(I), I=1,NTAU+NTAU1)
= LABEL OF THE l'TH PARAMETER
= INITIALVALUES OF THE l'TH PARAMETER
= TOTAL NUMBER OF FREE PARAMETERS
= TOTAL NUMBER OF CONSTRAINT PARAMETERS
PARK (1)
PARM(NP+NP1)NAME (NP+NP1)
WHERE: NAME (I)
PARM(I)
NP
NPl
WHERE NLl = # OF LIMBS (E.G., SEE FIGURE AT TOP: 2),
NL2 = # OF BRANCHES FOR EACH LIMB (E.G.: 1,2),
NL3 = # OF TWIGS FOR EACH BRANCH OF EACH LIMB,
(E.G.: 2 FOR LIMB 1 AND 4,3 FOR LIMB 2)
WHERE NTH = # OF LEVEL 2 DIBS. PARAMETERS (THETA),
TO BE OPTIMIZED OVER ("FREE"'),
NTHl =.# OF LEVEL 2 DISS. PARAMETERS (THETA),
TO BE EQUALITY CONSTRAINED,
(LOCLIM~LOCBRA) = RELATIVE LOCATION (LIMB, BRANCH)
OF THE THETA'S.
WHERE NTAU = # OF LEVEL 1 DIBS. PARAMETERS (TAU),
TO BE OPTIMIZED OVER ("FREE"),
NTAUl = # OF LEVEL 1 DISS. PARAMETERS (TAU),
TO BE EQUALITY CONSTRAINED,
LOCTAU = RELATIVE LOCATION (LIMB) OF THE TAU'S.
NOTE: THE PROGRAM CHECKS THE LEVEL OF THE TREE BY CHECKING
NTAU+NTAUl AND NTH+NTH1.
IF BOTH ARE ZERO, THE TREE COLLAPSES TO A SIMPLE MNL MODEL.
IF ONLY NTAU+NTAU1 IS ZERO, THE TREE COLLAPSES TO TWO LEVELS.
IN EITHER CASE, SIMPLER FORMULAS ARE USED IN SUBROUTINE CONT.
NOTE: THE LOCATIONS OF FREE DISS.PARKS HAVE TO APPEAR FIRST IN
LOCTAU, LOCLIM, AND LOCBRA, FOLLOWED BY THE LOCATIONS OF THE
EQUALITY CONSTRAINT DISS.PARKS.
THERE IS NO PROVISION IN THE CONT-ROUTINE FOR INTER-NODE EQUA-
LITY CONSTRAINTS.
THE FINAL CARDS OF FILE 20 CONTAIN IN (A8,F15.9)-FORMAT THE
LABELS AND INITIALVALUES OF ALL THOSE PARAMETERS, OVER WHICH
Dl) NAME (1)
D2) A BLANK LINE TO INDICATE END OF INPUT
D) INITIAL VALUES
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
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THERE IS A MENU-DISPLAY BEFORE EACH OPERATION~
FI 18 IS USED INTERNALLY AS A VIRTUAL SCRATCH-FILE FOR DFP.
EITHER WILL BE OPTIMIZED OR WHICH ARE EQUALITY CONSTRAINT,
IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER:
APART FROM OUTPUT ON THE TERMINAL, THE PROGRAM GENERATES THE
FOLLOWING OUTPUT-FILES:
COEFFICIENTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ON LEVEL 3 (BETAoS)
A) ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC
B) AGENT-SPECIFIC
C) PURE DUMMIES (FREE OR CONSTRAINT)
DISS. PARAMETERS OF LEVEL 2 (THETA'S) (FREE)
DISS. PARAMETERS OF LEVEL 1 (TAU'S) (,,)
DISS. PARAMETERS OF LEVEL 2 (THETA'S) CEQ. CONSTR.)
DISS. PARAMETERS OF LEVEL 1 (TAU'S) (" )
2)
3)
4)
5)
1)
"OUTPARMS":
FI 19 TREE STRUCTURE AND ESTIMATION RESULTS. THIS FILE CAN BE
USED AS NEW TREE-INPUT FILE 20. PARTS A) THROUGH C) ARE
COPIED FROM "INPARMS", IN D), THE INITIALVALUES ARE RE-
PLACED BY THE ESTIMATED PARAMETERS, INCL. STANDARD-
ERRORS AND T-STATISTICS. APPENDED ARE SUMMARY-STATISTICS.
NOTE: CERTAIN OPERATIONS CAN ONLY BE DONE IN A FIXED ORDER:
(1) CALCULATION OF THE AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL ELASTICITIES
NEEDS THE PROBABILITY-SHARES FROM THE PREDICTION-OPERATION~
(2) FOR THE TRANSFORMATION TO MNL-FORMAT THE COVARIANCE-
MATRIX HAS TO BE PROVIDED.
"PREDICT":
FI 9 DATA WITH PREDICTED CHOICES RATHER THAN OBSERVED. THIS
FILE CAN BE USED AS NEW DATA-INPUT FILE 7. THE INDEPEN-
DENT VARIABLES ARE COPIED FROM FILE 7, THE DEPENDENT
VARIABLE IS REPLACED BY ITS PREDICTION ACCORDING TO THE
MAXIMUM PROBABILITY PRINCIPLE.
THE TERMINAL WILL PROMPT YOU FOR OPTIONS AND ITERATION PARAMETERS
AS THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE GQOPT-KANUAL.
(THE TERMINAL WILL PROMPT YOU FOR FILE-NAMES. IF THE FILES
ALREADY EXIST, THEY WILL BE OVERWRITTEN. IF YOU ENTER BLANK
NAMES, THE ABOVE DEFAULT NAMES WILL BE USED)
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c---------------------~-------------------------------~-----------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c-----------------------------------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c----------------------------------------~---~--------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c-------------------------------------~---------------------------------
c
- 241 -
THE PACKAGE ALLOWS FOR THE MAXIMAL DIMENSIONS:
THE PROGRAM ALWAYS USES ANALYTICAL FIRST DERIVATIVES.
ALL DIMENSIONS CAN EASILY BE CHANGED BY CHANGING THESE
PARAMETER SETTINGS IN ALL ROUTINES THROUGHOUT THE PACKAGE.
THE CHOICE FOR SECOND DERIVATIVES IS GDVERENED BY IDIFF2. THEY
CAN BE APPROXIMATED ACCORDING TO BHHH~ BY SIMPLE FINITE
DIFFERENCES, OR BY SYMMETRIC FINITE SECOND DIFFERENCES.
ONLY FOR THE SIMPLE MNL-CASE, ANALYTIC SECOND DERIVATIVES ARE
IHPLEHENTED.
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS + 1 FOR MEANS,
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARAMETERS TO OPTIMIZE OVER,
1ST ORDER DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS AT LEVEL 2,
2ND ORDER DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS AT LEVEL 1,
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC EXPLANATORY VARIABLES,
AGENT SPECIFIC EXPLANATORY VARIABLE f
NUMBER OF TREE~DUMMIES,
NUMBER OF LEVELS,
LIMBS AT LEVEL 1,
BRANCHES AT LEVEL 2 FOR EACH LIMB AT LEVEL 1,
ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVES,
ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVES IN AN UNDERLYING LARGER FRAME)
PARAHETER
(KA.XOBS =
KAXNP =
KAXTH =
MAXTAU =
MAXNX =
KAX!IXD =
MAXNXM =
HAXLEV =
HAXLIM =
MAXBRA =
KAXALT =
MAXFRA =
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1:
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c--~-----------------------------------------------------------------~--
c
c
c
c-----------------------------------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c--------------------~-~----------------~------------------------------
c
c
c
c----------------------------------------------------------------------
c
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
c
• PARAHETER
* (MAXOBS =2001,
* HAXNP =50,
* HAXTH =10,
* MAXTAU =5,
* MAXNX =10,
11: HAXNXD =5,
* HAXNXM =20,
* MAXLEV =3,
* MAXLIM =5,
* MAXBRA =5,
* KAXALT =20,
* MAXFRA =61,
{( MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, HAXNXR=MAXNX+MAXNXD,
* MAXNPS=HAXNP*(MAXNP+l)/2, MAXALS=MAXALT*(MAXALT+l)/2,
* KAXSTK=5*KAXNP*MAXNP+6*MAXNP+KAXALT*MAXALT+8*MAXALT)
c
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REAL*8 PARH(MAXNP),GRAD(MAXNP),HESS(MAXNP,MAXNP),
* GRAD2(MAXNP),SCRA(MAXNP,MAXNP),MBHHH(MAXNPS),HESS2(MAXNPS),
* THETA(KAXLIM,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
* WORK(MAXHP),ZBAR(MAXNP),ZIZBAR(MAXALT,MAXNP),
* HINV(MAXNP,MAXNP),AAUX(MAXNP,MAXALT),BAUX(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* SCRAUX(MAXNP,MAXALT),QAUX(MAXALT)
REAL*8 EXB(MAXALT),EZG(MAXALT),EYA(MAXLIM),
* EINC2(MAY-LIM,MAXERA),EINC1(MAXLIM),
* XB(HAXALT),ZG(MAXALT),YA(MAXLIM),
• INC2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),INC1(MAXLIM),
* DER2B(MAXLIM,MAXBRA,MAXNP),DER1B(MAXLIM,MAXNP),
* DER2T(HAXLIM,MAXBRA,MAXTH),DER1T(MAXLIM,MAXTH),
• DER1U(MAXLIM,MAXTAU)
REAL*8 PKASKY(KAXNXD,MAXALT),PMASKD(MAXALT),
~ PDUKMY(HAXALT),PNAME(MAXNP),NDUMMY(MAXALT).
« PROB1(MAXALT),PROB2(KAXALT),PROBS(MAXALT),
* DERIV1(MAXALT,HAXALT),DERIV2(MAXALT,KAXALT),
* PSUM1(MAXALT),Q3(MAXALT),
* PSUK2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),Q2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
REAL*4 DATA1{MAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS),DATA2(MAXNXD,KAXOBS),
* PSHARE(MAXALT,MAXOBS),PROBFR(MAXFRA),
* PROB(MAXALT),FREQ(MAXALT),ACTl(MAXALT),ACT2(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* ELAS(MAXALT,MAXALT,MAXNXR),ELAS2(MAXALT,MAXALT,MAXNXR)
INTEGER HAP(MAXALT,MAXLEV),MAPLEN(MAXNXM),MAPTR(MAXNXM,MAXALT),
* MS3(MAXLIM,HAXBRA),IAKTIV(MAXFRA),JAKTIV(MAXALT),
* NCT1(HAXALT),NCT2(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* IP1(MAXLIM),IP2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),
* ACTTAU(MAXLIM),ACTTH(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
REAL -4 FCNTR(20,20)
LOGICAL*l PCNTR(20,20)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,LMAP{MAXNXM,MAXALT),STDDUM,NOALT,NOAGE,
* STDUMA,STDUMD,NALSTD,NAGSTD,NALTRE,NAGTRE~UNCON
CHARACTER*21 VERSlO
CHARACTER*20 TRFILE
COMMON / BSTACK / AINT(MAXSTK)
COMMON / BPRINT / IPT,NPRINT,NDIG,NPUNCH
COMMON / DPARM I NP,PARM,GRAD,HESS
COMMON / DIMEN I NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,KXA,MTH,MTAU,NOBS
COKMON I DDISS I LOCTAU(HAXTAU),LOCLIM(KAXTH),LOCBRA(MAXTH),
*
NL1,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,HAXBRA)
COKMON I DATAX / DATAl
COMMON I DATAY / DATA2
COMMON / DCOVM / KBHHH
COMMON / DHESS / HESS2
COMMON I DCONT / EXB t EZG,EYA,EINC2,EINC1,
*
XB,ZG,YA,INC2,INC1,
*
DER2B,DER1B,DER2T,DER1T,DER1U,
*
ZBAR,ZIZBAR,UPP,LOW,
*
MS3K(MAXTH),ML3K(MAXTH),MS2K(MAXLIM)
COMMON / DSSQD / PROB1,PROB2,DERIV1,DERIV2
COMMON / DCNTR I FCNTR,PCNTR
COMMON / DMAIN I KANALS,LEVCHG,PNAME,NTAU1,NTH1,NXA2,
*
NALTFR,PROBFR,IAKTIV,JAKTIV,
- 243 -
*
*
COMMON / DWORK /
COMMON / DELAS /
COMMON / DTREE /
COMMON / DMAPP /
COMMON / DDUMM /
*
*
COMMON / DCONST /
COMMON / DWESML /
COMMON / DWESTK /
C
c
C START DIALOG
C
C
NCT1,NCT2,ACT1,ACT2,IP1,IP2,ACTTAU,ACTTH,
GRAD2,SCRA,PSHARE,ELAS,ELAS2,PROB,FREQ
WORI<,PROBS
PSUM1,PSUM2,Q2,Q3
NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
NXM,MAP,MAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PMASKD,LMAP
STDDUM,STDUMA,STDUMD,NDUMA,NDUMD,
NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(MAXNXD,KAXALT),
NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
UNCON,PDUMMY,NDUMMY
RELSIZ,WEIGHT(KAXALT)
HINV,AAUX,BAUX,QAUX,SCRAUX
CALL START(NPRINT,KANAL5,KANAL6,UPP,LOW,VERSIO)
WRITE (KANAL6,1) VERSIO
1 FORMAT (//' GQTREE [VERSION ',A21,']'
* II ======================================'
~ 1/' ENTER TREE-INPUT-FILE >')
READ (KANAL5,'(A20)') TRFILE
c
C READ INPUT-FILE 20 "'INPARMS"
C
OPEN (UNIT=20,STATUS='OLD',FILE=TRFILE)
c
C READ IN NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES AND NAP OF ALTERNATIVES, IF ANY
C
READ (20,*) NALT,NALTFR,RELSIZ
NALT1=NALT-l
IF (NALT.GE.NALTFR) GOTO 5
READ (20,*} (IAKTIV(I),I=l,NALTFR)
READ (20,*) (PROBFR(I),I=l,NALTFR)
READ (20,*) (JAKTIV(J),J=l,NALT)
5 IF (RELSIZ.GT.O.O) THEN
READ (20,*) (WEIGHT(I),I=l,NALT)
ELSE
DO 6 I=l,NALT
6 WEIGHT(I)=1.0
END IF
c
C READ IN NUMBER OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
C
READ (20,*) NX,NXD,NXM,NXA
NXR=NX+NXD
NXA2=NXA
IF ( (NXA.GE.2.AND.NXM.EQ.O) .OR. NXA.LE.-2)
* WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'WARNING: CONFLICTING CHOICE OF NXA AND NXM'
UNCON=.TRUE.
IF (NXA.EQ.~l) THEN
NXA=O
UNCON=.FALSE.
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END IF
c
C SWITCHES FOR DUMMIES
C
STDDUM=.FALSE.
IF (NXA.EQ.O) THEN
C NO PURE DUMMIES TO BE ESTIMATED
NOALT=.TRUE.
NALTRE=.TRUE.
NALSTD=.TRUE.
STDUMA=.FALSE.
NDUMA=Q
ELSE
NOALT=.FALSE.
IF (NXA.GE.2) THEN
C PURE TREE-DUMMIES
NALTRE=~FALSE.
NALSTD=.TRUE.
STDUMA=.FALSE.
NDUMA=NXM
NXA=l
ELSE
C PURE STD.-DUMMIES
STDDUM=oTRUE.
STDUMA=.TRUE.
NALSTD=.FALSE.
NALTRE=.TRUE.
NDUMA=NAl,Tl
END IF
END IF
IF (NXD.EQ.O) THEN
C NO AGENT-SPECIFIC VARIABLES PRESENT
NOAGE=. TRUE 0
NAGTRE=.TRUE.
NAGSTD=.TRUE.
STDUMD=.FALSE.
NDUKD=O
ELSE
NOAGE=t'lFALSE.
IF (NXM.GT.O) THEN
C AGENT SPEC.VAR. * TREE-DUMMIES
NAGTRE=.FALSEe
NAGSTD=.TRUE.
STDUMD=.FALSE.
NDUMD=NXM
ELSE
C AGENT SPEC.VAR. * STD.-DUMMIES
STDDUM=.TRUE.
STDUMD=.TRUE.
NAGSTD=.FALSE.
NAGTRE=.TRUE.
NDUHD=NALTl
END IF
END IF
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c
C INDEX FOR AGENT SPECIFIC VARIABLES IN PARM-VECTOR
C
IF (.NOT.NOAGE) THEN
KK=NX
DO 10 K=l,NXD
DO 10 I=l,NDUMD
I<K=KK+l
10 INDAGE(K,I)=KK
END IF
C
C READ IN HAP OF TREE-DUMMIES, IF ANY
C
IF (NXM.EQ$O) GaTO 12
DO 11 I=l,NALT
11 READ (20,*) (MAP(I,K),K=1,3)
c
C READ IN TREE STRUCTURE
C
12 READ (20,*) NLl
READ (20,*) (NL2(I) ,I=1,NL1)
DO 13 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il.)
13 READ (20,*) (NL3(Il,I2),I2=1,ML2)
c
C READ IN NUMBER AND LOCATION OF DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS
C
READ (20,*) NTAU,NTAU1,(LOCTAU(J), J=1,NTAU+NTAU1)
READ (20,*) NTH ,NTH! , (LOCLIM(J),LOCBRA(J),J=l,NTH +NTHl )
c
C READ IN INITIAL VALUES
C
Nl=NX+NXD*NDUMD+NXA*NDUMA+NTH+NTH1+NTAU+NTAUl
IF (.NOT~UNCON) Nl=Nl+NALTl
DO 15 I=l,Nl
READ (20,16,END=17) PNAME(I),PARM(I)
16 FORMAT (A8,F1S.9)
15 CONTINUE
C
17 CLOSE (UNIT=20)
C
C REARRANGE PARK-VECTOR FOR CONSTRAINT ESTIMATION
C
20 IF (UNCON) GOTO 29
Nl=NX+NXD*NDUMD
DO 22 I=l,NALTl
PDUMMY(I)=PARM (Nl+I)
22 NDUMMY(I)=PNAME(Nl+I)
N2=Nl+N~H+NTAU+NTH1+NTAUl
DO 24 I=Nl+1,N2
PARK (I)=PARM (NALT1+I)
24 PNAME(I)=PNAME(NALT1+I)
29 CONTINUE
C
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C LEVEL OF TREE
C
LEVCHG=O
30 IF (NTAU+KTAUl.EQ.O) THEN
LEVEL2=.TRUE.
IF (NTH+NTH1.EQ.O) THEN
LEVEL1=.TRUE.
ELSE
LEVEL1=.FALSE.
END IF
ELSE
LEVEL2=.FALSE.
LEVEL1=.FALSE.
END IF
c
C ACTUAL DIHENSIONS OF PROBLEM
C
MXA = NX + NXD*NDUMD
MTH = HKA + NXA~NDUMA
MTAU = MTH + NTH
NP = MTAU + NTAU
c
C CHECK DIMENSIONS
C
IF (NX.GT.HAXNX) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NX=',NX,' > MAXNX=',MAXNX
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NXD.GT.MAXNXD) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NXD=',NXD,' > MAXNXD=',MAXNXD
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NXM.GT.MAXNXM) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NXM=',NXM,' > MAXNXM=',MAXNXM
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NTAU.GT.MAXTAU) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NTAU=',NTAU,' > MAXTAU=',MAXTAU
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NTH.GT.KAXTH) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NTH=',NTH,' > MAXTH=',MAXTH
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NP.GT~HAXNP) GOTO 9999
IF (NALT.GT~MAXALT) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NALT=',NALT,' > MAXALT=',MAXALT
GOTO 9999
END IF
IF (NALTFR&GT.KAXFRA) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'WARNING: FRAME TOO LARGE'
NALTFR=KAXFRA
END IF
IF (NL1.GT.MAXLIM) THEN
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WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NLl=',NL1,' > MAXLIM=',MAXLIM
GOTO 9999
END IF
NBRA=O
DO 31 Il=l,NLl
IF (NL2(Il).GT~NBRA) NBRA=NL2(Il)
3~ CONTINUE
IF (NBRA.GT.MAXBRA) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NL2=',NBRA,' > MAXBRA=',MAXBRA
GOTO 9999
END IF
c
C INITIALIZE TAU AND THETA ARRAYS
C
DO 32 Il=l~NLl
TAU(Il)=1.0
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 32 12=1,ML2
32 THETA(Il,I2)=1.0
C
C UPDATE FREE DISS. PARAMETERS
C
CALL UPDATE(PARM,NP,*33)
c
C UPDATE EQUALITY-CONSTRAINT DISS. PARAMETERS
C
33 DO 34 K=l,NTHl
Kl<=NTH+K
IF (LOCLIM(KK)5EQ.O) GOTO 35
THETA(LOCLIM(KK),LOCBRA(KK» = PARM(NP+K)
34 CONTINUE
35 MTAU1=NP+NTHl
DO 36 K=l,NTAUl
KK=NTAU+K
IF (LOCTAU(KK)~EQ.O) GOTO 40
TAU(LOCTAU(KK» = PARM(HTAU1+K)
36 CONTINUE
C
C THESE ARRAYS HELP SPEEDING UP THE LOOPS IN CONT
C
40 IB=O
IT=O
DO 41 Il=l,NLl
C START FOR TAU~LOOPS IN CONT
HS2K(Il)=IB
IB=IB+NL2(Il)
DO 42 K=l,NTAU
42 DERIU(Il,K)=O.DO
DO 43 l<=l,NTH
43 DERIT(Il,K)=O.DO
DO 41 12=~,NL2(I1)
C START FOR THETA-LOOPS IN caNT
KS3(Il,I2)=IT
IT=IT+NL3(Il,I2)
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DO 41 K=l,NTH
41 DER2T(Il,I2,K)=O.DO
DO 44 K=l,NTH
NTll=LOCLIM(K)
NT12=LOCBRA(K)
C START FOR THETA-LOOPS
MS3K(K)=MS3(NT11,NT12)
C LENGHT OF THETA-LOOPS
44 HL3K(K)=NL3(NT11,NT12)
C
c
C DRIVER CALLS SUPERVISOR SUBROUTINE
C
CALL TASKS(PARM,GRAD,HESS,NP)
c -----------------------------
c
C NORMAL EXIT
C
IF (LEVCHG.EQ.O) STOP
c
c
C LEVEL-CHANGE
C
C CHANGE LOCATION AND ACTIVENESS OF DIBS.PARMS
C USEFUL FOR LEVELWISE ESTIMATION AND FREEZING OF DISS. PARMS
C
200 WRITE (KANAL6,251)
251 FORMAT(/' ENTER NEW NTH, NTH! >')
READ (KANALS,*) NTH,NTHl
IF (NTH+NTH1.EQ.O) GOTO 250
c
IF (NTH.EQ.O) GOTO 265
WRITE (KANAL6,261)
261 FORMAT(' ENTER NEW LIMB,BRANCH-LOCATIONS FOR FREE THETA"S >')
READ (KANALS,*) (LOCLIM(I),LOCBRA(I),I=l,NTH)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'INDEX AND INITIALVALUES OF FREE THETA"S:'
DO 262 I=l,NTH
262 WRITE (KANAL6,209) I,PNAME(MTH+I),PARM(MTH+I)
c
265 IF (NTH1.EQ.O) GOTO 270
WRITE (KANAL6,266)
266 FORMAT(' ENTER NEW LIMB,BRANCH-LOCATIONS FOR CONSTR. THETA"S >')
READ (KANAL5,*) (LOCLIM(I),LOCBRA(I),I=NTH+l,NTH+NTH1)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'INDEX AND INITIALVALUES OF CONSTR. THETA"S:'
DO 267 I=NTH+l,NTH+NTHl
267 WRITE (KANAL6,209) I,PNAME(MTH+I),PARM(MTH+I)
c
270 WRITE (KANAL6,221)
READ (KANALS,*) K,ANAHE,APARM
IF (K.EQ.O) GOTO 250
PNAME (MTH+K) =ANAME
PARK (HTH+K)=APARM
GOTO 270
c
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250 WRITE (KANAL6 r 205)
205 FORMAT(/' ENTER NEW NTAU, NTAUI >')
READ (KANALS,*) NTAU,NTAUl
IF (NTAU+NTAU1.EQ.O) GOTO 290
209 FORMAT(I3,': ',AS,' = ',F9.4)
c
IF (NTAU.EQ.O) GOTO 215
WRITE (KANAL6,211)
211 FORMAT(' ENTER NEW LIMB-LOCATIONS FOR FREE TAU"S >')
READ (KANALS,*) (LOCTAU(I),I=l,NTAU)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'INDEX AND INITIALVALUES OF FREE TAU"S:'
MTAU=MTH+NTH
DO 212 I=l,NTAU
212 WRITE (KANAL6,209) I,PNAKE(MTAU+I),PARM(MTAU+I)
c
215 IF (NTAU1.EQ.O) GOTO 220
WRITE (KANAL6,216)
216 FORMAT(' ENTER NEW LIMB-LOCATIONS FOR CONSTRAINT TAUt'S >.)
READ (KANAL5,*) (LOCTAU(I),I=NTAU+1 6 NTAU+NTAU1)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'INDEX AND INITIALVALUES OF CONSTRAINT TAU"S:'
DO 217 I=NTAU+l,NTAU+NTAUl
217 WRITE (KANAL6,209) IfPNAME(MTAU+I),PARM(MTAU+I)
c
220 WRITE (KANAL6,221)
221 FORMAT(' ENTER INDEX, NEW NAME, AND NEW INITIALVALUE FOR CHANGE'
* " (ZEROES IF OK) >')
READ (KANAL5,*) K,ANAME~APARM
IF (KoEQ.O) GOTO 290
PNAME (MTAU+K) =ANAME
PARM (MTAU+K)=APARM
GOTO 220
C
290 GOTO 30
C
C ERROR EXIT
C
9999 WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'ERROR: ACTUAL DIMENSIONS EXCEED MAXIMUM'
9998 FORKAT(/' NUMBER OF PARAMETERS : '
* I' NX+(NXD*NDUMD)+(NXA*NDU~A)+NTH+NTAU= NP'
* / 1X,I2,IS,316,3I5)
WRITE (KANAL6,9998) KX,NXD,NDUMD,NXA,NDUMA,NTH,NTAU,HP
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE TAS~9(PARM,GRAD,HESS,NP)
c-------~--------------------------~------------------------------------
c
C SUPERVISOR PROGRAM FOR THE TASKS OF GQTREE.
C
C AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN VERSION MARCH 22, 1984
C
C NOTE: DYNAMIC DIMENSION NP FOR USE IN GQOPT-ROUTINES.
C
C------------~-----~----------~-----------------------------------------
C
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IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*e PARM(NP),GRAD(NP),HESS(NP,NP)
PARAKETER
(RAXOBS =2001,
KAXHP =50,
KAXTH =10,
IlAXTAU =5,
IIAXHX =1.0,
RAXHXD =5,
IIAXNXM =20,
RAXLEV =3,
KAXLIM =5,
MAXBRA =5,
IIAXALT =20,
MAXFRA =61,
IIAXHXY=HAXNX+1, HAXNXR=HAXNX+KAXNXD,
KAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+l)/2,
IlAXDA1=KAXALT*MAXNXY*HAXOBS, MAXDA2=MAXNXD*MAXOBS)
PNAKE(MAXNP),NDUKMY(MAXALT),BLANK/8H I
C
REAL*8
C
CHARACTER* 1
*
*
CHARACTER*8
'*
*
CHARACTER*14
*
*
CHARACTER*5
CHARACTER* 4
CHARACTER*8
CHARACTER*18
c
*
•
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
•
*
*
*
*
*
c
*
*
*
•
*
*
*
*
1t
*
*
*
*
*
REAL*B WORK(MAXNP),SCRA(MAXNP,HAXNP),
HBHHH(MAXNPS),THETA(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
PMASKY(MAXNXD,MAXALT),PMASKD(MAXALT),
GRAD2(MAXNP),PROBS(MAXALT),PDUMMY(MAXALT)
REAL*4 DATA1(MAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS),DATA2(MAXNXD,MAXOBS),
FDATA1(MAXDA1),FDATA2(MAXDA2),
PSHARE(MAXALT,MAXOBS),PROBFR(KAXFRA),
ELAS(MAXALT,MAXALT,MAXNXR),ELAS2(MAXALT,MAXALT,KAXNXR),
PROB(MAXALT),FREQ(MAXALT),CH,
ACT1(MAXALT),ACT2(MAXALT,MAXALT)
INTEGER KAP(HAXALT,MAXLEV),MAPLEN(MAXNXM),MAPTR(MAXNXM,MAXALT),
NLMST(5),NCT1(KAXALT),NCT2(MAXALT,MAXALT),
IP1(MAXLIM),IP2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),
IAKTIV (MAXFRA) ,JAKTIV (MAXALT) ,
ACTTAU(MAXLIM},ACTTH(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,LMAP(MAXNXM,MAXALT),
STDUMA,STDUHD,STDDUM, NOALT,NOAGE, UNCON,
HALSTD.NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
TRl(lOO),TR2(lOO),TR3(lOO),TR7(lOO),TR8(100),TR9(100),
BL/' v/,vB/'I'/,CR/'+'/,DA/t-'I,FK/'F'/,CK/'C'I,
DG (0 : 9) / ' 0' , , .1 ' , '2 ' • ' 3' , '4' , , 5' , , 6' , • 7' , •8' , , 9 ' /
HENAHE(7)/'DA.FL.PO','QUADHILL','BHHH-COV','SIMP-COV',
'SYMM-COV','ANAL-COV','ADJUSTED'/,
SUMME/ ' SUM ' /
CHVER(6)/'FLETCHER ','DFP-ORIGINAL
'BROYDEN ','RANK-l-CORR.,
'QUADR. HILLCL.','MODIF. HILLeL.'/
CHIST(O:3)/'HONE ','DLNSRg,'LNSR ','STReH'/
CHDIF2(4)/'BHHH','SIHpi,'SYMM','HNL 1/
CHSTOP(O:l)/'ENABLED ','DISABLED"
CWESHL(2)/' ',' (WESML-WEIGHTED)'/
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CHARACTER*20 TITLE,EMPTY/' 'I
CHARACTER*4 DASH4(MAXALT)/MAXALT*'----,/
CHARACTER*7 DASH7(MAXALT)/MAXALT*'-------,/
c
COMMON
COMMON
COKMON
COMMON
COMMON
COMMON
COMMON
COMMON
COMMON
/ ESTACK
/ BSTAK
/ BREAD
I BSTOP
/ BINPUT
/ SOPT
! BOPT2
/ BSPD
/ BPRINT
I AINT(l)
/ NQ,NTOP
/ NREAD
/ NPSTOP,ISTOP(3)
I INFLG
I IVER,LT,IFP,ISP,NLOOP1,IST,ILOOPl
/ TOL,RM1,PM1,IVALFU,ITERL,ITERC,MAX,IER
/ ISPD
/ IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
C
COMMON / DIMEN / NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,HXA,MTH,MTAU,NOBS
COMMON / DDISS / LOCTAU(MAXTAU),LOCLIM(MAXTH),LOCBRA(MAXTH),
*
NL1,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
COMMON / DATAX I DATAl
COMMON / DATAY / DATA2
COMMON / DCOVM / MBHHH
COMMON / DMAIN / KANAL5,LEVCHG,PNAME,NTAU1,NTH1,NXA2,
*
NALTFR,PROBFR,IAKTIV,JARTIV,
*
NCT1,NCT2,ACT1,ACT2,IP1,IP2,ACTTAU,ACTTH,
*
GRAD2,SCRA,PSHARE,ELAS,ELAS2,PROB,FREQ
COMMON / DWORI< I WORK, PROBS
COMMON / DTREE / NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
COMMON / DMAPP / NXM,MAP,MAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PHASKD,LMAP
COMMON / DDUMM / STDDUMtSTDUMA,STDUMD,NDUMA~NDUMD,
*
NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(MAXNXD,MAXALT),
*
NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
COMMON / DIFF2 / IDIFF2
COMMON / DCONST / UNCON,PDUMMY,NDUMMY
COMMON / DWESML / RELSIZ,WEIGHT(MAXALT)
c
c
EXTERNAL FUNC,GRADX,DFP,SSQDEV
EQUIVALENCE (DATA1,FDATA1),(DATA2,FDATA2)
c
C *** INITIALIZATIONS ***
C
c
c ***
C
940
ISTRUC=O
ISHARE=O
ICOVAR=O
IDATA=O
IF (LEVCHG.EQ.l) THEN
IDATA=l
LEVCHG=Q
END IF
ECHO TREE STRUCTURE, PARAMETER LABELS, INITIALVALUES
WRITE (KANAL6,-) 'ENTER TREE-OUTPUT-FILE >'
READ ~KANAL5,Q(A20)') TITLE
IF (TITLE.EQ.EMPTY) TITLE='OUTPARKS'
***
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9401 OPEN (UNIT=19,STATus=eNEW',FILE=TITLE,ERR=9402)
GOTO 9405
9402 OPEN (UNIT=19,STATUS='OLD',FILE=TITLE)
CLOSE(UNIT=19,STATUS='DELETE')
GOTO 9401
ACTIVE (= FREE AND EQUALITY CONSTRAINT) DISS. PARAMETERS
941
944
9441
C
9442 WRITE (19,9410) NLl
WRITE (19,9410) (NL2(I),I=1,NL1)
WRITE (KANAL6,942) NALT,NL1,(NL2(I),I=1,NL1)
WRITE (KANAL6,943)
942 FORMAT (
*//, HIERARCHICAL CHOICE TREE WITH ',12,' ALTERNATIVES:'
* I' ------------------------------~-----------~---,
* I' THE STEM HAS',I2,' LIMBS, EACH HAS'!913)
943 FORHAT(' BRANCHES, WHICH HAVE THE FOLLOWING TWIGS :'}
DO 941 Il=1,NL1
ML2=NL2(Il)
WRITE (19,9410) (NL3(Il,I2),I2=1,KL2)
WRITE (KANAL6,944) (NL3(Il,I2),I2=1,KL2)
FORMAT(' ',513)
WRITE (19,9410) NTAU,NTAU1,(LOCTAU(J), J=1,NTAU+NTAU1)
WRITE (19,9410) NTH ,NTHl ,(LOCLIM(J),LOCBRA(J),J=l,NTH+NTHl
WRITE {KANAL6,945} NTAU,(LOCTAU(J),J=l,NTAU)
WRITE (KANAL6,946) NTH ,(LOCLIM(J),LOCBRA(J),J=l,NTH)
WRITE (KANAL6 t 947) NTAU1,(LOCTAU(J),J=NTAU+l,NTAU+NTAU1)
WRITE (KANAL6,948) NTHl ,(LOCLIM(J),LOCBRA(J),J=NTH+l,NTH+NTH1)
FORHAT(/I3,' FREE TAU"S':,' AT " 5(' (',11,')':»
FORMAT ( 13,' FREE THETA"S':,' AT ',10('(',11,',',11,')':»
FORMAT ( 13,' CONSTRAINT TAU"S':,' AT " 5('(',11,')':)
FORXAT( 13,' CONSTRAINT THETA"S':,' AT ',10(' (',11,',',11,')':)
945
946
947
948
C
C
C
C
9406 FORMAT(8(12I6 I»
9407 FORMAT(8(12F6.3/»
9410 FORMAT (2513)
9411 FORMAT(2I3,FI0.6)
C
9405 WRITE (19,9411) NALT,NALTFR,RELSIZ
IF (NALT.GE.NALTFR) GOTO 9420
WRITE (19,9406) (IAKTIV(I),I=l,NALTFR)
WRITE (19,9407) (PROBFR(I),I=l,NALTFR)
WRITE (19,9410) (JAKTIV(J),J=l,NALT)
9420 IF (RELSIZ.EQ.O.') GOTO 9440
WRITE (19,9407) (WEIGHT(I),I=1,NALT)
C
9440 WRITE (19,9410) NX,NXD,NXM,NXA2
IF (NXM.EQ.O) GOTO 9442
DO 9441 I=l,NALT
WRITE (19,9410) (KAP(I,K),K=1,3)
DO 9750 Il=l,NLl
ACTTAU(Il)=Q
DO 9750 12=1,NL2(Il)
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9750 ACTTH(Il,I2)=Q
C
DO 9751 K=l,NTH
9751 ACTTH(LOCLIM(K),LOCBRA(K»=l
DO 9752 K=NTH+l,NTH+NTHl
9752 ACTTH(LOCLIK(K),LOCBRA(K»=2
C
DO 9755 K=l.,NTAU
9755 ACTTAU(LOCTLU{K»=l
DO 9756 K=NTAU+!,NTAU+NTAUl
9756 ACTTAU(LOCTAU(K»=2
C
C PAINT THE TREE
C
IC=O
I=O
IP1(1)=2
IP2(1,1)=2
DO 9700 Il=l,NLl
IF (Il.EQ.l) GOTO 9701
IC=IC+l
TR7(IC)=BL
'l'R8(IC)=BL
TR9(IC)=BL
IC=IC+l
TR7(IC)=BL
TR8(IC)=BL
TR9(IC)=VB
IP1(Il)=IC+2
9701 ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 9700 12=1,ML2
IC=IC+l
TR7(IC)=BL
TR8(IC)=BL
TR9(IC)=BL
IF (Il.NE.1.0R.I2.NE.l) IP2(Il,I2)=IC+l
HL3=NL3(Il,I2)
DO 9700 13=~,KL3
1=1+1
IN=MOD(I,1.0)
lC=IC+l
TR7(IC)=CR
TR8(IC)=VB
TR9(IC)=DG(IN)
9700 CONTINUE
IFIHIS=IC
c
WRITE (KANAL6,9790) CR
9790 FORHAT(//' STRUCTURE ',Al,'
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) VB
9791 FORHAT (14X, lOOA1)
C
IEND=IP1(HL1)
DO 9710 IC=2,IEND
(F,e DENOTE DIBS. PARAMETERS)')
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TRl(IC)=DA
TR2{IC)=BL
TR3(IC)=BL
9710 CONTINUE
DO 9715 Il=l,NLl
IC=IP1(Il)
TRl(IC)=CR
TR2(IC)=VB
TR3(IC)=VB
IF (ACTTAU(Il).EQ.l) TR3(IC)=FK
IF (ACTTAU(Il).EQ.2) TR3(IC)=CK
9715 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR1(IC)rIC=2,IEND)
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR2(IC),IC=2,IEND)
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR3(IC),IC=2,IEND)
c
IEND=IP2(NL1,NL2(NL1»
DO 9720 IC=2,IEND
TR1(IC)=DA
TR2(IC}=BL
TR3(IC)=BL
9720 CONTINUE
DO 9725 !~=l,NLl
DO 9725 12=1,NL2{Il)
IC=IP2(11,I2)
TRl(IC)=CR
TR2(IC)=VB
TR3(IC)=VB
IF (ACTTH(Il,I2).EQ.l) TR3(IC)=FK
IF (ACTTH(Il,I2).EQ.2) TR3(IC)=CK
9725 CONTINUE
DO 9729 Il=2,NLl
IBL1=IP2{Il-l,NL2(Il-l»+1
IBL2=IP2(Il ,1 )-1
DO 9729 IC=IBL1,IBL2
TRl.(IC)=BL
9729 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR1(IC),IC=2,IEND)
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR2(IC),IC=2,IEND)
WRITE (KANAL6,9791) (TR3(IC),IC=2,IEND)
c
WRITE (KANAL6,9792) (TR7(IC),IC=1,IFINIS)
WRITE (KANAL6,9792) (TR8(IC),IC=1,IFINIS)
WRITE (KANAL6,9793) (TR9(IC),IC=1,IFINIS)
9792 FORMAT (13X,100Al)
9793 FORHAT(' CLUSTERING :',100Al)
WRITE (KANAL6,'(Al}') BL
c
IF (LEVEL2) THEN
IF (LEVELl) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6&*) eTREE IS COLLAPSED TO ONE LBVEL'
ELSE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'TREE IS COLLAPSED TO TWO LEVELS'
END IF
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ELSE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'THIS IS A FULL THREE LEVEL TREE'
END IF
NUMBER AND INITIALVALUES OF PARAMETERS
9801
9805
C
C
C
951
*
1:
*
952
953
955
c
C DISPLAY OF ALTERNATIVES AND DUMMIES
C
WRITE (KANAL6, 9800)
9800 FORMAT(/i ALTERNATIVES AND DUMMIES:'
* " -------------------------,
* /' INDEX LABEL LIMB BRANCH TWIG'/)
DO 9801 1=1,NALT
IF (.NOT.UNCON) ANAME=NDUMMY(I)
IF (UNCON.AND.NXA.NE.l) ANAME=BLANK
IF (UNCOH.AND.NXA.EQ.l) ANAME=PNAME(MXA+I)
IF (I.EQ.NALT) ANAME=BLANK
WORK (1) =BLANK
WORK (2) =BLANK
WORK (3)=BLANK
IF (NXM.EQ.O) GOTO 9801
IF (MAP(I,l).GT.O) WORK(l)=PNAHE(NX+MAP(I,l»
IF (MAP(I,2).GT.O) WORK(2)=PNAME(NX+MAP(I,2»
IF (MAP(I,3).GT.O) WORK(3)=PNAME(NX+MAP(I,3»
WRITE (KANAL6,9a05) I,ANAME,(WORK(J),J=1,3)
FORMAT(LX,I3,4X,A8,2X,AB,2X,A8,2X,AB)
WRITE (KANAL6,951) NX,NXD,NDUMD,NXA,NDUHA,NTH,NTAU,NP
FORMAT(/' NUMBER OF PARAMETERS: 'I' ----------------------,
/' NX+(NXD*NDUMn)+(NXA*NDUMA)+NTH+NTAU = NP'
/ 1X,I2,I5,316,315
//' INITIALVALUES :'/' ~~-------------')
DO 952 I=l,NP
WRITE (KANAL6,953) PNAME(I),PARM(I)
CONTINUE
FORMAT{' ',A8,F15.9)
IF (UNCON.AND.NTAU1+NTH1.EQ.O) GOTO 9620
WRITE (KANAL6,955)
FORKAT(//' CONSTRAINT :t/, ------------,)
IF (UNCON) GOTO 957
DO 956 I=1,NALT1
WRITE (KANAL6,953) NDUMMY(I),PDUMHY(I)
956 CONTINUE
957 Nl=NP
IF (.NOT.UNCON) Nl=Nl+NALTl
DO 958 I=l,NTHl
KK=NTH+!
WRITE (KANAL6,953) PNAKE(Nl+I),THETA(LOCLIM(KK),LOCBRA(KK»
958 CONTINUE
DO 959 I=l,NTAUl
IG<=NTAU+I
WRITE (KAHAL6,953) PNAME(N1+NTH1+I),TAU(LOCTAU(KK»
959 CONTINUE
C
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C MAPS FOR INDICES OF NON-STANDARD DUMMIES:
C
C (1) LMAP(K,I) ,I=l,NALT , K=l,NXH : LOGICAL MAP
C RETURNS .TRUE., IF DUMMY K APPEARS IN ALTERNATIVE I
C .FALSE., IF NOT
C (2) HAP(I,N) , I=l,NALT , N=l,Nl : ORIGINAL HAP
C RETURNS UP TO Nl DUMMIES K PER ALTERNATIVE I
C N~=3 FOR THREE LEVEL TREE
C (3) MAPTR(K,N) , K=l,NXM , N=l,N2 : TRANSPOSED MAP
C RETURNS UP TO N2 ALTERNATIVES I PER DUMMY K
C ' N2=MAPLEN(K): # OF APPEARANCES OF DUMMY K
c
9620 IF (NXM.EQ.O) GOTO 969
C
DO 9621 K=l,NXM
962~ MAPLEN(K)=Q
DO 9625 I=l~NALT
Ml=MAP(I,l)
M2=MAP(I,2)
M3=MAP(I,3)
IF (Ml.NE.O) THEN
MAPLEN(Ml)=MAPLEN(Ml)+l
MAPTR(K1,MAPLEN(Ml»=I
END IF
IF (M2.NE.O) THEN
MAPLEN(M2)=MAPLEN(M2)+1
MAPTR(M2,MAPLEN(M2»=I
END IF
IF (H3.NE.O) THEN
MAPLEN(M3)=MAPLEN(M3)+1
MAPTR(M3,MAPLEN(M3»=I
END IF
DO 9625 K=1,NXM
IF (K.EQ.Ml .ORe KDEQ.M2 .OR. K.EQ.M3) THEN
LMAP(K,I)=.TRUE.
ELSE
LMAP(K,I)=.FALSE.
END IF
9625 CONTINUE
C
C FINISHED WITH PRELIMINARY WORK ON TREE-SPECIFICATION
C
969 ISTRUC=l
C
C *** DATA AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ***
C
900 IF (IDATA.EQ.1) GOTO 920
CALL INDATA(KANALS,KANAL6)
c
NOBS1=NOBS+1
IWESML=1
903 WRITE (KANAL6,904) NOBS,NALT,CWESKL(IWESML)
904 FORHAT(/' IDCASE = ',15,', IDALT = ',14,
* /' SAMPLE FREQUENCIES AND MEANS :',A18
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* I' ------------------------------,)
DO 906 I=l,NALT
906 WRITE (KANAL6,911) DATA1(I,1,NOBS1),
~ (DATA1(I,J+l,NOBS1),J=1,NX),
* (DATA2(J,NOBS1),J=1,NXD)
911 FORMAT(' ',F6.4,12F10.4)
c
IF (RELSIZ.EQ.O.O .OR. IWESMLoEQ.2) GOTO 920
c
IWESML=2
NOBS1=NOBS+2
GOTO 903
C
920
c
c ***
C
1
3
4
2
8
C
5
6
7
9
c
IDATA=l
NOBS1=NOBS+l
MENU ****
WRITE (KANAL6,3)
FORMAT(/' HIT ENTER FOR MENU, 7 FOR STOP >,>
READ (KANALS,4) MENU
FORMAT (11)
IF (MENU.NE.O) GOTO 8
WRITE (KANAL6,2) ~
FORMAT(' SELECT FROM ~HE MENU :'
* /' l=ESTIMATION, 2=PREDICTION, 3=ELASTICITIES, 4=COVARIANCE,'
* /1 5=LEVEL CHANGE, 6=DERIVATIVE CHECK, 7=STOP, 8=PRINT DATA,'
* II 9=LM-TEST, lO=TRANSFORM, 11=PLOT, 12=AIRUM, 13=SELECT DATA,'
~ I' 14=ADJUST SHARES >')
READ (KANAL5,*) MENU
GOTO (100,200,300,400,9,500,99,600,700,780,650,790,620,800),MENU
(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14)
WRITE (KANAL6,6)
FORMAT(' IMPROPER ORDER OF OPERATIONS')
FORMAT(' INPUT ERROR')
GOTO 1
LEVCHG=l
GOTO 99
***************2**
******************
TASKS OF GQTREE ***
ITERATION PARAMETERS **
ITERATION PARAMETERS >')
ESTIMATION
*
WRITE (KANAL6,lOl)
FORMAT(/' TYPE 1 TO OVERRIDE DEFAULT
READ (KANAL5,'(Il)') IQUERY
IF (IQUERY.EQ.l) GOTO 105
ITER=NP!4*2
TOL =0.001
HETHOD=2
c ~**
C
C
C
C
C
C *fl
C
~OO
101
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LIMIT=',13,', ACCURACY=',F8.6
, ,A8,A18
, ,A14
, ,AS
',A4,', UPDATE EVERY',I2,' ITERATION'
PARMS=',A8,', GRADIENT=',A8,
" LOGLIK= I) , AS
I ' f, 68 ( • - it ) I)
MATPRT~O
NLOOP1=20
INFLG=O
MAX=l
NPSTOP=NP-NTH-NTAU
IF (METHOD.EQ.l) THEN
NQ = NP*NP + 8*NP
NPIJNCH=18
NREAD=18
OPEN (UNIT=18,STATUS='SCRATCH')
ELSE
NQ = 4*NP*NP + 5*NP
IVER=2
IP ~LEVEL1) IVER=l
IST=l
IDIFF2=2
IF (LEVELl) IDIFF2=4
ISPD=l
IF (NP.GE.20) ISPD=2
I STOP (l)=Q
I STOP (2)=Q
ISTOP(3)=1
GOTO llO
WRITE (KANAL6,106)
FORHAT(' ITERATION : LIMIT >,
I' ACCURACY>'
Ie KETHOD : 1 = DFP, 2 = GRADX >'
I' VERSION 1-4 IN DFP, 1-2 IN GRADX >,
I' LINE-SEARCH : 0-2 IN DFP, 0-3 IN GRADX >,
/' 2ND DERIVATIVES: 1 = BHHH, 2 = SIMPI,E, 3 = SYMM.,'
, , 4 = MNL >'
;, : FREQENCY OF UPDATING >,
I' CONV.-ChITERION: PARM (O=ENABLE,l=DISABLE) >'
I' : GRAD (O=ENABLE,l=DISABLE) >,
I' LIKL (O=ENABLE,l=DISABLE) >')
READ (KANALS,*) ITER,TOL,METHOD,IVER,IST,IDIFF2,ISPD,ISTOP
IF (.NOT.LEVEL1.ANDoIDIFF2.EQ.4) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NO ANALYTIC 2ND DERIVATIVES IMPLEMENTED'
IDIFF2=2
END IF
IVER2=IVER
IF (METHOD.EQ.2) IVER2=IVER+4
WRITE (KANAL6,115) ITER,TOL,MENAME(METHOD),CWESNL(IWESML),
CHVER(IVER2),CHIST(IST),CHDIF2(IDIFF2),ISPD,
CHSTOP(ISTOP(1»,CHSTOP(ISTOP(2»,CHSTOP(ISTOP(3»
FORMAT (/1° ';68('-')
I' ITERATION
II METHOD
/' VERSION :
I' LINE-SEARCH :
I' 2ND DERIVATIVES:
I' CONV.-CRITERION:
~10
*
*
115
*
it
*
*
*
*
1(
*
~.l6
105
106
I:
*
.t
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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IF (IVER.EQ.2) NQ = 5*NP*NP + 6*NP
END IF
IF (.NOT~UNCON) NQ = NQ + NALT1*NALTl + 8*NALTl
c
C ** ITERATION **
C
ITERAL=O
NEVALF=Q
120 CONTINUE
IF (KETHOD.EQ.l)
* CALL OPT(PARH,NP,XLF, DFP , ITER,MAX,IER,TOL,FUNC,PNAME)
IF (METHOD.EQ .. 2)
* CALL OPT(PARM,NP,XLF,GRADX,ITER,MAX,IER,TOL,FUNC,PNAME)
ITERAL=ITERAL+ITERC
NEVALF=NEVALF+IVALFU
WRITE (KANAL6,122) IER
122 FORKAT(//' *** OPTIMIZATION TEHMINATED *** IER=',I3
• II TYPE NR OF MORE ITERATIONS OR 0 TO STOP >')
READ (KANAL5,*) IQUERY
IF (IQUERY.EQ.O) GOTO 140
ITER=IQUERY
IF (METHOD.NE.l) GOTO 120
CALL PUNCH(PARM,NP)
REWIND NPUNCH
INFLG=l.
GOTO 120
c
C ** PRINT PARAMETERS, STD ERRORS AND T-STATS **
C NOTE: COVARIANCE-MATRIX = -INV(HESSIAN)
C
140 IF (IER.GT.O) GOTO 145
C
C RECALCULATE COVARIANCES
C
MATPRT=2
IREnO=l
GaTO 420
c
C USE GQOPT-COVARIANCES
C
145 Ll{=NP*NP
CALL OPTMOV(l,HESS,LK)
CALL OPTMOV(3,GRAD,NP)
CALL WESML(PARM,GRAD,HESS,NP,SCRA~FUNC)
ICOVAR=l
C
150 XLFO = NOBS * DLOG(l.DO/DBLE(NALT»
DOF = NOBS * NP
AMSQGR = DOTV(GRAD,NP,GRAD)/nOF
AMSQGR = DSQRT(AMSQGR)
WRITE (KANAL6,151)
151 FORMAT(' ENTER TITLE >t)
READ (KANALS,152) TITLE
152 FORKAT(A20)
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WRITE (KANAL6,153) MENAME(METHOD)
153 FORMAT (//' **_. OUTPUT OF RESULTS -***'//1' ',AB,' ESTIMATE'
* , STD-ERR T-STAT'/)
Nl=NP
IF (.NOT.UNCON) Nl=Nl+NALTl
1=0
DO 160 lI=1,N1
IF (.NOT.UNCON.AND.II.GT.MXA.AND.II.LE.MXA+NALTl) GaTO 165
1=1+1
ZZZ = - HESS(l,I)
IF (ZZZ.LE.O.) THEN
STDERR = 0.0
TSTAT = 0.0
ELSE
STDERR = DSQRT(ZZZ)
TSTAT = PARM(I)/STDERR
IF (I.GT.MTH) TSTAT=(PARM(I)-l.O)/STDERR
END IF
WRITE (KANAL6,161) PNAME(I),PARM(I),STDERR,TSTAT
161 FORMAT(' ·,A8,2X,F8.4,2X,F7.3,2X,F7.3)
WRITE (19,162) PNAME(I),PARM(I),STDERR,TSTAT
162 FORMAT(AS,3F15.9)
GOTO ~60
165 WRITE (KANAL6,161) NDUMMY(II-MXA),PDUMMY(II-MXA)
WRITE (19,~62) NDUMMY(II-MXA)~PDUMMY(II-MXA)
160 CONTINUE
DO 170 I=1,NTH1
KK=NTH+I
WRITE (KANAL6,161) PNAME(Nl+I),THETA(LOCLIM(KK),LOCBRA(KK»
WRITE (19,162) PNAHE(Nl+I),THETA(LOCLIM(KK),LOCBRA(KK»
170 CONTINUE
DO 175 I=~,NTAUl
KK=NTAU+I
WRITE (KANAL6,161) PNAME(Nl+NTH1+I),TAU(LOCTAU(KK»
WRITE (19,162) PNAME(Nl+NTH1+I),TAU(LOCTAU(KK»
~75 CONTINUE
IF (MATPRT.EQ.3) GOTO 430
~~1
WRITE (19,180) TITLE,XLF,XLFO,ITERAL,NEVALF,NOBS,IER,
* AMSQGR,(TR9(IC),IC=1,IFINIS)
WRITE (KANAL6,180) TITLE,XLF,XLFO,ITERAL,NEVALF,NOBS,IER,
* AHSQGR 6 (TR9(IC),IC=1,IFINIS)
FORMAT(!' TITLE ',A20
I' LOGLlKELIHOOD ',Fl0.4
I' LOGLlKELIHOOD AT ZERO ',F10.4
II TOTAL NUMBER OF ITERATIONS ',110
I' TOTAL NUMBER OF EVALUATIONS: ',110
I' NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ',110
I' MEAN SQUARE GRADIENT (',12,'): ',D10.4
1/' CLUSTERING: ',65A1//)
180
~
*
*
*
*
*
*
C~
C
C
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GOTe 5
WRITE (KANAL6,202)
FORMAT(' TYPE 1 TO CREATE DATA-SET WITH PREDICTED CHOICES >')
READ (KANALS,'(Il)') IWRITE
IF (IWRITE.EQ.l) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,203)
FORMAT (. ENTER NEW DATA-SET NAME >')
READ (KANALS,'(A20)') TITLE
IF (TITLE.EQ.EMPTY) TITLE='PREDICT'
OPEN (UNIT=9,STATUS='NEW',FILE=TITLE,ACCESS='SEQUENTIAL'
,ERR=206)
c
c
C
200
202
203
204
*
*
- 261 -
PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE AND PROBABLITY SHARES
GOTO 205
206 OPEN (UNIT=9,STATUS='OLD',FILE=TITLE,ACCESS='SEQUENTIAL')
CLOSE(UNIT=9,STATUS='DELETE')
GOTO 204
205 CONTINUE
END IF
XLFO = NOBS * DLOG(l.DO/DBLE(NALT»
XLF = C.DO
XLP = C.DO
PCP = O.DO
UTIL = C.DO
Z4 = C.DO
Z5 = a.DO
NFAIL= 0
DO 201 K=1,NALT
ACT1(K)=O.O
PROB(K)=O.O
FREQ(K)=DATA1(K,1,NOBS+l)*WEIGHT(K)
DO 201 J=J.,NALT
201 ACT2(K,J)=O.O
C
NN1=1
NN2=1
I NCREK=HAXALT*MAXNXY
DO 210 IOBS=l,NOBS
c
C ACTUAL CHOICE
C
1=0
DO 211 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 21.1 12=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(I1,I2)
DO 211 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (DATA1(I,1,IOBS).EQ.l.0) Ie=I
211 CONTINUE
WT=WEIGHT (IC)
C
C PREDICTED CHOICE
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c
NF=NFAIL
CALL CONT(FDATA1(NN1),FDATA2(NN2),
* 2,PARM,NP,XLFI,WORK,PROBS,NFAIL)
NN1=NN1+INCREM
NN2=NN2+MAXNXD
IF (NFAIL.GT.NF) THEN
215 WRITE (KANAL6,212) IOBS,IC
2~2 FORMAT(' CONT: FAILURE AT IOBS=',I5)
IMAX=IA
GaTO 222
END IF
XLF=XLF+XLFI
UTIL=UTIL+WORK(l)*WT
PMAX=ODDO
1)0 221 IA=l, NALT
PIA=PROBS(IA)
PSHARE(IA,IOBS)=PIA
PROB (IA) =PROB (IA) +PIA*WT
IF (PIA.LE.PMAX) GOTO 221
PMAX=PIA
IMAX=IA
221 CONTINUE
C
C COMPARISON ACTUAL VS. PREDICTED CHOICE
C
IF (IC.EQ.IMAX) PCP=PCP+WT
ACT2(IC,IKAX)=ACT2(IC,IMAX)+WT
NCT2(IC,IMAX)=ACT2(IC,IMAX)+O.5
ACT1(IMAX)=ACT1(IMAX)+WT
IF (PMAX.LE.O.DO) GOTO 215
XLP=XLP+DLOG(PMAX)*WT
Z4 =Z4 +PMAX*WT
Z5 =Z5 +PMAX/FREQ(IMAX)*WT
c
C WRITE DATASET WITH PREDICTED CHOICES
C
222 IF (IWRITE.EQ.l) THEN
DO 223 J=l,NALT
IF (J.EQ.IHAX) THEN
CH=1.0
ELSE
CH=O.O
END IF
223 WRITE (9) CH,(DATA1(J,K+l,IOBS),K=1,NX),
* (DATA2(K,IOBS),K=1,NXD)
END IF
C
210 CONTINUE
C
IF (IWRITE.EQ.l) CLOSE (UNIT=9)
PCP=PCP/NOBS*lOO.O
WRITE (KANAL6,230) CWESHL(IWESHL),(J,J=l,NALT)
230 FORKAT(//' PREDICTION SUCCESS TABLE',Al8
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* I' =====================~=='
* II' OBSERVED PREDICTED ALTERNATIVE'
* II ALT. 1',3014)
WRITE (KANAL6,231) (DASH4{I),I=1,NALT)
231 FORMAT (t ----~--+',30A4)
DO 232 I=l,NALT
232 WRITE (KANAL6,233) I, (NCT2(I,J),J=1,NALT)
233 FORKAT( 16 " I' ,3014)
WRITE (KANAL6,231) (DASH4(1).I=1,NALT)
WRITE (KANAL6,235) PCP,XLFO,XLF,XLP,UTIL
235 FORMAT (
*/, PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED ',FlO.2,' %'
*1' LIKELIHOOD AT ZERO ',F12.4
*/, LIKELIHOOD AT ACTUAL CHOICES ',F12.4
*/, LIKELIHOOD AT PREDICTED CHOICES '~F12.4
*/, UTILITY AT PREDICTED CHOICES ',F12.4)
WRITE (KANAL6,240) CWESML(IWESML)
240 FORMAT (/1 , PROBABILITY-SHARES',A18
* I' =================='
*1/' ALTG ACTUAL DISCRETE CONTINUOUS'
*/, ------------------------------------------------------,)
DO 245 I=l,NALT
MOBSV=FREQ(I)*NOBS+O.5
ADI SC=ACTl (I)/NOBS
MDISC=ACT1(I)+O.5
ACONT=PROB(I)/NOBS
245 WRITE (KANAL6,246) I,FREQ(I),MOBSV,ADISC,MDISC,ACONT,PROB(I)
246 FORKAT(I6,F9.4,I6,F10.4,I6,F10.4,F8.2)
C
C R-SQUARE-EQUIVALENTS (SEE DOMENCICH/MCFADDEN P.123)
C
Zl=O.DO
Z2=O.DO
Z3=O.DO
Sl=O.DO
S2=O.DO
S3=O.DO
El=O.DO
E2=O.DO
E3=O.DO
Z7=O.DO
NFAIL=O
ALT=l.DO/NALT
DO 250 IOBS=l,NOBS
DO 251 I=l,NALT
IF (DATA1(I,1,IOBS)~EQal)WT=WEIGHT(I)
251 CONTINUE
DO 250 J=l v NALT
FIJ = DATA1(J,l,IOBS)
PIJ = PSHARE(J,IOBS)
PJ = FREQ(J)
IF (PIJ.LT.O.DO .OR. PIJ.GTal.DO)
* WRITE (KANAL6,252) PIJ,IOBS,J
252 FORMAT(' ERROR: PSHARE=',Fl0.4,· IN OBS=',IS,' AND ALT=',I3)
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250
C
IF (PIJ.EQ.O) PIJ=PJ
IF (PIJ.EQ.O) NFAIL=NFAIL+l
Rl = (FIJ-PIJ)**2
R2 = (FIJ-ALT)**2
R3 = (FIJ-PJ )**2
Zl = Zl + Rl*WT
Z2 = Z2 + Rl/PJ*WT
Z3 = Z3 + Rl/PIJ*WT
81 = Sl + R2*WT
82 = S2 + R2/PJ*WT
83 = 83 + R2/PIJ*WT
El = El + R3*WT
E2 = E2 + R3/PJ*WT
E3 = E3 + R3/PIJ*WT
Z7 = Z7 + FIJ*(l.DO-ALT)!PJ*WT
CONTINUE
CWESML(IWESML),Rl,R2,R3,R4,RS,R6,R7,R8,R9
c
c
c
c
253
Rl = 1.0 - Zl/Sl
R2 = 1.0 - Z2/S2
R3 = 1.0 - Z3/S3
R4 = 1.0 - zl/El
R5 = 1.0 -- Z2/E2
R6 = 1.0 - Z3/E3
R7 = 1.0 - XLF/XLFO
R8 = Z4/NOBS
R9 = ZS/Z7
WRITE (KANAL6,253)
FORMAT (
*' -~-~~~-~---~-~--~--~----~-~~-~-~~~~---~-~--~-~~~------'
c
*///, R-SQUARE-EQUIVALENTS:',A18
* I' ====================='
* I' WEIGHTS NONE FREQ PROBS'
* II SIMPLE :', 3F10.5
* /1 EFRON"S :',3F10.5
* It MCFADDEN"S :'~ F10.S
* II SUCCESSES :', 2F10.5 )
IF (NFAIL.GT.O) WRITE (KANAL6,*) It PROBS REPL. BY FREQ: ',NFAlL
*******************-
********************
IF (ISTRUC.EQ.O) GOTO 5
ISHARE=l
GOTO 1
*
ELASTICITIES
*
WRITE (KANAL6,302) CWESML(IWESHL)
FORMAT{//' ELASTICITIES AT SAMPLE MEANS AND FREQUENCIES:',A1S//)302
C
c
c
c
c
C
300
C
3020
303
301
304
305
307
309
308
306
3061
C
c
*
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DO 3020 I=l,NALT
FREQ(I)=DATA1(I,1,NOBS+IWESML)
CALL ELAST(PARM,NP,FREQ,ELAS,NOBS+IWESML)
WRITE (KANAL6,303) (I,I=l,NALT)
FORMAT(' VARIABLE ALT. 1',16(' P(',I2,')':»
FORMAT (, " 14 ( • - • ) , ,+, , 16A7 )
DO .304 K=l,NX
WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
DO 304 J=l,NALT
WRITE (KANAL6,30S) PNAME(K),J,(ELAS(I,J,K),I=l,NALT)
FORMAT ( , ',AB,' ',13,' I' ,16F7.3)
IF (NOAGE) GOTO 3061
DO 306 K1=1,NXD
WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
DO 307 I=l,NALT
PROBS (I)=O.DO
DO 308 J=l,NDUMD
K=NX+(K1-1)*NDUMD+J
WRITE (KANAL6,30S) PNAME(K),J,(ELAS(I,J,NX+Kl),I=l,NALT)
DO 309 I=l,NALT
PROBS (I)=PROBS (I)+ELAS (I,J,NX+Kl)
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,30S) SUMME,Kl,(PROBS(I),I=l,NALT)
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
IF (ISHARE.EQ.O) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,"=)
'FOR INDIVIDUAL ELASTICITIES, RUN PREDICTION FIRST'
GOTO 1
END IF
WRITE (KANAL6,310) CWESML(IWESHL)
310 FORMAT(//' AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL ELASTICITIES:I,A1S//)
C
DO 311 I=l,NALT
DO 311 J=l,NALT
DO 311 K=l,NXR
311 ELAS(I,J,K)=O.O
C
DO 312 IOBS=l,NOBS
DO 313 J=l,NALT
IF (DATA1(J,1,IOBS).EQ.l.O) WT=WEIGHT(J)
313 PROB(J)=PSHARE(J,IOBS)
CALL ELAST(PARM,NP,PROB,ELAS2,IOBS)
DO 314 I=l,NALT
DO 314 J=l,NALT
DO 314 K=l,NX~
314 ELAS (I,J ,K) =ELAS (I,J ,K)'~ELAS2(I,J ,1<) *WT
312 CONTINUE
C
DO 320 I=l,NALT
DO 320 J=l~NALT
DO 320 1<=1 f NXR
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320 ELAS(I,J,K)=ELAS(I,J,K)/NOBS
WRITE (KANAL6,303) (III=l,NALT)
DO 321 K=l,NX
WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
DO 321 J=l,NALT
321 WRITE (KANAL6,305) PNAME(K),J,(ELAS(I,J,K),I=1,NALT)
IF ~NOAGE) GOTO 326
DO 322 Kl=l,NXD
WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
DO 323 I=l,NALT
323 PROBS(I)=O.DO
DO 324 J=l,NDUMD
K=NX+(Kl-l)*NDUMD+J
WRITE (KANAL6,305) PNAME(K),J,(ELAS(I,J,NX+Kl),I=1,NALT)
DO 325 I=l,NALT
325 PROBS (I)=PROBS (I)+ELAS(I,J,NX+Kl)
324 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,305) SUMME,Kl,(PROBS(I),I=l,NALT)
322 CONTINUE
326 WRITE (KANAL6,301) (DASH7(I),I=1,NALT)
GOTO 1
c
c
c
c
C
400
401
*
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GOTO 5
IREDO=O
IER=O
WRITE (KANAL6,401)
FORMAT(' COVARIANCES : l=PRINT, 2=RECALCULATION, 3=BOTH'
I' RECALCULATION: l=BHflH, 2=SIMPLE, 3=SYMM., 4=MNL >I}
READ (KANAL5,*) MATPRT,IDIFF2
IF (.NOT.LEVEL1~AND.IDIFF2.EQ.4)IDIFF2=2
IF (MATPRT .EQ. 1) GO TO 430
CALL FUNC(PARM,NP,XLF,*440)
c
C RECALCULATION OF COVARIANCE-MATRIX
C NOTE: COY = -INV(HESS) = -INV(MBHHH) = -INV(-GRAD*GRAD')
C
420 CALL FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
CALL SP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,HESS,FUNC)
c
C NOTE IF IDIFF2=1, FP RECALCULATES MBHHH = -GRAD*GRAD ,
C SP REFILLS HESS
C IF IDIFF2=2,3 FP CALCULATES GRAD
C SP CALCULATES FINITE DIFFERENCES OF GRAD
C IF IDIFF2=4, FP CALCULATES EXACT DERIVATIVES FOR MNL
C SP REFILLS HESS
C
C INVERSION OF HESSIAN AND CONTROL OF EIGENVALUES
C
IERINV=l
CALL MATEV2(HESS,SCRA,NP,NP,KAXNP,IERINV)
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IF (IERINV.GT.l) IER=-S
WRITE (KANAL6,422)
422 fURHAT(!' EIGENVALUES OF HESSIAN:'
• I' -----------------------,)
DO 423 I=1 i NP
WORK(I)=HESS(I,I)
IF (WORK(I).NE.O.O) GOTO 423
WORK(I)=O.lD-99
IER=-9
IERINV=2
423 WRITE (KANAL6,'(I3,2X,D10.4)') I,WORK(I)
IF (IERINV.EQ.2) WRITE (KANAL6,421)
421 FORMAT(' COV-MATRIX NOT INVERTIBLE')
IX) 425 I=1,NP
DO 425 J=l,I
ZZZ = 0.00
DO 426 K=l,NP
ZZZ = ZZZ + SCRA{I,K)*SCRA(J,K)/WORK(K)
426 CONTINUE
HESS(I,J) = ZZZ
HESS(J,I) = ZZZ
425 CONTINUE
CALL WESML(PARM,GRAD,HESS,NP,SCRA,FUNC)
c
C PRINT RESULTS ANEW
C
c
c
C
430
432
436
435
440
441
c
c
c
c
C
500
IF (IREDO.EQ.1) GaTO 150
HETHOD=2+IDIFF2
ITERAL=O
NEVALF=Q
GOTO 150
PRINT COVARIANCE-MATRIX
WRITE (KANAL6,432)
FORMAT(' COVARIANCE-MATRIX :'//)
DO 435 I = .1.,NP
DO 435 J = 1,1
ZZZ = -HESS(I,J)
WRITE (KANAL6,436) PNAME(I),PNAME(J),ZZZ
FORHAT(3X,A8,3X,A8,3X,G20.7)
CONTINUE
GaTO 1
W~_ITE (I<ANAL6,441)
FORMAT(' INADMISSIBLE INITIALVALUES')
GOTO 1
***$********************
* DERIVATIVE CHECK *
*********-**************
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GOTO 5
CALL FUHC(PARH,NP,XLF,*530)
WRITE (KAHAL6,SOl) XLF
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501 FORMAT(/' DERIVATIVE CHECK: LIKELIHOOD = ',FIO.4
* II' HIT ENTER TO QUIT p IDIFF2=1-4 IF SECOND DERIVATIVES,'
* Ii 2 IF ONLY FIRST DERIVATIVES, 5 FOR CHECK OF SSQDEV >')
READ (KANAL5,'(Il)') IDIFF2
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.O) GOTO 1
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.5) GOTO 540
WRITE (KANAL6,S02)
502 FORMAT (//' PARAMETER ANALYTIC DIFFERENCE')
CALL FP(PARH,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
CALL FDIFF(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD2,FUNC)
DO 510 I=l,NP
510 WRITE (KANAL6,511) PNAME(I),GRAD(I),GRAD2(I)
511 FORMAT (lX,A8,lOX,2D13.5)
WRITE (KANAL6,S12)
512 FORMAT(/' HIT ENTER TO QUIT, IDIFF2=1-4 FOR SECOND DERIV. >')
READ (KANAL5,4) IDIFF2
IF (IDIFF2.EQeO) GOTO 1
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.2.0R.IDIFF2.EQ.3.0R.(IDIFF2.EQ.4.AND •• NOT.LEVEL1»
* THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'ERROR: IDIFF2=',IDIFF2
GOTO 1
END IF
CALL SP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,HESS,FUNC)
CALL SDIFF(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,HESS,FUNC)
C (NOTE: HBHHH IS NOT ALTERED BY CALLING SDIFF)
KK=O
DO 520 I=l,NP
DO 520 J=l,I
KK=KK+l
ZZZ=MBHHH(KK)
520 WRITE (KANAL6,521) PNAME(I),PNAME(J),ZZZ,HESS(I,J)
521 FORMAT(lX,A8,lX,A8,lX,2D13~5)
GOTO 1
530 WRITE (KANAL6,531)
531 FORMAT(' INADMISSIBLE INITIALVALUES')
GOTO 1
C
540 IF (NXA.NE.l) GOTO 549
Nl=NX+NXD*NDUMD
DO 542 I=l,NALTl
PDUHMY(I)=PARM(Nl+I)
542 NDUMKY(I)=PNAME(Nl+I)
CALL SSQDEV(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,*530)
CALL FPSSQD(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,PROBS,PROBS,SSQDEV)
ACC=O.OOOOl
WRITE (KANAL6,543) SSD
543 FORMAT(/' SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS =',Fl0.4)
WRITE (KANAL6,S02)
DO 545 l=l,NALTl
PD=PDUKHY(I)
PDUHHY(I)=PD+ACC
CALL SSQDEV(PDUMMY,NALTi,SSD2,*530)
PDUMKY(I)=PD
SQDIFF=(SSD2-SSD)/ACC
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545 WRITE (KANAL6,511) NDUMMY(I),PROBS(I),SQDIFF
GOTO 1
549 WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'INADMISSIBLE NXA SETTING'
GOTO 1
******************
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GaTO 5
WRITE (KANAL6,601)
FORMAT (/1 , FIRST AND LAST OBSERVATION >')
READ (KANAL5,*) IOBSl,IOBS2
DO 606 IOBS=IOBS1,IOBS2
DO 606 J=l,NALT
WRITE (KANAL6,911) DATAl (J,lf lOBS),
(DATA1(J,K+l,IOBS),K=1,NX),(DATA2(K,IOBS),K=1,NXD)
c
c
c
c
C
600
601
606
*
• PRINT DATA *
***********~*~~**************
*********.*****************~*
*********************~**************
GOTO 1
*
ELIMINATE SINGLE DATA POINTS
PLOT OF CONTOUR LINES
*
*
WRITE (KANAL6,-) 'ENTER NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS TO BE ELIMINATED >'
READ (KANAL5,*) NSKIP
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'NOW ENTER OBSERVATIONS IN DESCENDING ORDER >'
DO 621 ISKIP=l,NSKIP
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'lOBS >'
READ (KANAL5,*) IOBSS
DO 625 IOBS=IOBSS+l,NOBS+l
DO 626 l<=l,NXR
DO 626 I=l,NALT
DATA1(I,K,IOBS-1)=DATA1(I,K,IOBS)
DO 627 I<=l,NXD
DATA2(K,IOBS-l)=DATA2(K,IOBS)
CONTINUE
NOBS=NOBS-l
CONTINUE
GOTO 1
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GOTe 5
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'SELECT TWO VARIABLES TO PLOT, REST IS CONSTANT'
DO 652 K=l,NP
WRITE (KANAL6,653) K,PNAME(K)
FORMAT(' ',13,' = ',AB)
WRITE (KANAL6,654)
FORMAT(/' ENTER (1) TWO INDICES FOR THE TWO VARIABLES TO PLOT,'
I' (2) RANGE OF FIRST VARIABLE (XMIN,XMAX) >'
I' (3) RANGE OF SECOND VARIABLE (YMIN,YKAX) >')
READ (KANALS,*) IND1,IND2,XMIN,XMAX,YMIN,YHAX
626
627
625
621
C
C
C
C
C
650
652
653
654
*
*
c
c
c
c
C
620
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CALL FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
CALL SP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,HESS,FUNC)
CALL LMSTAT(NP,NP1,MTH,NLMST,GRAD,HESS,TEST)
XLABEL=PNAME(IND1)
YLABEL=PNAME(IND2)
CALL CNTR(PARM,NP,IND1,IND2,XMIN,XMAX,YMIN,YMAX,
* FUNC,XLABEL,YLABEL)
GOTO 1
*
LM-STATISTIC
*
IF (IDATA.EQ.O) GOTO 5
WRITE (KANAL6,701)
FORHAT(' 2ND DERIVATIVES: l=BHHH, 2=SIMPLE, 3=SYMM. >')
READ (KANAL5,*) IDIFF2
WRITE (KANAL6,702)
FORMAT(' DEGREES OF FREEDOM (= # OF DISS.PARKS TO BE TESTED) >')
READ (KANAL5,*) NPl
IF (NPleGT.5) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'ERROR: NPl > 5'
GOTO 1
END IF
WRITE (KANAL6,703)
FORMAT(' INDICES OF DISS. PARAMETERS IN PARM >')
READ (KANAL5,*) (NLMST(I),I=1,NP1)
703
702
c
701
c
c
c
c
c
C
100
WRITE (KANAL6,709) TEST
709 FORMAT(//' LM-STATISTIC
GOTO 1
',F15.S/' ',30('-'»
c
c
c
c
C
780
781
782
783
***********-****************************************************
* TRANSFORM PARAMETERS TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH MNL (OBSOLETE) *
~***************************************************************
.IF (ISTRUC.EQ.O .OR. NTH.EQ.O .OR. ICOVAR.EQ.O) GaTO 5
WRITE (KANAL6,781)
FORXAT(///' TRANSFORMED VARIABLES :'
* I' PARAMETER / SIM.COEFF MEAN STDoERROR T-STAT'/)
DO 782 I=l,NX
DO 782 K=~,NTH
KP=MTH+K
CALL TRAFO(PARM,NP,I,KP,HESS,C,SC,W)
WRITE (KANAL6,783) PNAHE(I),PNAME(KP),C,SC,W
WRITE (21,783) PNAME(I),PNAME(KP),C,SC,W
FORMAT(' ',AS,' / ',AS,' :',2X,F8.4,2X,F7.3,2X,F7.3)
IF (NOAGE.AND.NOALT) GOTO 1
IF (.NOT.STDDUM) GOTO 1
K=MTH
1=0
DO 784 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
785
787
786
788
784
c
c
c ,
c
C
790
c
c
c
c
C
800
C
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DO 784 12=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(Il,12)
IF (THETA(Il,I2).NE.l.DO) GOTO 785
I=I+ML3
GOTO 784
K=K+l
DO 788 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (I.EQ.NALT) GaTO 1
IF (NOAGE) GOTO 786
DO 787 M=l,NXD
KK=(M-l) * (NALT-l)+NX+I
CALL TRAFO(PARM,NP,KK,K,HESS,CwSC,W)
WRITE (KANAL6,783) PNAME(KK),PNAME(K),C,SC,W
WRITE (21,783) PNAHE(KK),PNAME(K),C,SC,W
IF (NOALT) GOTO 788
KI<=MXA+I
CALL TRAFO(PARM,NP,KK,K,HESS,C,SC,W)
WRITE (KANAL6,783) PNAME(KK),PNAME(K),C,SC,W
WRITE (21,783) PNAME(KK),PNAME(K),C,SC,W
CONTINUE
CONTINUE
GOTO 1
**********************************~**********
* AIRUM-CHECK (NOTE: SPECIAL CASE ONLY) *
****ft****************************************
CALL AIRUM(PARM,NP,KANAL6)
GOTO 1
****************-**********~******************************
ADJUST AGGREGATED SAMPLE SHARES WITH LEAST SQUARES
*****.********************************~****************~**
IF (NXA.NE.l) GOTO 840
ISTOP(l)=O
ISTOP(2)=Q
ISTOP(3)=Q
ITERLS=2*NALT
WRITE (KANAL6,811)
811 FORMAT(/' TYPE 1 TO OVERRIDE DEFAULT ITERATION PARAMETERS >')
READ (KANAL5,'(Il)') IQUERY
IF (IQUERY.EQ.l) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,812)
812 FORMAT(' ITERATION LIMIT >,
* II CONY. CRITERION (PARM, GRAD, SSD; Q=ENABLE,l=DISABLE) >')
READ (KANAL5,*) ITERLS,ISTOP
END IF
NQ=NALT1*NALT1+8*NALTl
c
Nl=NX+NXD*NDUHD
DO 820 I=l,HALTl.
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820 PDUMMY(I)=PARM(Nl+I)
CALL LSFIT(PDUKMY,NALT1,SSD,IERLS,SSQDEV,ITERLS)
WRITE (KANAL6 f 821) SSD,IERLS,ITERLS
8~1 FORHAT(//' ALTERNATIV SPECIFIC DUMMIES ADJUSTED:'
* /' SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS:',F11.5
* I' DA.FLoPO. ITERATIONS (',12,'):',111
* II' DUMMY INITIALVALUE ADJUSTED VALUE')
DO 822 I=l,WALTl
WRITE (KANAL6,823) PNAME(Nl+I),PARM(Nl+I)gPDUNMY(I)
823 FORHAT(' ',A8,3X,F9.4,9X,F9.4)
822 PARH(Nl+I)=PDUMMY(I)
C
CALL FUNC(PARM,NP,XLF,~830l
DO 825 I=l,NP
GRAD(I)=O.O
825 HESS(I,I)=O.O
I TERAL=ITERLS
NEVALF=Q
IER=IERLS
METHOD=7
MATPRT=O
GOTO 150
C
830 WRITE (KANAL6,831)
831 FORMAT(' ERROR: FUNCTION UNDEFINED AT ADJUSTED DUMMIES')
GOTO 1
C
840 WRITE (KANAL6,841) NXA
841 FORMAT(/' INCORRECT SETTING FOR ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES:'
* II NXA = ',11,' .NE. 1 FOR CORRECT INITIALIZATION')
GOTO 1
*
EXIT
****1r1t******
*<;t~********'"
START UP ROUTINE FOR GQTREE
1) FORTRAN UNITS FOR TERMINAL IN/OUTPUT
2) LOG (LARGEST) AND SMALLEST POSITIVE REAL*8 NUMBER
3) DATE, TIME, AND WEEKDAY OF LAST CHANGE
c
c
c
c
C
99 RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE START(NPRINT,KANAL5,KANAL6,UPP,LOW,VERSIO)
~---------~------------------------------------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
c-----------------------------------------------------------------
REAL*8 UPP,LOW
CHARACTER*21 VERSIO
c
C IBM
C
KANAL5=5
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I<ANAL6=6
UPP=173.DO
LOW=1.D-74
c
C PRIKE
C
KANAL5=1
KANAL6=1
UPP=22622.DO
LOW=loD-9824
c
C GQOPT OUTPUT
C
NPRINT=KANAL6
c
C LAST UPDATE
C
VERSIO='03/30/84.1S:43:52.Fri'
c
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE INDATA (KANALS,Y~NAL6)
c-----------~--------------------------------------~--------------------
C DATA INPUT FOR GQTREE, CALCULATES WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED MEANS
C CHECKS DATA AND MEANS FOR CONSITENCY
C KANALS
c-----------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
c
PARAMETER
* (MAXOBS =2001,
* HAXNX =10,
* HAXNXD =5,
* MAXALT =20,
* HAXNXY=HAXNX+l, HAXNXR=MAXNX+MAXNXD)
c
REAL*4 DATA1(HAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS),DATA2(MAXNXD,MAXOBS)
CHARACTER*20 DAFILE
COMMON / DIKEN / NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,MXA,MTH,XTAU,NOBS
COMMON / DATAX I DATAl
COMMON I DATAY / DATA2
COMMON / DWESML / RELSIZ,WEIGHT(MAXALT)
c
C STORAGE FOR MEANS : NDW =MAXOBS, THEN NOBS+2
C NDl = MAXOBS-~, THEN NOBS+l
C
NDD=MAXOBS-2
ND1=MAXOBS-l
NDW=MAXOBS
c
WRITE (KANAL6,lO)
10 FORMAT (/1' ENTER DATA-INPUT-FILE >i)
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READ (KANALS,'(A20)') DAFILE
OPEN (UNIT=7,STATUS='OLD',FILE=DAFILE,ACCESS='SEQUENTIAL')
WRITE (KANAL6,~2)
12 FORMAT(i ENTER MAX. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS >')
READ (KANAL5,*) NNOBS
IF (NHOBS.EQ.O) NNOBS=NDD
IF (NNOBS.GT.NDD) THEN
WRITE(KANAL6,*) 'WARNING: NOBS SET TO ',NDD
NNOBS=NDD
END IF
c
C INITIALIZATIONS FOR MEANS AND COUNT
C
NOBS=O
DO 20 I=l,NALT
DATA1(I,1,ND1)=O~O
DATA1(I,1,NDW)=O.O
DO 20 J=l,NX
DATA1(I,J+l,ND1)=O.O
20 DATA1(I,J+i,NDW)=O.O
DO 21 J=l,NXD
DATA2(J,NDl)=O.O
21 DATA2(J,NDW)=O.O
C
C LOOP THROUGH DATA
C
DO 100 IOBS=1,NNOBS
IC=O
DO 120 I=1,NALT
READ (7,END=200) DATA1(I,1,IOBS),
* (DATA1(I,J+l,IOBS),J=1,NX),(DATA2(J,IOBS),J=1,NXD)
IF (DATA1(I,1,IOBS).EQ.l.) THEN
Ie=!
WT=WEIGHT(IC)
END IF
120 CONTINUE
C
IF (IC.EQ.O) WRITE (KANAL6,130) lOBS
130 FORMAT(' ERROR: NO ALTERNATIVE CHOSEN IN OBSERVATION',I6)
C
141
140
146
*
•
DATA1(IC,1,NDl) = DATA1(IC,1,ND1) + 1.0
DATA1(IC,1,NDW) = DATA1(IC,1,NDW) + WT
DO 140 I=l,NALT
DO 140 J=l,NX
IF (ABS(DATA1(IiJ+l,IOBS».GT.l0000~O)
WRITE (1,141) J+l,IOBS,DATA1(I,J+1 6 IOBS)
FORMAT(' DATA CHECK: X(IALT,K,IOBS)=',3I3,G20.10)
DATA1(I,J+l,ND1) = DATA1(I,J+l,ND1) + DATA1(I,J+l,IOBS)
DATA1(I,J+l,NDW) = DATA1(I,J+1,NDW) + DATA1(I,J+l,IOBS)*WT
DO 145 J=l,NXD
IF (ABS(DATA2(J,IOBS».GT.10000.0)
WRITE (1,146) J,IOBS,DATA2(J,IOBS)
FORMAT(' DATA CHECK: Y(K,IOBS)=',2I3,G20.10)
DATA2(J,ND1) = DATA2(J,ND1) + DATA2(J,IOBS)
145
C
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DATA2(J,NDW) = DATA2(J,NDW) + DATA2(J,IOBS)*WT
NOBS=NOBS+l
100 CONTINUE
C
C SUKMARY
C
200 CLOSE (UNIT=7)
IF (NOBS.EQ.O) THEN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'ERROR: DATA-FILE EMPTY'
RETURN
END IF
SUM=O.DO
DO 220 I=l,NALT
SUM=SUM+DATA1(I,1,ND1)~WEIGHT(I)
DATAl (I,l,NOBS+l)=DATAl (I,1,ND1)/NOBS
DATA1(I,1,NOBS+2)=DATA1~I,1,NDW)/NOBS
DO 220 J=l,NX
DATA1(I,J+l,NOBS+l)=DATA1(I,J+l,ND1)/NOBS
220 DATAl (I,J+l,NOBS+2)=DATAl (I,J+l,NDW)/NOBS
DO 221 J=l,NXD
DATA2(J,NOBS+l)=DATA2(J,ND1)/NOBS
221 DATA2(J,NOBS+2)=DATA2(J,NDW)/NOBS
C
IF (DABS(SUM-NOBS).GTol) WRITE (KANAL6,229) SUM,NOBS
229 FORMAT(' ERROR: WEIGHTS DO NOT SUM UP TO NOBS:G,G20.10,II0)
C
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE UPDATE(PARM,NP,*)
c----------------------------------------------------------------------
C UPDATES THE PARAMETERS IN COMMON BLOCKS:
C (1) DISSIMILARITY PARAMETERS
C (2) PARAMETERS FOR TREE DUMMIES
C----------------------------------------------------------------------
RE~~L*8 PARK (NP)
C
PARAMETER
*
(HAXNXD =5,
*
HAXNXM =20,
*
HAXTH =10,
*
MAXTAU =5,
*
MAXLEV =3,
*
MAXLIM =5,
*
MAXBRA =5,
*
HAXALT =20)
C
REAL*8 THETA(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
* PMASKY(MAXNXD,HAXALT),PHASKD(MAXALT),P
INTEGER HAP(MAXALT,MAXLEV),MAPLEN(MAXNXM),MAPTR(MAXNXM,MAXALT)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,LHAP(HAXNXM,MAXALT),STDDUM,NOALT,NOAGE,
* Ll,L2,L3,STDUHA,STDUHD,NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
COMMON / DIKEN / NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,HXA,MTH,MTAU,NOBS
COMMON / DDISS / LOCTAU(MAXTAU),LOCLIK(HAXTH),LOCBRA(HAXTH),
- 276 -
* NL1,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
COMMON / DTREE / NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
COMMON / DMAPP / NXM,MAP,MAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PMASKD,LMAP
COMMON / DDUKM / STDDUM,STDUMA,STDUMD,NDUMA,NDUMD,
* NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(MAXNXD,MAXALT),
* NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
c
NFAIL=O
IF (NTAU+NTH.EQ.O) GaTO 20
c
IF (NTH.EQ.O) GOTO 9
c
DO 8 K=l,NTH
IF (PARM(MTH+K).LT.O.001) THEN
PRINT 91,K,PARM(MTH+K)
NFAIL=NFAIL+l
END IF
THETA(LOCLIM(K),LOCBRA(K»=PARM(MTH+K)
8 CONTINUE
C
9 IF (NTAU.EQ.O) GOTO 20
C
DO 10 }(=l.NTAU
IF (PARM(MTAU+K).LT.O.001) THEN
PRINT 92,K,PARM(MTAU+K)
NFAIL=NFAIL+l
END IF
TAU(LOCTAU(K»=PARM(MTAU+K)
10 CONTINUE
C
20 IF (NXM.EQ.O) GOTO 90
C
DO 25 I=l,NALT
Hl=MAP(I,l)
M2=MAP(I,2)
M3=MAP(I,3)
IF (HleNE.O) THEN
Ll=.TRUE.
ELSE
Ll=aFALSE.
END IF
IF (M2.NE.O) THEN
L2=.TRUE.
ELSE
L2=.FALSE.
END IF
IF (M3.NE.O) THEN
L3=.TRUEG
ELSE
L3=.FALSE.
END IF
IF (NOALT) GOTO 26
P=O.DO
IF (Ll) P=P+PARM(MXA+Ml)
- 277 -
IF (L2) P=P+PARM(KXA+M2)
IF (L3) P=P+PARH(KKA+M3)
PHASKD(I)=P
26 IF (NOAGE) GaTO 25
DO 27 K=l,NXD
P=O.DO
IF (Ll) P=P+PARM(INDAGE(K,Hl»
IF (L2) P=P+PARM(INDAGE(K,M2»
IF (L3) P=P+PARM(INDAGE(K,K3»
PMASKY(K,I)=P
27 CONTINUE
25 CONTINUE
C
90 IF (NFAIL.GT.O) RETURN 1
91 FORMAT(' ATTEMPT THETA(',I2,!) = ',D12.4)
92 FORMAT(' ATTEMPT TAU(',Il,') = ',D12.4)
RETURN
END
C-----SUBROUTINE PACKAGE: FUNC,FP,SP,FDIFF,SDIFF----------------------
C
C AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN SEP 06 , 1983
C
c----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE FUNC(PARM,NP,XLF,*)
c-------------------------~--------------------------------------------
C
C .- THIS SUBROUTINE EVALUATES AND ACCUMULATES THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
C
C ** FOR UNCON=.FALSE. IT ADJUSTS AFTER SUCCESSFUL EVALUATION THE
C ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES TO FIT THE AGGREGATE SAMPLE SHARES
C
, C------------------~--------------------------~------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PAIDI (NP)
c
PARAMETER
* (HAXOBS =2001,
1&: HAXNP =50,
* MAXNX =10,
* HAXNXD =5,
* MAXALT =20,
* KAXNXY=KAXNX+l,
* KAXDA1=HAXALT*MAXNXY*MAXOBS, MAXDA2=MAXNXD*KAXOBS,
* MAXALS=MAXALT*(MAXALT+l)/2)
c
REAL*8 WORK(MAXNP),PROBS(MAXALT),PDUHMY(MAXALT),NDUMMY(MAXALT)
REAL*4 FDATA1(MAXDA1),FDATA2(MAXDA2)
LOGICAL UNCON
c
COMMON / DIREN / NALT,NALT1,NPARM(7),NOBS
COMMON / DATAX / FDATAl
COMMON / DATAY I FDATA2
COKMON / DCONST / UNOON,PDUMHY,NDUMMY
COMMON / DWORK / WORK, PROBS
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COMMON / SPRINT / IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
EXTERNAL SSQDEV
c
I LOOP=I
NFAIL=O
HOBSF=NOBS/1.O
CALL UPDATE(P~M,NP,*10)
C
C EVALUATION OF LIKELIHOOD
C
10 IfNI=1
NN2=1
INC=M~~LT·MAXNXY
XLF=O.DO
DO 100 lOBS = 1,NOBS
NFAIL1=NFAIL
CALL CONT(FDATA1(NN1),FDATA2(NN2),
* ILOOP,PARM,NP,XLFI,WORK,PROBS,NFAIL)
HN1=NN1+INC
NN2=NN2+MAXNXD
IF (NFAIL.GT.NFAILl) IOBF=IOBS
IF !~FAIL.GT.NOBSF ) GOTO 97
IF (NFAIL.GToNFAIL1) GOTO 95
XLF = XLF + XLFI
100 CONTINUE
C
C SOLVE LEAST SQUARES PROBLEM TO FIT SAMPLE-SHARES
C
IF (UNCON) GOTO 90
ITERLS=2*NALTl
CALL LSFIT(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,IER,SSQDEV,ITERLS)
IF (IERnLT.O) GOTO 93
GOTO 90
c
C ERROR HANDLING, EXIT
C
90 RETURN
C
93 WRITE (KANAL6,94) SSD,IER,ITERLS
94 FORMAT(' SHARES NOT EXACT: SSD=',D10.4,', IER=',I2,', ITERLS=',I2}
RETURN
C
95 IF (NFAIL.GT.O) WRITE (KANAL6,96) NFAIL,IOBF
96 FORMAT(' FUNC: NFAIL =',12,', LAST aBS =',I4)
RETURN 1
C
97 · WRITE (KANAL6,98) NFAIL
98 FORMAT(' FUNC: ABORT B/a MORE THAN ',14,' FAILURES')
99 RETURN 1
END
C---------------------------------------------------------------------SUBROUTINE FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
C---------------------------------------------------------------------
C
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C ** THIS SUBROUTINE EVALUATES THE GRADIENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD-FUNCTION
C (HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT AND MUST NOT UPDATE XLF)
C
C ** FOR ID!FF2=1: THE BHHH APPROXIMATION OF THE HESSIAN IS PROVIDED
C [ NOTE: HESSIAN = -GRAD*GRAD , = - INV(COV) ]
C ** FOR IDIFF2=4: THE EXACT HESSIAN IS CUMULATED
C
C-----------------------~----------------~----------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z>
REAL*8 PARM(NP),GRAD(NP)
c
PARAMETER
* (MAXOBS =2001,
* MAXNP =50,
* MAXNX =10,
* MAXNXD =5,
* MAXALT =20,
* MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, MAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+l)/2,
* HAXDA1=KAXALT*MAXNXY*MAXOBS, MAXDA2=MAXNXD*HAXOBS)
c
REAL*B WORK(MAXNP),PROBS(MAXALT),HESS(MAXNPS),HESS2(MAXNPS)
REAL*4 FDATA1(MAXDA1),FDATA2(MAXDA2)
c
COMMON / DIMEN / NPARM(9),NOBS
COMMON / DATAX / FDATAl
COMMON / DATAY / FDATA2
COMMON / DWORK / WORK,PROBS
COMMON / DCOVM I HESS
COMMON / DRESS / HESS2
eOKMON / DIFF2 / IDIFF2
COMMON / BOPT2 / ACC,R,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,MX,IER
COMMON / BPRINT / IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
EXTERNAL FUNC
c
ILOOP=O
NFAIL=O
CALL UPDATE(PARM,NP,*92)
C
C EVALUATION OF GRADIENT (AND HESSIAN)
C
DO 5 I=l.,NP
5 GRAD(I)=O.DO
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.2.0R.IDIFF2.EQ.3) GOTO 12
LK = NP*(NP+l)/2
DO 10 I=l,LK
10 HESS (I)=O.DO
12 NN1=1
NN2=1
I NC=MAXALT*HAXNXY
DO 100 lOBS = 1,NOBS
NFAIL1=NFAIL
CALL CONT(FDATA1(NN1),FDATA2(NN2),
* ILOOP.PARH,NP,XLFI,WORK,PROBS,NFAIL)
NN1=NN1+INC
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NN2=NN2+MAXNXD
IF (NFAIL.GT.NFAIL1) IOBF=IOBS
DO 30 J=l,NP
30 GRAD(J) = GRAD(J) + WORK(J)
c
IF (IDIFF2oNE.l) GOTO 50
IND=O
DO 40 J=l,NP
DO 40 K=l,J
IND=IND+l
40 HESS (IND) = HESS(IND) - WORK(J) * WORK(K)
GOTO 100
C
50 IF (IDIFF2.NE.4) GOTO 100
DO 55 K=l,LK
55 HESS(K) = HESS(K) + HESS2(K)
c
100 CONTINUE
C
FILLS BHHH-TRIANGLE MBHHH ON ARRAY SDERIV
COMPUTES SIMPLE FINITE SECOND DIFFERENCES
COMPUTES SYMMETRIC FINITE SECOND DIFFERENCES
: FILLS TRIANGLE WITH ANAL. DERIVS ON SDERIV
** IDIFF2=1
*It IDIFF2=2
** IDIFF2=3
** IDIFF2=4
ARRAY OF SECOND DERIVATIVES:
FOR FINITE DIFFERENCES, GRAD HAS TO BE SUPPLIED
92
97
IVAL~IVAL+2
IF (NFAIL.GT.O) WRITE (KANAL6,97) NFAIL,IOBF
FOR~AT(' FP: NFAIL=',I4,' LAST OBS=',I5)
RETURN
WRITE (KANAL6,*) • FP: DISS. PARM < 0.01'
RETURN
END
c----------------~---------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE SP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,SDERIV,FUNC)
C--------------------------------------------------------~-----
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C---------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-HtO-Z)
REAL*B PARH(NP),GRAD(NP),SDERIV(NP,NP)
c
PARAMETER
* (MAXNP =50,
* MAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+1)!2)
c
REAL*8 MBHHH(MAXNPS)
c
COMMON / DCOVM / MBHHH
COMMON / DIMEN / NPARM(9),NOBS
COMMON / DIFF2 / IDIFF2
COMMON / BOPT2 / ACC,R,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,MX,IER
COMMON / BSTACK/ A(l)
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COMMON / BOPT1 / NPARS,JH,JFP,JFP1,JSP,JSP1,JA1,JS
COMMON / BFIDIF/ FDFRAC,FDMIN
EXTERNAL FUMe
c
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.2 .OR. IDIFF2.EQ~3) GOTO 40
c
C REFILL OF SDERIV (IDIFF2=1,4)
C
IND=O
DO 35 J=l,NP
DC 35 K=l,J
IND=IND+l
ZZZ=MBHHH(IND)
SDERIV(J,K)=ZZZ
35 SDERIV(K,J)=ZZZ
RETURN
c
C COMPUTATION OF FINITE DIFFERENCES (IDIFF2=2,3)
C
40 DO 90 I=l,NP
AI=PARM(I)
EI=DHAX1(DABS(AI)*FDFRAC,FDMIN)
PARM(I)=AI+EI
CALL FP (PARM,NP,XLF2,A(JA1),FUNC)
JA2I=JA1+I-l
IF (IDIFF2.EQ.2) GO TO 475
c
C SYMMETRIC FIRST DIFFERENCES OF GRAD
C
PARM(I)=AI-EI
CALL FP (PARM,NP,XLF1,A(JAl+NP)iFUNC)
JA1I=JA2I+NP
SDERIV(I,I)=(A(JA2I)-A(JA1I»/(2.DO*EI)
DO 410 J=l,NP
IF (JeEQ.I) GO TO 410
JA2J=JA1+J-l
SDERIV{I i J)=(A(JA2J}-A(JA2J+NP»!(2.DO*EI)
IF (J.GT.I) GO TO 410
SDERIV(I,J)=(SDERIV(I,J)+SDERIV(J,I»/2.0DO
SDERIV(J,I)=SDERIV(I,J)
410 CONTINUE
GO TO 90
c
C· SIMPLE FtIRST DIFFERENCES OF GRAD
C
475 SDERIV(I,I)=(A(JA2I)-GRAD(I»/EI
K=I-l
IF (K.EQ.O) GO TO 90
DO 476 J=l,K
SDERIV(I,J)=(A(JA1+J-l)~G,RAD(J»/EI
476 SDERIV(J,I)=SDERIV(I,J)
90 PARM(I)=AI
C
RETURN
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END
C-------·-----------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE FDIFF(AO,NP,AFUO,FPD,FUNC)
C------------------------------------------------------------------
C FIRST ORDER SYMMETRIC DIFFERENCE QUOTIENT (CENTRAL APPROX.)
C------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,O-Z)
DIMENSION AO(NP),FPD(NP)
COMMON I BOPT2 / ACC,R,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,KX,IER
DO 90 l=l,NP
AI=AO(I)
EI=DMAX1(DABS(AI)*.lD-3,.lD-5)
11 AO(I)=AI+EI
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU2,*85)
IVAL=IVAL+l
AO(I)=AI-EI
CALL FUNC(AO~NP,AFU1,*85)
IVAL=IVAL+l
FPD(I)=(AFU2-AFU1)/(2.DO*EI)
GO TO 90
85 EI=EI/10.DO
IF (EI.LE.l.D-l0) GOTO 130
GOTO 11
90 AO(I)=AI
RETURN
130 AO(I)=AI
IER=-2
RETURN
END
c---------------~----------------------~---------------------------
SUBROUTINE SDIFF(AO,NP,AFUO,FPD,SPD,FUNC)
c--------------------------------------------~~---~---------~-------
C SECOND ORDER SYMMETRIC DIFFERENCE QUOTIENT
C
C STAR: AFUll AFU21
C AFUl AFUO AFU2
C AFU12 AFU22
c------------------------------------------~-----------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8(A-H,o-Z)
DIMENSION AO(NP),SPD(NP,NP),FPD(NP)
COMMON / BOPT2 / ACC,R,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,HX~IER
DO 90 I=1.,NP
AI=AO(I)
EI=DMAX1(DABS(AI)*.~D-3,.lD-5)
11 AO(I)=AI+El
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU2,w85)
IVAL=IVAL+l
AO(I)=AI-EI
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU1,*85)
IVAL=IVAL+l
13 SPD(I,I)=(AFU2-2.DO*AFUO+AFU1)/(EI*EI)
IF (I.EQ.l) GOTO 90
K~I-l
DO 80 J=l,K
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~----~-~--~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~---~--~~~~-~~~~~-~-~-~~-
THREE LEVEL NESTED LOGIT MODEL
70
30
85
80
90
AJ=AO(J)
EJ=DMAX1(DABS(AJ)*.lD-3,.lD-5)
AO(J)=AJ+EJ
AO(I)=AI+EI
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU21,*70)
I VAL=IVAL+!
AO(I)=AI-EI
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU11,*70)
IVAL=IVAL+!
AO(J)=AJ-EJ
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU12,*70)
IVAL=IVAL+l
AO(I)=AI+EI
CALL FUNC(AO,NP,AFU22,*70)
IVAL=IVAL+l
SPD(I,J)=(AFU21-AFU11-AFU22+AFU12)/{4.DO*EI*EJ)
SPD(J,I)=SPD(I,J)
GOTO 80
EJ=EJ/IO.DO
IF (EJ.LE.l.D-10) GOTO 125
GOTO 30
AO(J)=AJ
GOTO 90
EI=EI/10.DO
IF (EI.LE.l.D-10) GOTO 130
GOTO 11
AO(I)=AI
RETURN
1.25 AO(J)=AJ
130 AO(I)=AI
IER=.....2
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE CONT(DATA1,DATA2,ILOOP,PARM,NP,XLFI:WORK,PROBS,NFAIL)
c-------------------------------------~-------------------------------
c
c
c
CONTRIBUTION OF THE N-TH OBSERVATION
- TO THE LIKELIHOOD (XLFI , ILOOP;O,1,2)
- TO ITS DERIVATIVE (WORK i ILOOP=O)
- TO THE HESSIAN (HESS, lLOOP=O AND IDIFF2=4, MNL ONLY)
- PROBABILITY-SHARE (PROBS, ILOOP=2)
EXCEPT ILOOP=O, WORK(l) CARRIES UTILITY-LEVEL INCa
AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN
DISSIMILARITY-PARKS:
23.00
EXP (INCL. VALUE) :PARMS:DATA:
NORMALIZED VERSION OCT 31 , 1983
TREE STRUCTURE :
LEVEL:
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c-----------------------~---------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
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TAU
THETA
EINCO
EINel
EINC2
(ALPHA)
(GAMMA)
BETA
(y)
(Z)
X
o
1
2
3
FOR ARRAY DIMENSIONS, SEE MAIN
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c-------------------~---~------~-------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PARM(NP)
REAL*4 DATA1(*),DATA2(*)
c
PARAMETER
* (MAXNP =50,
* KAXTH =10,
It MAXTAU =5,
1t KAXNX =10,
It MAXNXD =5,
* MA.1tNXM =20,
* HAXLEV =3,
1( HAXLIM =5,
* MAXBRA =5,
1( MAXALT =20,
* MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, MAXNXR=MAXNX+MAXNXD, MAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+l)/2)
c
REAL*8 UPP,LOW,ONE/1.DO/,ZERO/O.DO/
INTEGER IZERO/O/
c
REAL*8 THETA(MAXLIK,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM)IWORK(MAXNP),
* EXB(MAXALT),EZG(MAXALT),EYA{MAXLIM),
* XB(MAXALT),ZG(MAXALT),YA(MAXLIM),
* EINC2(MP~LIM,MAXBRA),EINC1(MAXLIM),EINCO,
* INC2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)6 I NC1(MAXLIM),INCO,INC2C,INC1C,
* DER2B(MAXLIM,MAXBRA,MAXNP).DER1B(MAXLIM,MAXNP),
* DER2T(MAXLIM,MAXBRA t MAXTH),DER1T(MAXLIM,MAXTH),
* DER1U(MAXLIM,MAXTAU),PROBS(MAXALT),
* PDUMMY(HAXALT),NDUMMY(MAXALT),
* PMASKY(MAXNXD,MAXALT),PMASKD(KAXALT),
* ZBAR(MAXNP),ZIZBAR(HAXALTwMAXNP),HESS(MAXNPS)
INTEGER HAP(MAXALT,MAXLEV),HAPLEN(MAXNXM),MAPTR(MAXNXM,MAXALT)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,LKAP(MAXNXM~MAXALT),STDDUM,NOALT,NOAGE,DUMP,
* LDUMMY,STDUKA,STDUMD,NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE,UNCON
C
COMMON / DIMEN / NALT,NALT1, NX, NXD, NXA, NXR,MXA,MTH,MTAU, NOBS
COMMON / DDISS / LOCTAU(MAXTAU)~LOCLIM(MAXTH),LOCBRA(MAXTH),
*
NL1,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
COMMON / DCONT / XB,ZG,YA,INC2,INC1,
*
EXB,EZG,EYA,EINC2,EINC1,
*
DER2B,DERIB,DER2T,DER1T,DER1U,
*
ZBAR,ZIZBAR,UPP,LOW,
*
MS3K(HAXTH),HL3K(MAXTH),HS2K(MAXLIM)
COMMON I DTREE / NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
COMMON / DMAPP / HXK,MAP,IAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PHASKD,LMAP
COMMON / DDUHK / STDDUH,STDUMA,STDUMD,NDUXA,NDUMD,
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* NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(MAXNXD,MAXALT),
* NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
COMMON / DHESS / HESS
COMMON I DIFF2 / IDIFF2
COMMON / DCONST I UNCON,PDUKMYfNDUMMY
COMMON / DWESKL I RELSIZ,WEIGHT(MAXALT)
COMMON / BPRINT I IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
c
DUMP=.FALSE.
c
C INNER PRODUCTS XB(I)
C
IALT=IZERO
XBM=ZERO
DO 9 I=l,NALT
IF (DATA1(I).EQ.l) !ALT=I
XBC = ZERO
NNl = MAXALT
DO 7 K=l,NX
XBC = XBC + DATA1(NN1+I)*PARM(K)
7 NNl = NNI + MAXALT
IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 3
DO 4 K=l,NXD
4 XBC = XBC + DATA2(K)*PMASKY(K,I)
3 IF (NALTRE) GOTO 2
XBC = XBC + PMASKD(I)
2 IF (I.EQ.NALT) GOTO 5
IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 6
DO 1 I<=-1,NXD
1 XBC = XBC + DATA2(K)*PARM(INDAGE(K,I»
6 IF (NALSTD) GOTO 8
XBC = XBC + PARM(MXA+I)
8 IF (UNCON) GOTO 5
XBC = XBC + PDUMMY(I)
5 XB(I)=XBC
XBM=XBM+XBC
9 CONTINUE
C
C CHECK AND MEAN OF XB(I)
C
IF (IALT.EQ.O) GOTO 9005
XBM=XBM/NALT
c
C INCLUSIVE VALUES
C
I=IZERO
IB=!ZERO
EINCO=ZERO
DO 1.0 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
TA =TAU(Il)
DINCl=ZERO
DO 20 I2=1,ML2
1B =IB+1
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c
c
c
ML3=NL3(I1,I2)
TH =THETA(Il,I2)
THT=TH/TA
Dli~C2=ZERO
DO 30 13=1,HL3
1=1+1.
CHOICE
IF (I.NE.IALT) GOTO 40
Ie1=!!
IC2=I2
IBPA=IB
c
C INNER PRODUCT XB/TH
C
C /* NORMALIZE BY SUBTRACTION OF XBM */
40 XBI = (XB(I)-XBM) / TH
IF (XBI.GT.UPP) GOTO 9001
XB(I)=XBI
ZZZ=DEXP(XBI)
EXB(I)=ZZZ
DINC2=DINC2+ZZZ
30 CONTINUE
C
C LOWER LEVEL INCLUSIVE VALUE INC2(Il,I2)
C
IF (LEVELl) GOTO 21
IF (DINC2.LT.LOW) GOTO 9002
EINC2(Il,I2)=DINC2
DINC2=DLOG(DINC2)
INC2(I1,I2)=DINC2
DINC2=THT*DINC2
IF (DINC2~GT.UPP) GOTO 9002
ZG(IB)=DINC2
DINC2=DEXP(DINC2)
EZG(IB)=DINC2
21 DINC1=DINC1+DINC2
20 CONTINUE
C HIGHER L~VEL INCLUSIVE VALUE DLOG(INC1(Il»
c
EINC1(Il)=ONE
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 11
IF (DINC1.LT.LOW) GOTO 9003
EINC1(Il)=DINCl
DINC1=DLOG(DINC1)
INC1(Il)=DINCl
DINC1=TA*DINCl
IF (DINC1.GT.UPP) GOTO 9003
YA(Il)=DINCl
DINC1=DEXP(DINC1)
EYA(Il)=DINCl
11 EINCO=EINCQ+DINCl
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10 CONTINUE
IF (EINCO.LT.LOW) GOTO 9004
INCQ=DLOG(EINCO)
c
c
c
c
c
eg900
C
C9901
C
50
c
c
C
5~
52
61
62
60
69
c
c
XBC =XB(IALT)
INC2C=INC2(IC1,IC2)
IHCIC=INC1(IC1)
LOG LIKELIHOOD
XLFI = XBC - INCa
WORK (1) = INca
WRITE (KANAL6,9900) XLFI
FORMAT(' $X$ MNL-XLFl=',D14.5)
IF (LEVELl) GOTO 51
THe = THETA(IC1,IC2)
TAC = TAU(IC1)
THl = THC/TAC-ONE
XLFI = XLFI + TH1*INC2C
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 50
TAl = TAC-ONE
XLFI = XLFI + TA1*INCIC
WRITE (KANAL6,9901) XLFI
FORMAT(' $X$ NMNL-XLFI=',D14.5)
IF (ILOOP.EQ.l) GOTO 5000
IF (ILOOP.EQ.O) GOTO 70
PROBABILITY-SHARES
DO 52 I=l,NALT
PROBS(I)=EXB(I)/EINCO
CONTINUE
IF (LEVELl) GOTO 69
I=IZERO
DO 60 IJ.=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 61
DINC1=(TAU(Il)-ONE)*INC1(I~)
C011TINUE
DO 60 I2=1,ML2
KL3=NL3(Il,I2)
DINC2=(THETA(Il,I2)!TAU(Il)-ONE)*INC2(Il,I2)
DO 60 I3=1,ML3
I?=I+l
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 62
PROBS (I)=PROBS (I) *DEXP(DINC1+DINC2)
GOTO 60
PROBS (I)=PROBS (I) *DEXP(DINC2)
CONTINUE
IF (ILOOP.EQ.O) GOTO 4000
GaTO 5000
SWITCHES FOR DUMMY
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C
70 IF (IALT.EQ.NALT) THEN
LDUMMY=.FALSE.
ELSE
LDUMMY=.TRUE.
END IF
c
C DERIVATIVES OF INCLUSIVE VALUES LEVEL 2
C
C W.R.T. BETA
C
I=IZERO
DO 80 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 80 12=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
DINC2=EINC2(Il,I2)*THETA(Il,I2)
NN1=MAXALT
DO 82 l<=l,NX
ZZ=ZERO
DO 81 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
ZZ=ZZ + &~B(I) * DATA1(NN1+I)
81 CONTINUE
I=I-ML3
DER2B(Il,I2,K) = zz / DINC2
C WRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il,I2,K,DER2B(Il,I2,K)
C9907 FORMAT(' $X$ DER2B(',312,')=',D18.4)
NN1=NN1+MAXALT
82 CONTINUE
C
IF (NALTRE) GOTO 823
DO 821 K=l,NXM
ZZ=ZERO
DO 822 13=1,ML3
I=I+l
IF (LMAP(K,I» ZZ=ZZ + EXB(I)
822 CONTINUE
I=I-HL3
DER2B(Il,I2,K+MXA) = zz / DINC2
C WRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il,I2,K+MXA,DER2B(Il,I2,K+MXA)
821 CONTINUE
C
823 IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 826
DO 824 K=l,NXM
DO 824 Kl=.l,NXD
ZZ=ZERO
KK=INDAGE(Kl,K)
DO 825 I3=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (LHAP(K,I» ZZ=ZZ + EXB(I)*DATA2(K1)
825 CONTINUE
I=I-ML3
DER2B(Il,I2,KK) = zz / DINC2
C
824
C
826
C
827
828
C
829
C
830
831
c
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WRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il,I2,KK,DER2B(Il,I2,KK)
CONTINUE
IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 829
DO 827 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (I.EQ.NALT) GaTO 828
DO 827 Kl=l,NXD
ZZ=EXB(I) * DATA2(Kl)
KK=INDAGE(Kl,I)
DER2B(Il,I2,KK) = zz / DINC2
tiRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il,I2,KK,DER2B(Il,I2,KK)
CONTINUE
I=I--ML3
IF (NALSTD) GOTO 83
DO 830 I3=1,ML3
I~I+l
IF (I.EQ.NALT) GOTO 831
DER2B(Il,I2,MXA+I) = EXB(I) / DINC2
WRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il,I2,MXA+I,DER2B(Il,I2,MXA+I)
CONTINUE
I=I-ML3
83 I=I+HL3
80 CONTINUE
C
C W.R.T. THETA
C
IF (NTH~EQ.O) GOTO 89
c
86
C
C9921
85
C
89
C
C
C
C
C
C
DO 85 K =l,NTH
NT11=LOCLIM(K)
NT12=LOCBRA(I<)
I =MS3K(K)
ML3 =HL3K(K)
ZZ=ZERO
DO 8S 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
ZZ=ZZ + EXB(I) * XB(I)
DER2T(NT11,NT12,K) = -ZZ / EINC2(NT11,NT12) / THETA(NTll i NT12)
WRITE (KANAL6,9921) NT11,NT22,K,DER2T(NTll,NT12,K)
FORMAT(' $X$ DER2T(',312,')=',D18.6)
CONTINUE
CONTINUE
DERIVATIVES OF INCLUSIVE VALUES LEVEL 1
W.R.T. BETA
DO 93 l<=l,KTH
I=IZERO
94
C
C9908
93
C
C
C
c
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DO 93 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
ZZ=ZERO
DO 94 I2=1,ML2
1=1+1
ZZ = ZZ + EZG(I) * DER2B(Il,I2,K) *
DER1B(Il,K) = zz / EINC1(Il) / TAU(Il)
WRITE (KANAL6,990B) Il,K,DERlB(Il,K)
FORKAT(' $X$ DER1B(',212,')=',D18.4)
CONTINUE
W.R.T. THETA
IF (NTH.EQ.O) GOTO 99
THETA (11,12)
C
C9922
95
C
C
C
99
C
DO 95 K=1,NTH
NT11=LOCLIM(l<)
NT12=LOCBRA(K)
ZZZ = EINC2(NT11,NT12) ** ( THETA(NT11,NT12)/TAU(NTll) )
zz = ZZZ * ( INC2(NTl1,NT12)
* + THETA(NTll,NT12) * DER2T(NT11,NT12,K)
DERIT(NT11,K) = ZZ I EINC1(NT11) / TAll(NT11)
WRITE (KANAL6,9922) NT11,K,DER1T(NT11,K)
FORMAT(' $X$ DER1T(',2I2,o)=',D18.6)
CONTINUE
W.R.To TAU
IF (NTAU.EQ.O) GOTO 920
DO 921 K=l,NTAU
NT1=LOCTAU(K)
I =MS2K(NT1)
ML2=NL2(NT1)
ZZZ=ZERO
DO 922 12=1,ML2
1=1+1
922 ZZZ=ZZZ + EZG(I) * ZG(I)
DER1U(NT1,K) =- zzz / EINC1(NT~) / TAU(NT1)
C WRITE (KANAL6,9211) NT1,K,DER1U(NT1,K)
9211 FORMAT(' DERIU(',2I2,')=',D14e5)
921 CONTINUE
C
920 CONTINUE
C
C DERIVATIVES OF THE LOG LIKELIHOOD (THREE LEVEL T~EE)
C
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 200
c
C W.R.T. BETA
C
NNl = MAXALT
DO 120 K=l,NX
ZZ=ZERO
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DO 121 Il=l,NLl
121 ZZ = ZZ + EYA(Il) * DER1B(Il,K) • TAU(Il)
ZZZ = DATA1(NN1+IALT)/THC - ZZ/EINCO
* + THl * DER2B(IC1,IC2,K) + TAl * DERIB(IC1,K)
NNl = NNl + MAXALT
120 WORK(K) = ZZZ
C
IF (NALTRE) GOTO 1223
DO 1221 K=l,NXH
Kl=K+HXA
ZZ=ZERO
DO 1222 11=1,NLl
1222 ZZ=ZZ + EYA(Il)*DERlB(Il,Kl)*TAU(Il)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl * DER2B(ICl,IC2,Kl) + TAl * DERIB(IC1,Kl)
IF (LMAP(K,IALT» ZZ = ZZ + ONE/THe
WORK (Kl)=ZZ
1221 CONTINUE
C
1223 IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 122
DO 1.224 K=l,NXM
DO 1224 K2~1,NXD
Kl=INDAGE(K2,K)
ZZ=ZERO
DO 1225 Il=l,NLl
1225 ZZ=ZZ + EYA(Il)*DER1B(Il,Kl)*TAU(Il)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl *DER2B(IC1,IC2,Kl) + TAl *DERIB(IC1,Kl)
IF (LMAP(K,IALT» ZZ = ZZ + DATA2(K2)/THC
WORK (Kl)=ZZ
1224 CONTINUE
C
122 IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 123
K=NX
DO 125 Kl=l,NXD
DO 125 K2=l,NALT1
K=K+l
ZZ=ZERO
DO ~26 I1=1,NLl
~26 ZZ = ZZ + EYA{Il) * DER1B(I1.K) * TAU(Il)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl w DER2B(IC1,IC2,K) + TAl * DERIB(IC1,K)
125 WORK(K) = ZZ
IF (.NOT.LDUMHY) GOTO ~23
DO 124 K=l,NXD
124 WORK(INDAGE(K,IALT» = WORK{INDAGE(K,IALT» + DATA2(K)/THC
C
~23 IF (NALSTD) GOTO 129
NX1=MXA+l
DO 127 K=NX1,MTH
ZZ=ZERO
DO 128 I.1=l,NLl
128 ZZ = ZZ + EYA(Il) * DER1B(Il,K) * TAU(Il)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl * DER2B(IC1,IC2,K) + TAl * DER1B(ICl,K)
127 WORK(K) = ZZ
IF (LDUHKY) WORK(MXA+IALT) = WORK(MXA+IALT) + ONE/THe
.129 CONTINUE
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c
C W.R.T. THETA
C
IF (NTH.EQ.O) GOTO 139
c
DO 130 K=l,NTH
NTll=LOCLIM(K)
NT12=LOCBRA(K)
ZZZ = -EYA(NTl1) * DER1T(NTll,K) * TAU(NTll)/ EINCO
IF (lel.HE.NTl1) GOTO 131
ZZZ = ZZZ + TAl * DERIT(IC1,K)
IF (IC2.NE_NT12) GOTO 131
ZZZ = ZZZ + INC2C/TAC + TH1*DER2T(IC1,IC2,K) - XBC/THC
131 WORK (MTH+K) = ZZZ
130 CONTINUE
C
139 CONTINUE
C
C WoR.T. TAU
C
IF (NTAU.EQ.O) GOTO 149
c
DERIVATIVES OF THE LOG LIKELIHOOD (TWO LEVEL TREE)
- ZZ/EINCO + TH1*DER2B(IC1,IC2,K)
GOTO 5000
W.R.T. BETA
DO 140 K=l,NTAU
NT1=LOCTAU(K)
ZZZ= -EYA(NT1) * ( INC1(NT1)+TAU(NT1)*DERIU(NT1,K) ) / EINCO
IF (IC1~NE.NT1) GOTO 140
ZZZ = ZZZ + INC1C + TA1*DER1U(IC1,K) - INC2C*THC/TAC/TAC
WRITE (KANAL6,9914) K,ZZZ
FORMAT(V $X$ WORK(MTAU+',I2,')=',D14.5)
WORK (MTAU+K) = ZZZ
NNI = HAXALT
. DO 220 K=l,NX
ZZ=ZERO
DO 221 Il=l,NLl
ZZ = ZZ + DER1B(Il,K)
ZZZ = DATA1(NN1+IALT)!THC
NNl = NNl + MAXALT
WORK(K) = ZZZ220
C
C
C9914
140
C
149
C
C
C
C
C
200
221
IF (NALTRE) GOTO 2223
DO 2221 K=l,NXM
Kl=K+MXA
ZZ=ZERO
DO 2222 I.1~l,NLl
2222 ZZ=ZZ + DERIB(Il,Kl)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + TH1 * DER2B(IC1,IC2,Kl)
IF (LMAP(K,IALT» ZZ = ZZ + ONE/THe
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WORI«Kl)=ZZ
2221 CONTINUE
C
2223 IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 222
DO 2224 K=l,HXM
DO 2224 K2=1,NXD
Kl=INDAGE(K2,K)
ZZ=ZERO
DO 2225 Il=1,NLl
2225 ZZ=ZZ + DERID(Il,Kl)
ZZ = -ZZ!EINCO + THl * DER2B(IC1,IC2,Kl)
IF (LKAP(K, IALT» ZZ = ZZ + DATA2(K2)!THC
WOIR!< (Kl ) =ZZ
2224 CONTINUE
C
222 IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 2~3
K=NX
DO 225 Kl=l,NXD
DO 225 K2=1,NALTl
K=K-"l
ZZ=ZERO
DO 226 Il=l,NLl
226 ZZ = ZZ + DERIB(Il,K)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl * DER2B(IC1,IC2,K)
225 WORK(K) = ZZ
IF (.NOT.LDUMMY) GOTO 223
DO 224 K=l,NXD
224 WORK(INDAGE(K,IALT» = WORK(INDAGE(K,IALT» + DATA2(K)!THC
C
223 IF (NALSTD) GOTO 229
NX1=MXA+l
DO 227 K=NX1,MTH
ZZ=ZERO
DO 228 Il=l,NLl
228 ZZ = ZZ + DERIB(Il,K)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO + THl * DER2B(IC1,IC2,K)
227 WORK(K) = ZZ
IF (LDUMMY) WORK (HXA+IALT) = WORK(MXA+IALT) + ONE/THe
229 CONTINUE
C
C W.R,T. THETA
C
IF (NTH.EQ.O) GOTO 239
c
C
C9923
231
230
DO 230 K=l,NTH
NTll=LOCLIM(I<)
NT12=LOCBRA(K)
zzz = ~DERIT(NTll,K) / EINCO
IF (IC2.NE.NT12) GOTO 231
ZZZ = ZZZ + INC2C + THl * DER2T(IC1,IC2,K) - XBC/THC
WRITE (KANAL6,9923) K,ZZZ
FORHAT(' $X$ WORK(MTH+',I2,')=',D14.5)
WORK (HTH+K) = ZZZ
CONTINUE
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C
239 GaTO 5000
C
C DERIVATIVES OF THE LOG LIKELIHOOD (SIMPLE MNL-VERSION)
C
4000 NNl = MAXALT
DO 4020 K=l,NX
ZZ = ZERO
ZB = ZERO
DO 4021 I=l,NALT
DA = DATA1(NN1+I)
ZP = PROBS(I) * DA
ZZ = ZZ + DATA1(I) * DA - ZP
ZB = ZB + ZP
4021 CONTINUE
NNl = NNl + MAXALT
ZBAR(K) = ZB
4020 WORK(K) = ZZ
C
IF (NALTRE.AND.NAGTRE) GOTO 4039
DO 4036 K=NX+1,MTH
ZBAR(K) = ZERO
4036 WORK(K) = ZERO
DO 4031 l<=l,NXM
K1 = I< + MXA
DO 4032 M=l,MAPLEN(K)
I = MAPTR(K,M)
ZZZ = DATA1(I) - PROBS(I)
IF (NALTRE) GOTO 4033
WORK (Kl) = WORK(Kl) + ZZZ
ZBAR(Kl) = ZBAR(Kl) + PROBS(I)
4033 IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 4032
DO 4034 K2=1,NXD
INDEX = INDAGE(K2,K)
ZBAR(INDEX) = ZBAR(INDEX) + PROBS(I) * DATA2(K2)
4034 WORX(INDEX) = WORK(INDEX) + ZZZ * DATA2(K2)
4032 CONTINUE
4031 CONTINUE
C
4039 IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 4040
K=NX
DO 4030 K1=1,NXD
DO 4030 K2=1,NALT1
K=I<+l
WORK(K) = ( DATA1(K2) - PROBS(K2) ) * DATA2(Kl)
ZBAR(K) = PROBS(K2) * DATA2(Kl)
4030 CONTINUE
C
4040 IF (NALSTD) GOTO 4100
DO 4041 K=1,NALTl
WORK(K+MXA) = DATA1(K) - PROBS(K)
ZBAR(K+KXA) = PROBS(K)
4041 CONTINUE
C
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C EXACT SECOND DERIVATIVES (SIMPLE MNL-VERSION)
C
4100 IF (IDIFF2.NE.4) GOTO 5000
NN1=IZERO
DO 4105 K=l,NX
NN1=NN1+MAXALT
DO 4105 !=l,NALT
ZIZBAR(I,K)=DATA1(NN1+I)-ZBAR(K)
4105 CONTINUE
C
4110 IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 4120
K=NX
DO 4115 Kl=l,NXD
DO 4115 K2=1,NXM
K=K+l
DO 4115 I=l,NALT
DA=ZERO
IF (LMAP(K2,I» DA=DATA2(Kl)
ZIZBAR(I,K)=DA-ZBAR(K)
4115 CONTINUE
C
4120 IF (NALTRE) GOTO 4130
I<=MXA
DO 4125 K2=1,NXM
K=K+l
DO 4125 I=l,.NALT
DA=ZERO
IF (LMAP(K2,I» DA=ONE
ZIZBAR(I,K)=DA-ZBAR(K)
4125 CONTINUE
C
4130 IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 4140
K=NX
DO 4135 Kl=l,NXD
DO 4135 K2=1,NALTl
K=K+l
DO 4135 I=l,NALT
DA=ZERO
IF (K2.EQ.I) DA=DATA2(K1)
ZIZBAR(I,K)=DA-ZBAR(K)
4135 CONTINUE
C
4140 IF (NALSTD) GaTO 4200
K=MXA
DO 4145 K2=1,NALTl
K=K+1
DO 4145 I=l,NALT
DA=ZERO
IF (K2.EQ.I) DA=ONE
ZIZBAR(I,K)=DA-ZBAR(K)
4145 CONTINUE
C
C HESSIAN
C
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4200 KK= I ZERO
DO 4205 J=l,NP
DO 4205 K=l,J
KK=KK+l
ZZ=ZERO
DO 4210 I=l,NALT
ZZ = ZZ + ZIZBAR(I,J)*PROBS(I)*ZIZBAR(I,K)
4210 CONTINUE
HESS (KK)=-ZZ
4205 CONTINUE
C
C APPLY WESML WEIGHTS TO LIKELIHOOD, GRADIENT, AND HESSIAN
C
5000 IF (RELSIZ.EQ.O.O) GOTO 9999
C
WT=WEIGHT(IALT)
XLFI=XLFI*WT
IF (ILOOP.EQ.l) GOTO 9999
c
DO 5001 I=l,NP
5001 WORK(I)=WORK(I)*WT
IF (IDIFF2.NE.4) GOTO 9999
c
5004
c
c
C
9001
9002
9003
9004
9005
C
9000
C9000
KK=l
DO 5004 J=l,NP
DO 5004 K=l,J
KK=KK+l
HESS(KK)=HESS(KK)*WT
GOTO 9999
FAILURE DUE TO UNDER- OR OVERFLOW
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'XBI',XBI,' IALT',IALT
GOTO 9000
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DINC2',DINC2,' IALT',IALT
GOTO 9000
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DINC1',DINC1,' IALT',IALT
GOTO 9000
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'EINCO',EINCO,' IALT',IALT
GOTO 9000
CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'CH=O,IALT',IALT
IF (.NOT.DUMP) GOTO 9998
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DUMP OF LAST RECORD:'
DO 9091 I=l,NALT
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'CH',I,DATA1(I)
NN1=MAXALT
DO 9092 I<=l,NX
WRITE (KANAL6,*) IX 'iDATA1(NN1+I),PARM(I<)
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9092 NN1=NN1+MAXALT
DO 9093 K=l,NXD
9093 WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'XD',DATA2(K),PMASKY{K,I)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DU',PARM(MXA+I)
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'XBI',XB(I)
9091 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'TH i ,(THETA(LOCLIM(I),LOCBRA(I»,I=l,NTH)
WRITE (KANAL6,~) 'TAU', (TAU(LOCTAU(I»,I=l,NTAU)
C
9998 XLFI=-1.D10
NFAIL=NFAIL+1
THE INVERSE HESSIAN HAS TO BE SUPPLIED IN HESS
CALCULATES CORRECT COVARIANCE FOR WESML ESTIMATOR
RELSIZ = 0.0: EXOGENOUS SAMPLING - NO CORRECTION NECESSARY
RELSIZ < 1.0: CHOICE BASED SAMPLING WITH ESTIMATED SHARES
(RELSIZ=MAIN SAMPLE SIZE/AUXILIARY SAMPLE SIZE)
RELSIZ = 1.0: CHOICE BASED SAMPLING WITH KNOWN SHARES
WEIGHT = VECTOR OF AUX. SAMPLE SHARES/MAIN SAMPLE SHARES
* INV(HESS)
MARCH 21, 1984AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN
COVM = INV(HESS) * ( BHHH + ABA'
C
9999 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE WESML(PARM,GRAD,HESS,NP,SCRA,FUNC)
c-------------------------------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c-~-----------------~----------------------------------------~------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PARM(NP),GRAD(NP),HESS(NP,NP)
C
PARAMETER
*
(MAXOBS=2001,
*
MAXNP =50,
*
MAXNX =10,
*
HAXALT=20,
*
MAXNXY=MAXNX+l)
c
REAL*8 SCRA{MAXNP,MAXNP),HINV(MAXNP,MAXNP),AAUX(MAXNP,MAXALT),
* BAUX(MAXALT,MAXALT),QAUX{MAXALT),SCRAUX(MAXNP,MAXALT)
REAL*4 DATA1(MAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS)
EXTERNAL FUNC
c
COMMON / DIMEN / NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,MXA,MTH,MTAU,NOBS
COMMON I DIFF2 I IDIFF2
COMMON / DATAX / DATAl
COMMON / DWESKL I RELSIZ,WEIGHT(MAXALT)
COMMON / DWESTK / HINV,AAUX,BAUX,QAUX,SCRAUX
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c
IF (RELSIZ.EQ.O) RETURN
c
C SAVE INVERSE HESSIAN IN "HINV"
C
DO 10 I=l,NP
DO 10 J=l,NP
10 HINV(I,J)=HESS(I,J)
c
C CALCULATE BHHH MATRIX IN "HESS"
C
ISAVE=IDIFF2
IDIFF2=1
CALL FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
CALL SP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,HESS,FUNC)
IDIFF2=ISAVE
c
C ADD CONTRIBUTION OF AUXILIARY SAMPLE SHARE ABA TO BHHH MATRIX
C
IF (RELSIZ.EQ.l.0) GOTO 200
c
C - GET AUX. SAMPLE SHARE AND FOOL FP WITH DIFFERENT WEIGHTS
C
DO 100 I=1,NALT
QAUX(I) =WEIGHT(I)*DATA1(I,1,NOBS+l)
100 WEIGHT(I)=WEIGHT(I)/(QAUX(I)*NOBS)
c
C - ASSEMBLE A AND B
C
DO 110 I=l,NALT
CALL FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
DO 112 K=l,NP
112 AAUX(K,I)=GRAD(K)
DO 113 J=.1,NALT
BAUX(I,J)=-RELSIZ*QAUX(I)*QAUX(J)
IF (I.EQ.J) BAUX(I,I)=BAUX(I,I)+RELSIZ*QAUX(I)
113 CONTINUE
110 CONTINUE
C
C - RESET WEIGHTS AND GRADIENT
C
DO 120 I=l,NALT
120 WEIGHT(I)=WEIGHT(I)*QAUX(I)*NOBS
CALL FP(PARM,NP,XLF,GRAD,FUNC)
c
C - MATRIX PRODUCT ABA'
C
CALL MATP (AAUX,NP,MAXNP,NALT,BAUX,MAXALT,NALT,SCRAUX,MAXNP)
CALL MATPT(SCRAUX,NP,MAXNP,NALT,AAUX,MAXNP,NALT,SCRA,MAXNP)
c
C - MATRIX ADDITION BHHH + ABA'
C
DO 130 I=.1,NP
DO 130 J=l,NP
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130 HESS(I,J)=HESS(I,J)+SCRA(I,J)
C
C PRE- AND POST-MULTIPLY INV. HESSIAN TO BHHH+ABA', STORE IN HESS
C
200 CALL MATP(HINV,NP,MAXNP,NP,HESS,NP~NP,SCRA,MAXNP)
CALL MATP(SCRA,NP,MAXNP,NP,HINV,MAXNP,NP,HESS,NP)
c
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE ELAST(PARM,NP,PROB,ELAS,IOBS)
C----------------------------------------- n-------------~------
C
C CALCULATES ARRAY OF ELASTICITIES IN THE THREE-LEVEL-TREE
C FOR EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
C
C AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN MARCH 29, 1984
C
c--------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PARM(NP)
C
PARAMETER
*
(MAXOBS =2001,
*
MAXNP =50,
*
MAXNX =10,
*
MAXNXD =5,
*
MAXNXM =20,
*
MAXTAU =5,
*
MAXTH =10,
*
MAXLEV =3,
*
MAXLIM =5,
*
MAXBRA =5,
*
MAXALT =20,
*
MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, MAXNXR=MAXNX+MAXNXD)
C
REAL*8 THETA(MAXLIM;MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
* PSUM1(MAXALT),Q3(MAXALT),
* PSUM2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),Q2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),
* PMASKY(MAXNXD,MAXALT),PMASKD(MAXALT)
REAL*4 DATAl(MAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS),DATA2(KAXNXD,MAXOBS),
* ELAS(MAXALT,MAXALT,MAXNXR),PROB(MAXALT)
INTEGER HAP(MAXALT,MAXLEV),MAPLEN(MAXNXM),HAPTR(MAXNXM,KAXALT)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,NOALT,NOAGE,NALTRE,NAGTRE,NALSTD,NAGSTD,
* STDUMA,STDUMD,STDDUM,LMAP(MAXNXM,MAXALT)
COMMON / DIMEN / NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,KXA,HTH,MTAU,NOBS
COMMON / DATAX I DATAl
COMMON / DATAY / DATA2
COMMON / DTREE / NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
COMMON / DMAPP / NXM,MAP,MAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PMASKDfLMAP
COMMON / DDISS / LOCTAU(MAXTAU),LOCLIM(MAXTH),LOCBRA(MAXTH),
* NLl,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
COMMON / DDUMM / STDDUM,STDUMA,STDUMD,NDUMA,NDUKD,
* NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(HAXNXD,MAXALT),
* NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
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COMMON / DELAS / PSUM1,PSUM2,Q2,Q3
COMMON / BPRINT I IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
c
C SUMMATION OF ELEMENTAL PROBABILITIES TO SECOND LEVEL
C
1=0
DO 10 Il=1,NL1
HL2=NL2(Il)
DO 10 I2=1,ML2
PSUM2(Il,I2)=O.DO
KL3=NL3(Il,I2)
DO 11 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
11 PSUM2(Il,I2)=PSUM2(Il,I2)+PROB(I)
IF (PSUM2(Il,I2)~LE.O.O) GOTO 90
10 CONTINUE
C
C SUMMATION TO FIRST LEVEL
C
DO 20 Il=1,NLl
PSUM1(I1)=O.DO
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 21 12=1,ML2
21 PSUM1(Il)=PSUM1(Il)+PSUM2(Il,I2)
20 CONTINUE
C
C NORMALIZE TO GET TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
C
1=0
DO 30 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 30 12=1,ML2
Q2(Il,I2)=PSUM2(Il,I2)/PSUM1(Il)
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
DO 30 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
Q3(I)=PROB(I)/PSUM2(Il,I2)
30 CONTINUE
C
C ARRAY OF ELASTICITIES
C
DO 40 JM=l,NXM
DO 40 Kl=l,NXD
DO 40 I=l,NALT
40 ELAS (I ,JM,NX+Kl) =0.• 0
C
1=0
J=O
DO 50 Jl=l,NLl
TA=TAU(Jl)
XLI=(TA-l.DO)/TA
ML2=NL2(Jl)
DO 50 J2=1,HL2
ATW=1.DO/THETA(Jl,J2)
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XBR=l.DO/TA-ATW
ML3~NL3(Jl,J2)
DO 50 J3=1,ML3
J=J+l
ABR=XBR*Q3(J)
ALI=XLI*Q3(J)*Q2(Jl,J2)
1=0
DO 60 Il=l,NLl
LL2=NL2(Il.)
DO 60 12=J.,LL2
LL3=NL3(Il,I2)
DO 60 I3=1,LL3
1=1+1
EL=-PROB(J)
IF (Il.NE.Jl) GOTO 70
EL=EL+ALI
IF (I2.NE.J2) GOTO 70
EL=EL+ABR
IF (I.EQ.J) EL=EL+ATW
C
70
72
C
74
C
75
76
C
60
50
C
DO 72 K=l,NX
ELAS(I,J,K)=PARM(K)*DATA1(J,K+l,IOBS)*EL
IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 75
DO 74 K=l,NXD
DO 74 JM=l,NXM
IF (.NOTrLMAP(JM,J» GOTO 74
Kl=INDAGE(K,JM)
ADD=PARM(Kl)*DATA2{K,IOBS)*EL
ELAS(I,JM,NX+K)=ELAS(I,JM,NX+K)+ADD
CONTINUE
IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 60
IF (J.EQ.NALT) GOTO 60
DO 76 K=l,NXD
Kl=INDAGE(I<,J)
ELAS(I,J,NX+K)=PARM(Kl) *DATA2 (K, IOBS)-EL
CONTINUE
CONTINUE
RETURN
C
90 WRITE (KANAL6,91) Il,I2,PSUM2(Il,I2)
91 FORMAT(' PSUM2(',213,')=',D15.5)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE LSFIT(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,IERLS,SSQDEV,ITERLS)
c--------------------------------------~----------------------------
c
C FIT AGGREGATE SAMPLE SHARES BY LEAST SQUARES
C
C CAN BE CALLED AS INNER MINIMIZATION LOOP WITHIN AN
C OUTER MAXIMIZATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD.
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c
MARCH 28, 1984
INITIAL ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
ADJUSTED ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS USED
RETURN CODE FROM DFP-ALGORITHM
SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS OF SHARES
PDUMMY(NALT1)
ITERLS
AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN
OUTPUT: PDUMMY(NALT1)
ITERLS
IERLS
SSD
INPUT:c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
C-------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL~8 (A-H,O-Z)
DIMENSION PDUHMY(NALT1)
EXTERNAL FUNC,OFP,SSQDEV
c
COMMON / BSTACK I A(l)
CO~MON / BOPT / IVER,LT,IFP,ISP,NLOOP1,IST,ILOOPl
COMMON / BOPTl / NPARS,JH,JFP,JFP1,JSP,JSP1,JA1,JS
COMMON I BOPT2 / ACC,R ,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,MX,IER
COMMON / BOPT3 / JSMP,JF,JSPD
COMMON / BSTAK / NQ,NTOP
COMMON / BPRINT / IPT,NFILE,NDIG,NPUNCH
COMMON / BLNSR / STEP1,STPACC,NLNSR
COMMON / BSTOP / NVAR1,ISTOP(3)
COMMON / BSTR I ST2,Fl,ST3,F3,IEDGE
COMMON I BPREC / RSMALL,ABSMAL
COMMON / BINPUT / INFLG
COMMON / BDFP / STPMIN,FMIN
c
C STORE PARAMETERS OF LIKELIHOOD MAXIMIZATION
C
IVER7=IVER
IFP7=IFP
ILOOP7=ILOOP1
NPARS7=NPARS
JH7=JH
JFP7=JFP
JFP17=JFPl
JSP7=JSP
JSP17=JSPl
JA17=JAl
JS7=JS
ACC7=ACC
R7=R
PM17=PMl
ITERL7=ITERL
ITERC7=ITERC
MX7=MX
IER7=IER
JSHP7=JSMP
JF7=JF
JSPD7=JSPD
IPT7=IPT
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STEP17=STEPl
STPAC7=STPACC
NLNSR7=NLNSR
NVAR17=NVARl
ST27=ST2
F17=Fl
ST37=ST3
F37=F3
IEDGE7=IEDGE
RSMAL7=RSMALL
ABSMA7=ABSMAL
INFLG7=INFLG
STPKI7=STPMIN
FMIN7=FMIN
c
C RESET PARAMETERS WHERE NECESSARY
C
NPARS=NALTl
IER=O
IFP=4
MX=2
STPACC=ACC
NVARl=NALTl
INFLG=O
PM1=FLOAT(3-2*MX)
ITERC=O
LASTOP=NTOP
c
C CALL MINIMIZATION ALGORITHM
C
rVER=l
ACC=O.Ol
ITERL=ITERLS
ITERC=O
IPT=2
CALL DFP(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,SSQDEV)
ITERLS=ITERC
I ERLS=IER
c
C RESTORE PARAMETERS OF LIKELIHOOD MAXIMIZATION
C
NTOP=LASTOP
IVER=IVER7
IFP=IFP7
ILOOP1=ILOOP7
NPARS=NPARS7
JH=JH?
JFP=JFP7
JFP1=JFP17
JSP=JSP7
JSP1=JSP17
JA1=JA17
JS=JS7
ACC=ACC7
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R=R7
PM1=PM17
ITERL=ITERL7
ITERC=ITERC7
MX=MX7
IER=IER7
JSMP=JSMP7
JF=JF7
JSPD=JSPD7
IPT=IPT7
STEP1=STEP17
STPACC=STPAC7
NLNSR=NLNSR7
NVAR1=NV~17
ST2=ST27
Fl=F17
ST3=ST37
F3=F37
IEDGE=IEDGE7
RSMALL=RSMAL7
ABSMAL=ABSMA7
INFLG=INFLG7
STPMIN=STPMI7
FMIN=FMIN7
c
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE SSQDEV(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSDf~)
C------------~------------------------~~-------------------------------
C
C SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS OF AGGREGATE PROBABILITY-SHARES FROM
C OBSERVED SAMPLE-SHARES
C
C AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN MARCH 27, 1984
C
c---------------------------------------------------------~------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PDUMMY(NALT1)
c
PARAMETER
* (KAXOBS =2001,
* HAXNP =50,
* KAXNX =10 6
* MAXNXD =5,
1: MAXALT =20,
* KAXNXY=MAXNX+l,
* MAXDA1=HAXALT*MAXNXY*MAXOBS, MAXDA2=MAXNXD*MAXOBS,
* MAXALS=MAXALT*(MAXALT+l)/2)
c
REAL*8 PROB1(MAXALT),PROB2(MAXALT),
* DERIV1(MAXALT,MAXALT),DERIV2(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* PARM(MAXNP),GRAD(MAXNP),HESS(MAXNP,MAXNP)
REAL*4 FDATA1(MAXDA1),FDATA2(MAXDA2)
c
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COMMON / DIMEN / NALT,NPARM(8),NOBS
COMMON / DATAX / FDATAI
COMMON / DATAY / FDATA2
COMMON / DSSQD I PROB1,PROB2,DERIV1,DERIV2
COMMON I DPARM I NP,PARM,GRAD,HESS
COMMON / DWESML / RELSIZ,WEIGHT(MAXALT)
c
ILOOP=l
NFAIL=O
CALL UPDATE(PARM,NP,*90)
DO 10 I=l,NALT
10 PROB2(I)=O.DO
C
C EVALUATION OF PROBABILITY-SHARES
C
NN1=1
NN2=1
I NC=MAXALT*MAXNXY
DO 100 lOBS = 1,NOBS
CALL CONTPS(FDATA1(NN1),FDATA2(NN2),
* ILOOP,PARM,NP,PDUMMY,NALT1,PROBl,DERIV1,NFAIL)
DO 15 I=l,NALT
IF (FDATA1(NN~+I-l).EQ.l.0)WT=WEIGHT(I)
15 CONTINUE
NN1=NNl+INC
NN2=NN2+MAXNXD
DO 16 I=l,NALT
16 PROB2(I)=PROB2(I)+PROB1(I)*WT
100 CONTINUE
C
IF (NFAIL.GT.O) GOTO 90
c
C SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS IN PERCENTAGES
C
NN=NNl+INC
SSD=O.DO
DO 20 I=1,NALT
ZZZ = (PROB2(I)/NOBS - FDATA1(NN+I-1»*100.0
SSD =~SD + ZZZ*ZZZ
20 CONTINUE
C
RETURN
90 PRINT 91,NFAIL
91 FORMAT(' ERROR IN SSQDEV:',I5,' FAILURES IN EVALUATION')
RETURN 1
END
C---------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBROUTINE FPSSQD(PDUMMY,NALT1,SSD,DERIV,SDERIV,SSQDEV)
c---------------------------------------------------------------------
c
C GRADIENT OF THE SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS
C
c--~-~----------------------------~-----------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
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REAL*8 PDUMMY(NALT1),DERIV(NALT1),SDERIV(NALTl)
c
PARAMETER
• (KAXOBS =2001,
1t MAXNP =50,
It MAXNX =10,
* MAXNXD =5,
* MAXALT =20,
* MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, MAXNPS=MAXNP* (MAXNP+l)/2,
* MAXDA1=MAXALT~MAXNXY*MAXOBS, MAXDA2=MAXNXO-MAXOBS)
c
REAL*8 PROBl(MAXALT),PROB2(MAXALT).
* DERIV1(MAXALT.MAXALT),DERIV2(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* PARM(MAXNP),GRAD(MAXNP),HESS(MAXNP,MAXNP)
REAL*4 FDATA1(MAXDAl),FDATA2(MAXDA2)
c
COMMON I DIMEN / NALT,NPARM(8),NOBS
COMMON / DATAX / FDATAl
COMMON / DATAY / FDATA2
COMMON / DPARM / NP,PARM,GRAD,HESS
COMMON / DSSQD / PROB1,PROB2,DERIV1,DERIV2
COMMON / DWESML / RELSIZ,WEIGHT(M~~LT)
COMMON / BOPT2 / ACC,R,PM1,IVAL,ITERL,ITERC,MX,IER
EXTERNAL SSQDEV
c
ILOOP=O
NFAIL=O
CALL UPDATE(PARM,NP,*90)
DO 10 I=l,NALT
PROB2(I)=O.DO
DO 10 K=l,NALTl
10 DERIV2(I,K)=O.DO
C
C EVALUATION OF PROBABILITY-SHARES AND THEIR DERIVATIVES
C
NN1=1
NN2=1
I NC=MAXALT*MAXNXY
DO 100 lOBS = 1,NOBS
CALL CONTPS(FDATA1(NN1),FDATA2(NN2),
* ILOOP,PARM,NP,PDUKMY,NALT1,PROB1,DERIV1,NFAIL)
DO 15 I=l,NALT
IF (FDATA1(NN1+I-l).EQ.l.0) WT=WEIGHT(I)
15 CONTINUE
NN1=NN1+INC
NN2=NN2+HAXNXD
DO 16 I=1.,NALT
PROB2 (I)=PROB2 (I)+PROB1(I)*WT
DO 16 K=l,NALTl
i6 DERIV2(I,K)=DERIV2(I,K)+DERIV1(I,K)*WT
100 CONTINUE
C
IVAL=IVAL+l
IF (NFAIL.GT.O) GOTO 90
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c
C SUM OF SQUARED DEVIATIONS IN PERCENTAGES
C
NN=NN1+INC
SSD=O.DO
DO 20 I=l,NALT
PROB1(I) = ( PROB2(I)/NOBS - FDATA1(NN+I-l) ) - 100
SSD = SSD + PROB1(I)-PROBl{I)
20 CONTINUE
C
C ITS GRADIENT W.ReTa ALTERNATIVE SPECIFIC DUMMIES
C
DO 30 K=l,NALTl
ZZZ = 0.00
DO 31 I=l,NALT
31 ZZZ = ZZZ + 2.0 * PROB1(I)/NOBS*100.0 * DERIV2(I,K)
30 DERIV(K) = ZZZ
C
TAU
THETA
DISSIMILARITY-PARMS:
AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN
EINCO
EINel
EINC2
EXP(INCL.VALUE):PARKS:
(ALPHA)
(GAMMA)
BETA
DATA:
(y)
(Z)
X
o
1
2
3
VERSION MARCH 27, 1984
LEVEL:
TREE STRUCTURE :
FOR ARRAY DIMENSIONS, SEE MAIN
THREE LEVEL NESTED LOGIT MODEL
CONTRIBUTION OF THE N-TH OBSERVATION
- TO THE PROBABILITY-SHARE (PROBl , ILOOP=O,l)
- AND TO ITS DERIVATIVE (DERIV1, ILOOP=O)
--~--~--~-----~~---~~--~-~-~-~~ -~ - -~ ~~~ ~ --~ - - -~-
90
91
RETURN
PRINT 91,NFAIL
FORMAT(' ERROR IN FPSSQD:',I5,' FAILURES IN EVALUATION')
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE CONTPS(DATA1,DATA2,ILOOP,PARM,NP,
- PDUMMY,NALT1,PROB1,DERIV1,NFAIL)
c---------------------------------------------------------------------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
C---~-----------------------------------------------------------------
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C----------------------------------------------~---------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*8 PARM(NP),PDUMMY(NALT~)
REAL*4 DATA1(*),DATA2(*)
c
C
COMMON / DIMEN
COMMON / DDISS
*'
COMMON I DCONT
*
*
*
*
COMMON ! DTREE
COMMON I DMAPP
COMMON / DDUMM
*
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PARAMETER
* (MAXOBS =2001,
* MAXNP =50,
* MAXTH =10,
* NAXTAU =5,
* MAXNX ==10,
* MAXNXD =5,
-= MAXNXM: =20,
* MAXLEV =3,
* H1\XLIM =5,
* MAXBRA =5,
* MAXALT :20,
* MAXNXY=MAXNX+l, MAXNXR=MAXNX+MAXNXD, MAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+1)!2)
c
REAL*8 UPP,LOW,ONE/l.DO/,ZERO/O.DO/
INTEGER IZERO/O/
c
REAL*8 PROB1(HAXALT),DERIVl(MAXALT,MAXALT),
* THETA(HAXLIM,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
* EXB(MAXALT),EZG(KAXALT),EYA(MAXLIK),
* XB(MAXALT),ZG(MAXALT),YA(MAXLIM),
* EINC2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),EINC1(MAXLIM),EINCO,
* INC2(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),INC1(MAXLIM),INCO,INC2C,INCIC,
* DER2B(MAXLIM,MAXBRA,MAXNP),DERIB(MAXLIM,M~XNP),
* DER2T(MAXLIM,MAXBRA,MAXTH),DERIT(MAXLIM,MAXTH),
* DER1U(MAXLIM,MAXTAU),
* PMASKY(MAXNXD,MAXALT),PMASKD(MAXALT),
* ZBAR(MAXNP),ZIZBAR(MAXALT,MAXNP)
INTEGER MAP(MAXALT,MAXLEV),MAPLEN(MAXNXM),MAPTR(MAXNXM,MAXALT)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2,LMAP(MAXNXM,MAXALT),STDDUM,NOALT,NOAGE,DUMP,
* LDUMMY,STDUMA,STDUMD,NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
/ NALT,NALTDU,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,MXA,MTH,MTAU,NOBS
/ LOCTAU(MAXTAU),LOCLIM(MAXTH),LOCBRA(MAXTH),
NL1,NL2(MAXLIM),NL3(MAXLIM,MAXBRA)
/ XB,ZG,YA,INC2,INC1,
EXB,EZG,EYA,EINC2,EINC1,
DER2B,DER1B,DER2T,DER1T,DER1U,
ZBARrZIZBAR,UPP,LOW,
MS3K(MAXTH),ML3K(MAXTH)iMS2K(MAXLIM)
I NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
I HXM,MAP,HAPLEN,MAPTR,PMASKY,PMASKD,LMAP
/ STDDUM,STDUMA,STDUMD,NDUMA,NDUHD,
NOALT,NOAGE,INDAGE(MAXNXD,MAXALT),
* NALSTD,NALTRE,NAGSTD,NAGTRE
COMMON / BPRINT / IPT,KANAL6,NDIG,NPUNCH
c
C INNER PRODUCT XBETA, INCLUSIVE VALUES
,..
......
c
I=IZERO
IB=IZERO
EINCQ=ZERO
DO 10 Il=1,NLl
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ML2=NL2(Il)
TA =TAU(Il)
DINC1=ZERO
DO 20 12=1,ML2
IB =IB+l
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
TH =THETA(Il,12)
THT=TH/TA
DINC2=ZERO
DO 30 I3=1,ML3
1=1+1
c
C INNER PRODUCT XB/TH
C
31 XBI = ZERO
NNl = MAXALT
DO 40 K=l,NX
XBI = XBI + DATA1(NN1+I)*PARM(K)
40 NNl = NNl + MAXALT
IF (NAGTRE) GOTO 42
DO 41 K=l,NXD
41 XBI = XBI + DATA2(K)*PMASKY(K,I)
42 IF (I.EQ.NALT) GOTO 49
XBI = XBI + PDUMMY(I)
IF (NAGSTD) GOTO 49
DO 43 K=l,NXD
43 XBI = XBI + DATA2(K)*PARM(INDAGE(K,I»
49 CONTINUE
XBI = XBI I TH
IF (XBI.GT.UPP) GOTO 9001
XB(I)::XBI
ZZZ=DEXP(XBI)
EXB(I)=ZZZ
DINC2=DINC2+ZZZ
30 CONTINUE
C
C LOWER LEVEL INCLUSIVE VALUE INC2(Il,I2)
C
IF (LEVELl) GOTO 21
IF (DINC2.LT.LOW) GOTO 9002
EINC2(I~,I2)=DINC2
DINC2=DLOG(DINC2)
INC2(I1,I2)=DINC2
DINC2=THT*DINC2
IF (DINC2~GT.UPP) GOTO 9002
ZG(IB)=DINC2
DINC2=DEXP(DINC2)
EZG(IB)=DINC2
21 DINC1=DINC1+DINC2
20 CONTINUE
C HIGHER LEVEL INCLUSIVE VALUE DLOG(INC1(Il»)
C
EINC1(Il)=ONE
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IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 11
IF (DINC1.LT.LOW) GOTO 9003
EINC1(Il)=DINCl
DINC1=DLOG(DINC1)
INC1(Il)=DINC1
DINC1=TA*DINCl
IF (DINC1.GT.UPP) GOTO 9003
YA(Il)=DINCl
DINC1=DEXP(DINC1)
EYA(Il)=DINCl
11 EINCO=EINCO+DINCl
10 CONTINUE
IF (EINCO.LT.LOW) GOTO 9004
I NCO=DLOG (EINCO)
c
C PROBABILITY-SHARES
C
51 DO 52 I=l,NALT
PROBl(I)=EXB(I)/EINCO
52 CONTINUE
IF (LEVELl) GOTO 69
I=IZERO
DO 60 Il=.1,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 61
DINCl=(TAU(Il)-ONE)*INC1(Il)
61 CONTINUE
DO 60 12=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
DINC2=(THETA(Il,I2)!TAU(Il)-ONE)*INC2(Il,I2)
DO 60 I3=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 62
PROB1(I)=PROB1(I)ftDEXP(DINC1+DINC2)
GOTO 60
62 PROB1(I)=PROB1(I)*DEXP(DINC2)
60 CONTINUE
69 IF (ILOOP.EQ.l) GOTO 9999
IF (LEVELl) GOTe 4000
c
C DERIVATIVES OF INCLUSIVE VALUES LEVEL 2 WoR.T. DUMMIES
C
I=IZERO
DO 80 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 80 12=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
DINC2=EINC2(Il,I2)*THETA(Il,I2)
DO 80 I3=1,ML3
1=1+1
IF (I~EQ.NALT) GOTO 80
DER2B(Il,I2,MXA+I) =EXB(I) / DINC2
c WRITE (KANAL6,9907) Il g I2,MXA+I,DER2B(Il,I2,MXA+I)
c9907 FORMAT(' $X$ DER2B(',312,')=',D18.4)
80
C
C
C
94
c
c9908
93
C
C
C
c
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CONTINUE
DERIVATIVES OF INCLUSIVE VALUES LEVEL 1 W.ReT. DUMMIES
DO 93 K=MXA+l,KXA+NALTl
I=IZERO
DO 93 Il=l,HLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
ZZ=ZERO
DO 94 12=1,HL2
1=1+1
ZZ = ZZ + EZG(I) * DER2B(Il,I2,K) * THETA (Il,I2)
DERIB(Il,K) = ZZ I EINC1(Il) I TAU(Il)
WRITE (KANAL6,9908) Il,K,DER1B(Il,K)
FORKAT(' $X$ DERIB(',212,')=',D18e4)
CONTINUE
DERIVATIVES OF THE PROBABILITIES (THREE LEVEL TREE)
IF (LEVEL2) GOTO 200
DO 127 KK=l,NALTl
K=KK+MXA
ZZ=ZERO
DO 128 Il=l,NLl
128 ZZ = ZZ + EYA(Il) * DERIB(Il,K) * TAU(Il)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO
1=0
DO .127 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
TA1=TAU(Il)-ONE
DC .127 I2=1,ML2
ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
TH1=(THETA(Il,I2)/TAU(Il)-ONE)
DO 127 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
ZZZ = ZZ + THI * DER2B(Il,I2,K) + TAl * DER1B(Il,K)
IF (I.EQ.KK) ZZZ = ZZZ + ONE/THETA(Il,I2)
DERIV1(I,KK) = ZZZ * PROB1(I)
127 CONTINUE
GaTO 9999
c
C DERIVATIVES OF THE PROBABILITIES (TWO LEVEL TREE)
C
200 DO 227 KK=l,NALTl
K=KK+MXA
ZZ=ZERO
DO 228 Il=.l,NLl
228 ZZ = ZZ + DER1B(Il,K)
ZZ = -ZZ/EINCO
1=0
DO 227 Il=l,NLl
ML2=NL2(Il)
DO 227 12=1,ML2
227
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ML3=NL3(Il,I2)
TH1=THETA(Il,I2)-ONE
DO 227 13=1,ML3
1=1+1
ZZZ = ZZ + THl * DER2B(Il,I2,K)
IF (I.EQ.KK) ZZZ = ZZZ + ONE!THETA(Il,I2)
DERIV1(I,KK) = ZZZ * PROBl(I)
CONTINUE
GOTO 9999
c
C DERIVATIVES OF THE PROBABILITIES (SIMPLE MNL-VERSION)
C
4000 DO 4041 K=1,NALT1
DO 4041 I=l,NALT
ZZ = ZERO
IF (I.EQ.K) ZZ = ONE
DERIV1(I,K) = PROBI(I) * ( ZZ - PROB1(K) )
4041 CONTINUE
GOTO 9999
c
C FAILURE DUE TO UNDER- OR OVERFLOW
C
9001 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'XBI',XBI
GOTO 9000
9002 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DINC2',DINC2
GOTO 9000
9003 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'DINC1',DINCl
GOTO 9000
9004 CONTINUE
WRITE (KANAL6,*) 'EINCO',EINCO
C
9000 XLFI=-l.DIO
NFAIL=NFAIL+l
C
9999 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE LMSTAT(NP,NP1,NP2,ND,FPD,SPD,TEST)
C---------------------------------------------------------------C CALCULATES LM STATISTIC
C-------------------------------~-------------------------------
PARAMETER (MAXNP=SO,
* MAXNPS=MAXNP*(MAXNP+l)/2)
REAL*8 FPD(NP),SPD(NP,NP)
REAL*8 DL(S),DLB(S,MAXNP),DLL(5,5),DBB(MAXNPS),TEST
INTEGER ND(5)
C
C FILL FIRST AND SECOND DERIV W.R.T. THETA DL,DLL
C
DO 560 I=l,NPl
DL(I)=FPD(ND(I»
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DO 560 J=l,NPl.
560 DLL(I,J)=SPD(ND(I),ND(J»
C
C FILL MIXED SECOND DERIV : DLB
C
DO 561 I=l,NPl
DO 561 J=1,NP2
561 DLB(I,J)=SPD(ND(I),J)
C
C FILL SECOND DERIV W.R.T. BETA ON TRIANGLE DBB
C
IND=O
DO 562 I=1,NP2
DO 562 J=l,I
IND=INIl+l
562 DBB(IND)=-SPD(I,J)
C (NOTE: NEED POSe DEF. MATRIX)
C
C INVERT DBB
C
LK2=NP2*(NP2+1)/2
CALL INV (DBB, N'P2 , LK2 , IER)
IF (IER.NE.O) PRINT 565
565 FORMAT(' DBB SINGULAR')
C
C REFILL INVERS OF DBB ON ARRAY
C
IND=O
DO 568 I=1,NP2
DO 568 J=l,I
IND=IND+1
SPD(I,J)=-DBB{IND)
568 SPD{J,I)=-DBB{IND)
C
C MATRIX PRODUCT: DLB * DBB(-l) * DLB'
C
DO 570 I=l,NPl
IND =(I-l)*NP2
DO 570 J=1,NP2
TEST=O.DO
DO 571 K=1,NP2
57l TEST=TEST+DLB(I,K)*SPD(K,J)
570 DBB(IND+J)=TEST
DO 575 I=l,NPl
IND =(I-l)*NP2
DO 575 J=l,NPl
TEST=O.DO
DO 576 K=1.,NP2
5i6 TEST=TEST+DBB(IND+K)*DLB(J,K)
575 SPD(I,J)=TEST
C
C FILL DLL - DLB*DBB(-l)*DLB' ON TRIANGLE
C
IND=O
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DO 580 I=l,NPl
DO 580 J=l,I
IND=IND+l
580 DBB(IND)=DLL(I,J)-SPD(I,J)
C
C INVERT THIS MATRIX
C
LK1=NP1*(NP1+l)/2
CALL INV(DBB,NP1,LK1,IER)
IF (IER.NE.O) PRINT 582
582 FORMAT(' DLL-DLB*DBB(-l)*DBL SINGULAR')
C
C REFILL THIS INVERS ON ARRAY
C
IND=O
DO 585 I=l,NPl
DO 585 J=l,I
IND=IND+l
SPD(I,J)=DBB(IND)
585 SPD(J,I)=DBB(IND)
C
C FINAL MATRIX PRODUCT DL * [DLL-DLB*DBB(-l)*DBL] (-1) * DL'
C
DO 590 I=l,NPl
DBB(I)=O.DO
DO 590 J=l,NPl
590 DBB(I)=DBB(I)+SPD(I,J)*DL(J)
TEST=O.DO
DO 595 I=l,NPl
595 TEST=TEST~DBB(I)*DL(I)
C
I
+----+---+
I I
+-+-+ +-+
I I I I I
AXEL BOERSCH-SUPAN23000
?
VERSION HAR 17 , 1983
COMPATIBILITY-CHECK WITH AIRUM
====================~========
- DENSITY NONNEGATIVE ?
- MASS OVER DATA < 1
*
*
*
*
*
"
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE AIRUM(PARM,NP,NFILE)
c---------------------------------------------~-----------~-----------
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
C---------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
PARAMETER
(HAXOBS=2001,
MAXALT=20,
MAXLIM=5,
MAXBRA=5,
HAXNX =.10,
KAXNXD=5,
MAXNXY=MAXNX+l)
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REAL*8 PARM(NP),THETA(MAXLIM,MAXBRA),TAU(MAXLIM),
* VMIN(9),VMAX(9),VMEA(9),V(9)
CHARACTER*3 C(2)!'MAX','MIN'/
REAL*4 DATA1(KAXALT,MAXNXY,MAXOBS),DATA2(MAXNXD,MAXOBS)
LOGICAL LEVEL1,LEVEL2
COMMON / DIMEN I NALT,NALT1,NX,NXD,NXA,NXR,MXA,HTH,MTAU,NOBS
COMMON / DATAX / DATAl
COMMON / DATAY / DATA2
COMKON I DTREE / NTH,NTAU,THETA,TAU,LEVEL1,LEVEL2
c
C INITIALIZATION - NOTE SPECIAL CASE
C
IF (HALT.NE.7) RETURN
NFILE=l
DO 1.0 I=1,NALT
VMEA(I)= O.DO
VKIN(I)= 1.D99
10 VMAX(I)=-1.D99
T3=TAU(1)
T2=THETA(3,1)
WRITE (NFILE,300) T3,T2
300 FORMAT (//' COMPATIBILITY-CHECK'/' =======7==========='
* //' TH_OWNER = ',F~O.4,' , TH RENTER = ',FIOo4)
C
C LOOP ON DATA FOR VMIN VMEA, CHECK AT DATA
C
c
c
c
20
21
24
c
c
C
29
40
41
44
NEG=O
DO 1000 N=l,NOBS
BENCHMARK: ALTERNATIVE 4
XB4=O.DO
DO 20 K=l,NX
XB4 = XB4 + DBLE( DATA1(4,K+l,N) ) * PARM(K)
IF (NXD.EQ.O) GOTO 24
DO 21 Kl=l,NXD
K3 = NX+(Kl-1)*NALT1+4
XB4 = XB4 + DATA2(Kl,N)-PARM(K3)
IF (NXA.EQ.O) GOTO 29
XB4 = XB4 + PARM(KXA+4)
OTHER ALTERNATIVES
DO 30 IT=l,NALT
IF (IT.EQ.4) GOTO 30
XB=O.DO
DO 40 K=l,NX
XB = XB + DBLE( DATA1(IT,K+l,N) ) * PARM(K)
IF (IT.EQ.NALT) GOTO 49
IF (NXD.EQ.O) GOTO 44
DO 41 Kl=l,NXD
K3 = NX+(Kl-l)*NALT1+IT
XB = XB + DATA2(Kl,N)*PARM(K3)
IF (NXA.EQ.O) GOTO 49
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c
c
C
49
30
C
C
C
XB = XB + PARM(MXA+IT)
RELATIVE UTILITY
XB = XB - XB4
V(IT) = XB
VMEA(IT) = VMEA(IT) + XB
IF (XB.GT.VMAX(IT» VMAX(IT)=XB
IF (XB.LT.VMIN(IT» VMIN(IT)=XB
CONTINUE
CHECK AT DATA
CALL GEV(V(1),V(2),V(3),V(S),V(6),T3,T2,G,DENS)
IF (DENScLT.O.DO) NEG=NEG+l
C
1000 CONTINUE
C
C CHECK AT MEAN
C
DO 31 I=l,NALT
31 V(I)=VMEA(I)!NOBS
CALL GEV(V(1),V(2),V(3),V(S),V(6),T3,T2,G,DENS)
WRITE (NFILE,301) NOBS,NEG,DENS
301 FORMAT (//' NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS:'~113
* II WITH NEGATIVE DENSITY :',113
* II DENSITY AT MEAN :',D13.4//)
c
C ESTABLISH INTERVAL
C
DO 35 I=l,NALT
35 WRITE (NFILE,302) I,VMIN(I),VMAX(I)
302 FORMAT(' INTERVAL V(~,Il,I)-V(4) : [',FIO.4,',',FIO.4,']')
WRITE (NFILE,303)
303 FORMAT (/1 , CORNER: SIGN: G-FUNCTION DENSITY'
* II ',55('-'»
c
C CHECK ON ALL CORNERS, ACCUMULATE PARTS OF INTEGRAL
C
AKASS=O.DO
DO 50 16=1,2
IF (I6.EQ.l) THEN
A6=VMAX(6)
ELSE
A6=VHIN(6)
END IF
DO 50 15=1,2
IF (I5.EQ.l) THEN
A5=VMAX(5)
ELSE
A5=VMIN(5)
END IF
DO 50 13=1,2
IF (I3.EQ.l) THEN
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A3=VMAX(3)
ELSE
A3=VMIN(3)
END IF
DO 50 12=1,2
IF (12.EQ.l) THEN
A2=VMAX(2)
ELSE
A2=VMIN(2)
END IF
DO 50 11=1,2
IF (Il.EQ.l) THEN
Al=VMAX(l)
ELSE
Al=VMIN(l)
END IF
C
CALL GEV(Al,A2,A3,A5,A6 1 T3,T2,G,DENS)
SIGN = (-1)**(11+I2+13+I5+16-5)
AMASS= AMASS + SIGN/G
c
WRITE (NFILE,51) C(Il),C(I2),C(I3),C(IS),C(I6),SIGN,G,DENS
51 FORMAT (. ',3 (A3, , , I ) , 10' ,2 ( , , , , A3) , 2X, F4.1, 2X, 2D1.3 ,.4)
50 CONTINUE
C
WRITE (NFILE,52) AMASS
52 FORMAT{' ',55('-')/' MASS OVER THE INTERVAL: ',FI0~4)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE GEV(A1,A2,A3,A5,A6,T3,T2,G,DENS)
c---------------------------------------------------------------~-------
C EVALUATES G=l/(JOINT CDF) AND JOINT DENSITY FOR GEV MODEL
c--------------------------------------------------------------~----~---
IMPLICIT REAL-S (A-H,O-Z)
c
C G-FUNCTION
C
Y1 = DEXP(-Al/T3)
Y2 = DEXP(-A2/T3)
Y3 = DEXP(-A3!T3)
y'- = DEXP(-AS!T2)..')
Y6 = DEXP(-A6!T2)
H3 = Y1 + Y2 + Y3
H2 = Y5 + Y6
G = H3**T3 + 1.DO + H2**T2
c
C DERIVATIVES OF G-FUNCTION
C
H31 = H3**(T3-1.DO)
H21 = H2~*(T2-1.DO)
H32 = H3**(T3-2.DO)
H22 = H2**(T2-2.DO)
H33 =H3**(T3-3.DO)
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T31 = (T3-1.DO)/T3
T21 = (T2--1.DO)/T2
T32 = T31*(T3-2.DO)/T3
Gl = -H31*Yl
G2 = -H31 ft Y2
G3 = -H31*Y3
G5 = -H21*YS
G6 = -H21*Y6
GJL2 = T31*H32*Yl*Y2
G23 = T3J.*H32*Y2*Y3
G13 = T31*H32*Yl*Y3
<:;56 = T21*H22*Y5*Y6
C31i.23 = -T32*H33*Yl*Y2*Y3
IGi5G6 = G5*G6
GG56 = G*G56
GSUM = G12*G3+G23*Gl+G13*G2
GPRO = G.l*G2*G3
POWERS OF THE G-FUNC~'ION
GT04 = G**4
GT05 = GT04*G
GiT06 = GT05*G
DENSITY
c
c
c
c
c
c
S3 = (GG56-3.DO*G5G6)/GT04
84 = (GG56-4.DO*GSG6)/GT05
SS = (GGS6-5.DO*G5G6)/GT06
DENS = 24.DO*GPRO*S5 - 6.DO*GSUM*S4 + 2.DO*G123*S3
c
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE TRAFO(PARM,NP,K,IND,HESS,C,SCrW)
c-------------------------------------------------------
c ~** TRANSFORM PARAMETERS TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH MNL ***
C-------------------------------------------------------
IMPLICIT REAL*8 (A-H,O-Z)
REAL*B PARH(NP),HESS(NP,NP)
C
A = PARM(K)
SA = -HESS (l<,K)
B = PARM(IND)
SAB = -HESS (IND,K)
SB = -HESS(IND,IND)
C = A/B
Be = (SA - 2. *C*SAB + C*C~SB)/B/B
IF (SC.LE. 0.) SC=l.DO
Be = DSQRT( Be )
w =else
c
RETURN
END
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